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1.  One year after the signature of the  Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, taking stock of the 
reconstruction  program  and  its  start-up  is  both  timely  and  appropriate.  There  is  significant 
progress  to  report:  improvements  in  living  conditions  have  been  noticeable  throughout  the 
country.  Roads,  railways  and  airports  have  been  re-opened,  energy supply  has  become  more 
regular,  running  water  has  reappeared  in  many  municipalities,  and  housing  reconstruction 
activities flourish  in  most areas.  Such  results have been made possible by the combination of a 
strong commitment of the  populations to  returning to  normal  life and  of a significant  level  of 
assistance, both advisory and financial, from  the donor community.  Donor support has generally 
met the needs as assessed last year and has made Bosnia and  Herzegovina's recovery program --
by  any  international  standard of comparison -- one of the  more  successful  attempts  in  the  last 
decades to reconstruct a war-torn country. 
The Vision 
2.  Continued effort is  necessary in  1997 and the years beyond to  reconstruct social and 
infrastructure facilities  and to  revitalize  the  economy  in  a country where  unemployment still 
exceeds 50 percent.  Assistance will  also be needed to  progressively rebuild  institutions and to 
provide training to replace skilled personnel who have been killed, or refugees who have left the 
country.  And  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  will  have  to  undertake  market-economy  reforms  to 
fundamentally modify its legal, regulatory, private sector and financial frameworks. 
3.  This must be a multi-year effort for Bosnia and Herzegovina and donors alike, and while 
much  progress  has  been  made,  expecting  quick  results  on  a  large  scale  will  lead  to 
disappointment.  Donors~  Bosnian  authorities,  and  observers  should  be  prepared  for  a 
reconstruction  process  which  will  take  some  years  to  be  completed.  We  are,  to  paraphrase 
Churchill, "not at the end, nor even at the beginning of  the end, but at the end of  the beginning." 
4.  Estimates of war damage range from  US$20 billion to as high  as  US$40  billion. 
1  The 
donor community's US$5. 1 billion three- to four-year recovery program will finance  at most a 
quarter of  these damages and the US$1.8 billion pledged in  1996 (and US$700 million disbursed 
to date) covers only 9 percent (and 3.5 percent respectively) of  the more conservative estimate of 
damages.  Restoring the entire housing stock of Bosnia and Herzegovina to  its prewar level, for 
example,  could  cost US$3  to  4 billion:  yet donors  provided  US$270  million  in  1996  and  are 
likely  to  finance  US$690  million  over the  three- to  four-year  period  -- about  a  fifth  of the 
damaged  stock.  Our accomplishments and  expectations must thus  be  assessed  and  measured 
against this vast scale of damages. 
"Bosnia and Herzegovina: Priorities for Recovery and Growth", World Bank and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, December 8,  1995. ii 
5.  While donor assistance will be required for several more years,  it must progressively be 
complemented  and  eventually  replaced  by  other  resources  -- including  domestic  savings, 
resources of the domestic private sector, budgetary resources from  all  levels of government as 
the economy and  budgets recover,  and,  over the  years,  resources of the  international  private 
sector. 
6.  To  achieve this,  sustainability must become the focus of  the joint efforts of  donors and 
authorities  in  Bosnia  and Herzegovina.  1996  was  a  year  for  implementing  quick  impact 
emergency projects and  for  preparing medium-term  investments.  Urgent repairs  were  mostly 
financed through donations, and little attention was paid to the conditions under which restored 
infrastructure would be operated or to the financing mechanisms that would ensure sustainability 
over the  medium-term.  In  1997,  donors'  assistance  must gradually move toward  supporting 
sustainable  investments:  priorities  should  reflect  medium-term  needs,  operating  conditions 
should be defined in  detail, and cost-recovery mechanisms should be designed prior to making 
investments. 
7.  Sustainability, both an  objective of,  and  a  pre-requisite for,  donor support,  is  a  broad 
theme.  It covers many aspects of government policies:  (i) better maintenance of rehabilitated 
infrastructure  and  cost-recovery  through  user  charges  so  that,  increasingly,  utilities  (or 
authorities) in Bosnia and Herzegovina cover operating costs and contribute to investment costs; 
(ii) sustainable budgets at all levels of governments so that teachers and doctors can be paid; (iii) 
viable and competent public institutions; and (iv) structural reforms in the banking and enterprise 
sectors  to  create  viable  financial  intermediaries  and  unleash  private  initiative.  Sustainable 
policies are critical to achieving high economic growth and, eventually, creditworthiness. 
8.  To promote these reforms, to move toward medium-term sustainability and to ensure that 
resources are  appropriately directed,  sound domestic policies on  the  Bosnian side,  and good 
donor coordination are critical.  Efforts must be made to ensure that donor-funded projects are 
consistent with overall sectoral strategies, and that donors work together to support enhanced 
policy environments across all  sectors.  Such  strategies  have been prepared by the  State and 
Entity Governments, with the support of the Sectoral Task Forces (composed of representatives 
of  the main donors), and are described in the sector reports that follow. 
The Reconstruction Financing Challenge 
9.  The  US$5.1  billion,  three- to  four-year  priority  reconstruction  program,  aimed  at 
restoring normal life and facilitating the repatriation of  refugees,  remains valid as an overall 
framework.  However, better knowledge of the present situation has led to some adjustment in 
strategies and to a revision of the financial estimates in  some sectors.  The total  1997 external 
financing requirement is estimated at US$1.4 billion (table 1). 
10.  External  financing  requirements  for  infrastructure  networks  transport, 
telecommunications,  electric power-- were reduced from an  initial US$1.88 billion (37 percent 
of the  overall  program) over the three- to  four-year  period  to US$1.37  billion  (27  percent). 
Three factors  played a  role here:  (i) a  better assessment of the current situation;  (ii) a  major 
contribution of IFOR activities, mainly in  transport; and (iii) increased expectations for private 
sector involvement in telecommunications.  Reconstruction activities in the network sectors have 
and should continue to focus on three areas: (i) damaged infrastructure should be restored; (ii) 
the  policy  framework  should  be  reformed  to  ensure  cost  recovery;  and  (iii)  appropriately iii 
efficient operating mechanisms should be  set up  for those  networks currently split into  three 
independent sub-systems, to restore efficient communication and interaction between them. 
•  In  1996,  there  were  significant  achievements  within  this  framework,  but  more 
remains to be done.  Transport infrastructure was repaired, and railways lines and 
airports re-opened.  But, much remains to be done to improve cost recovery and to 
reach  agreement  on  inter-Entity  matters.  In  telecommunications,  efforts  were 
impeded  by persistent political  difficulties which  could  not  be  resolved.  Electric 
power  facilities  were  rehabilitated,  restoring  regular  power  supply  to  many 
households,  and  progress was  made toward  cost-recovery.  However, cooperation 
among  the  operating  companies  is  still  insufficient.  In  1997,  significant donor 
assistance is required, particularly for electric power and transport.  Efforts should 
focus  on  rehabilitating damaged  infrastructure and  implementing economic policy 
reform so that rehabilitated facilities function effectively. 
Table 1. External Financing Requirements ofthe Priority Reconstruction Program (US$ million) 
Sector  Revised 3-4 Year  1996 Firm  1997 Requirements I 
Program  Commitments  Sectoral Allocations 
Agriculture  304  63  90 
Education  273  82  70 
Employment Generation  76  42  30 
Energy  87I  268  3IO 
[District Heating and Natural Gas]  [257]  [47]  [II  0] 
[Electric Power and Coal]  [6I4]  [22I]  [200] 
Fiscal and Social Support 
1  514  262  120 
Health  425  83  90 
Housing  693  273  I  50 
Industry and Finance  612  167  I80 
Landmine Clearing  203  43  60 
Telecommunications  I73  27  60 
Transport  583  I63  I75 
Water and Waste Management  363  83  IOO 
Subtotal  I,556 
Support to Peace Implementation  132 
Subtotal  1,688 
I996 Indicative Commitments  I63 
Total  5,090  1,851  1,435 
I.  Includes  support for  government  institutions,  the  social  fund,  other social  rehabilitation  programs,  as  well  as 
balance of payments assistance.  The counterpart funds of balance of  payments support can be used by the government 
to  finance  overall  fiscal  needs,  including  recurrent  costs  in  different  sectors  and  other  reconstruction-related 
expenditures.  The original  1996 program did not include a separate line item  for fiscal/balance of payments support 
but the sectoral requirements did include the corresponding recurrent costs. 
2.  While not specifically earmarked, this total includes provision for the creation of a "Quick Impact Regional Fund" 
to support regional economic cooperation by the-Office of  the High Representative. IV 
11.  The  requirements for activities  directly  supporting community revival  and return  or 
resettlement of  refugees and displaced persons -- housing, district and gas heating, water and 
waste management, and landmine hazard management -- remained at US$1.5 billion (30 percent 
of the overall US$5.1  billion three- to four-year program).  Integrated packages in  these sectors 
are critical for the return of refugees and displaced persons.  Necessary efforts consist of works 
and  physical  repairs,  together  with  critical  reforms  aimed  at  improving  management  of 
municipal companies (water and heating).  Ownership issues must also be addressed before some 
housing reconstruction can proceed. 
•  In  1996, activities were implemented in  a decentralized manner (through NGOs or 
direct contracts with municipalities) and were, in  general, successful -- although the 
landmine  clearing  sector  had  a  slow  start  due  to  political  difficulties  impeding 
donors' efforts.  In  1997, donors should ensure that preliminary steps are taken by 
the  Entity  Governments  to  address  medium-term  issues.  Since  decentralized 
implementation arrangements are likely to remain in  place for the bulk of assistance, 
efforts  should  be  made  to  ensure  coordination  among  donors.  Regional 
rehabilitation  projects  should  be  supported,  but  attention  should  be  paid  to 
distributing the assistance in a balanced fashion throughout the country. 
12.  Financial requirements to re-start economic activities in the private sector and generate 
employment  -- industry,  financial  sector  development,  direct  employment  generation,  and 
agriculture -- increased substantially from US$700 million over three to four years (14 percent 
of  the overall program) to US$1  billion (19 percent).  Addressing employment creation over the 
medium-term is essential for repatriating refugees and reintegrating displaced persons, as well as 
for demobilizing armies.  The program is aimed at supporting the re-start of economically-viable 
activities and at stimulating private sector involvement and reformed banks.  However, since the 
full-scale economic recovery will require a  few years,  it  also  includes "bridging projects" for 
direct employment creation in the near term. 
•  In  1996, activities focused on  emergency measures:  critical  imports in  agriculture, 
quick-start  lines  of  credit  in  industry,  and  especially  designed  employment 
generation  programs  (public  works,  training  and  counseling  and  local  initiative 
micro-credit projects).  Donor effort should increase in  1997 and assistance should 
gradually move toward  supporting measures which  will  enable  successful  private 
sector development,  including encouraging foreign  private  investments  in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and banking reform.  Success in this field, more than in  any other, 
is  directly linked to the commitment of the new State and  Entity Governments to 
reform the legal and regulatory framework, restructure the banking sector, re-orient 
government  activities  and  stimulate  private  initiative.  Donors  should  strongly 
encourage Governments at all levels to proceed in that direction. 
13.  Requirements for  the  social  sectors  -- education  and health  -- were  reduced from 
US$800  million  (16  percent of the overall  amount) to  US$700  million  (14  percent).  Major 
ongoing needs include physical repairs, provision of  consumables (e.g. medicines), critical inputs 
(e.g.  school  materials)  and  technical  assistance  to  reform  the  systems  and  ensure  their 
sustainability.  A  review of the  1996  social  sectors  program  showed that since  salaries were 
generally  paid  in  1996,  albeit  erratically  and  at  reduced  levels,  and  since  donors  could  not 
substitute for the Governments over the medium-term, recurrent cost financing  salary support 
should no longer be included in the social sectors allocation. v 
•  Support in  1996 to the social  sectors was substantial, but often  implemented in  a 
very decentralized manner.  Several donors continued or expanded emergency-type 
activities  started  during  the  war.  Many  channeled  their  funding  through 
international NGOs and implemented projects with direct contracts with beneficiary 
municipalities.  In  1997,  efforts  should  be directed  to  improve  coordination  and 
sustainability, and donors should support the design and implementation of sectoral 
investment  strategies  and  the  resolution  of  policy  issues,  especially 
financial/budgetary sustainability. 
14.  The  reconstruction program includes  increased fiscal support to  the  State  and Entity 
Governments,  both  for  developing  a  smooth  governance  structure  and  contributing  to 
establishing a social safety net for the neediest.  Total requirements increased significantly, from 
US$21 0 million over three to four years (4 percent of  the overall amount) to US$51 0 million (1 0 
percent), to reflect the continued high level of  need for social and budgetary support. 
•  Support to Government in  1996 was extensive -- most of which was received by the 
Federation.  Continued assistance in  1997 is required to support a successful budget 
reform process and the development of an appropriate safety net for the medium-
term. 
Next Steps: Challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
15.  An extraordinary effort will be required of  the people of  Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
their  governments  in  the  postwar  reconstruction  of their  country.  Significant  progress  has 
already been made.  But much remains to be done.  Volunteers have carried out emergency 
repairs of the gas networks, owners have started reconstructing their homes, public institutions 
have  prepared  and  implemented  large  projects,  private companies have  been  created.  Initial 
steps  have  been  taken  in  building  Federation  institutions,  such  as  the  tax  and  customs 
administrations;  privatization teams are  set up  in  both Entities and discussions on  State-level 
institutions  are  underway.  But  these  initiatives  are  still  to  be  transformed  into  activities 
sustainable over the medium-term;  and cost-recovery mechanisms have to  be developed  and 
implemented to that effect. 
16.  Continued donor  support  will be  essential for  the  success  of the  recovery  effort,  to 
ensure a lasting peace and make it possible for refugees to  return.  But the military, political, 
and financial efforts of the international community must be accompanied by strong efforts on 
the Bosnian side, focused on ensuring economically sustainable reconstruction and development. 
Thus, a comprehensive policy framework must be outlined to justify continued donor support 
and  the  allocation  of resources  to  specific  sectors.  Further,  compliance  with  the  Peace 
Agreement by the parties, good progress on the political front and in economic reforms would 
make a significant difference in donors' readiness to come forward.  The success of the peace 
process will depend on the capacity of both donors and Bosnians to unite their efforts toward 
achieving these goals. vii 
FOREWORD 
The  following  sector  reports  present  the  priority  reconstruction  program  in  each  of the 
reconstruction sectors.  Topics covered  include:  (i) a brief description of the background and 
prewar  situation,  consequences  of the  war,  and  regional  differences;  (ii)  the  objectives  and 
financing needs of the three- to four-year priority reconstruction program as modified in  light of 
1996  experiences  and  assessments;  (iii)  an  in-depth  review  of  donor  activities  and 
accomplishments  in  1996;  (iv)  the  external  financing  requirements  under  the  1997  program, 
including  major  objectives  and  recommended  implementation  arrangements;  and  (v)  policy 
issues  to  be  addressed  in  the  next  years  for  the  reconstruction  effort  to  be  successful  and 
sustainable.  These  sector  reports  will  be  updated  for  the  February  1997  Donor  Pledging 
Conference, with a list of  priority investments that the donor community is invited to support. 
The data shown  in  these reports are as  reported by each donor to the European Commission -
World  Bank-managed  data  base,  as  of October  1996.  In  particular,  the  firm  commitments 
reported for  1996 are pledges which have been (i) approved by a national  legislative body or 
multilateral board; and (ii) allocated to a specific sectoral program or project.  Information gaps 
exist, however, and figures should be considered best estimates. 
These  sector  reports  were  prepared  the  European  Commission,  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, with the valuable assistance of experts in 
the Sector Task Forces in  Sarajevo.  The authors would like to thank especially the International 
Management Group (IMG), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the many bilateral donors participating in 
these task forces  for their helpful comments.  Discussions with representatives of the Bosnian 
authorities also yielded many helpful insights.  Nevertheless, the authors are solely responsible 
for any errors in the report. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
An adequate prewar transport system 
1.  Before the hostilities, the transport system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized to meet the 
needs of  the former Yugoslavia.  Management was centralized at the level of  the Republic, and the extent 
and condition of the transport infrastructure were generally adequate -- with 8,600 kilometers (km) of 
main  and  regional  roads;  1,030  km  of railway  lines  (75  percent  electrified);  two  civil  airports  (in 
Sarajevo and Mostar), and public transportation available throughout the country. 
Severe war damage 
2.  The hostilities caused heavy damage (box 1), with transport links leading to or near the lines of 
confrontation suffering the most destruction.  Transport institutions  lost their premises, records,  staff, 
and  funds, and many lost access to those parts of the system that did remain operable.  Moreover, the 
institutions, never large, were forcibly broken up and communication between them was severed. 
3.  Since  the  end  of  hostilities,  the  condition  of the  transport  infrastructure  has  improved 
significantly.  Road and railway links have been gradually restored throughout the country.  Traffic on 
some of  the main road is approaching prewar levels.  The Sarajevo-Ploce railway line has been repaired. 
A  limited number of civilian  scheduled charter flights  are  available  again  at  Sarajevo Airport.  And 
public transportation companies are resuming operations. 
4.  Difficulties remain, however.  In the road sector, more than half of the main network still needs 
rehabilitation,  maintenance  is  urgently  required  to  prevent  collapse  of existing  infrastructure,  and 
maintenance  institutions  need  to  be  organized  and  equipped.  In  the  railway  sector,  repair  of 
infrastructure  -- including  the  restoration  of  the  essential  components  of  the  signaling  and 
telecommunications systems-- is expected to be completed shortly on most of the economically critical 
parts ofthe network.  Cooperative mechanisms still need to be established between the currently existing -2-
railway companies and organizational measures remain to  be  taken before trains can  run  not only on 
small segments but on the entire network.  Sarajevo airport will require extensive work to accommodate 
regular traffic at acceptable levels.  And a considerable level of assistance to public transport systems 
will be needed in the years to come. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
5.  Restoring an effective transport network is a precondition for economic recovery-- for restarting 
industry,  allowing  the  return  of  refugees  and  displaced  persons,  and  reviving  communities. 
Reconstruction efforts aim to: 
•  Remove critical bottlenecks; 
•  Restart the operation of  transport systems; 
•  Ensure the sustainable development of  the transport sector; and 
•  Rebuild the local contracting and consulting industry. 
6.  In  December 1995, a Transport Reconstruction Program was prepared by the Government with 
the support of the World Bank, the European Commission (EC), the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) and various donors. This program has been continually updated and remains 
valid.  It will require US$583 million for the three- to four-year reconstruction period 
1 within the overall 
US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program  (table I): 
2 
•  In 1996,  US$163  million  was  firmly  committed,  leaving  a  significant  gap  of US$154 
million  in  the first-year  program  requirements
2 (originally estimated at US$317  million); 
nevertheless, achievements in  1996 were significant (paragraphs 8 to 16); 
•  In 1997, US$175  million  is  required -- 15  percent of which  would  go  to  the  State,  34 
percent to the Federation, and 51  percent to Republika Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 25).  A list 
of corresponding investments will be prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be held in 
early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$245 million will be needed -- and  policy issues should  be 
addressed to ensure the medium-term sustainability of the program, which will  require the 
continued involvement of  the donor community (paragraphs 26 to 29). 
The  original  total  cost  of US$698  million  for  the  program  has  been  reduced  to  US$552  million:  IFOR 
activities  -- wide-scale  patching  of roads,  installation  of many  "temporary"  bridges,  and  assistance  with 
J:ailway  repairs -- have made it possible to  address some needs;  and the rehabilitation of the secondary and 
tertiary  road networks  has  been  extended beyond  the  three- to  four-year  reconstruction  period  since  these 
networks are not of  major economic significance. 
However, the first year requirements had been revised to US$163 million, in  view of persistent difficulties in 
appraising a country-wide program, and a still limited local absorptive capacity. -3-
Table 1.  Transport Reconstruction Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/  Allocation  Allocation 
Roads and bridges  341  96  97  148 
Roads  [173]  [44]  [36]  [93] 
Road safety  [1 0]  [0]  [4]  [6] 
Bridges  [75]  [26]  [25]  [24] 
Tunnels and slips  [13]  [7]  [6]  [0] 
Road equipment  [50]  [10]  [21]  [19] 
Asphalt plants and quarries  [20]  [9]  [5]  [6] 
Sava River ports  5  0  3  2 
Railways  90  15  40  35 
Civil aviation  43  24  11  8 
Urban transporfl  46  10  10  26 
Mine clearing  8  3  2  3 
Institution building  7  0  4  3 
Technical assistance  34  12  8  14 
Recurrent costs  9  3  0  6 
Total  583  163b  175  245 
a The allocations for 1997, 1998 and  1999 are tentative and relate mainly to buses, spare parts, and workshop 
equipment to cover remaining emergency needs.  The estimate is subject to successful implementation of  the 
"1,000 buses" operation managed by the Italian municipal transport agencies. 
b In addition, extensive works were undertaken by IFOR. 
7.  The priority reconstruction program includes several components: 
•  Rehabilitate and restart the maintenance of  the main road network; 
•  Restore the main railway lines and restart traffic; 
•  Complete the first phase of rehabilitation of the Sarajevo airport so that it duly fulfills the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements; 
•  Reopen the airports in Mostar and Banja Luka to regular civilian traffic; 
•  Rehabilitate two ports on the Sava River; 
•  Rehabilitate public transportation systems in the main cities; and 
•  Undertake related works (such as mine clearing) and provide consulting services and support 
to institutions. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
8.  In  1996, the program's objectives were to remove bottlenecks in  high-priority links, to provide 
equipment and assistance for maintaining critical parts of the network; and to prepare a framework for 
the development of  Bosnia and Herzegovina's transport system.  These objectives required: 
•  Rehabilitating about 50 km of roads and reconstructing fourteen bridges; -4-
•  Supplying construction and maintenance equipment to local contractors; 
•  Reopening the Federation railway network and gradually upgrading it; 
•  Resuming civilian and commercial flights from Sarajevo Airport; 
•  Delivering 100 buses to urban transport companies in the main cities; and 
•  Providing  the  necessary  technical  assistance  and  equipment  for  developing  institutional 
capacity (including about 300 man/month of  consulting services). 
9.  Progress in  1996 was significant, with an  impressive result:  the reopening of Sarajevo to some 
civilian air and rail transport (paragraphs 11  and 12).  !FOR's work to restore strategic infrastructure has 
largely contributed, although indirectly, to this success (box 2).  Substantial road works have also been 
initiated,  boosting  employment  with  local  consultants  designing  and  supervising  works  and  local 
contractors back  in  business.  Railway  infrastructure  is  being restored throughout the country -- and 
operating conditions are  under discussion by the Entities.  Urban transport has  restarted  in  the main 
cities, and Sarajevo tramways are running regularly after almost four years of virtually no service.  The 
resumption of activities  has  strengthened  institutions  -- for  management,  design,  and  supervision  of 
works as well as for  infrastructure maintenance.  These results reflect the efforts of more than twenty 
donors in twenty subsectors (table 2). 
3 
4 
Roads and bridges 
Railways 
Civil aviation 
Urban transport 
Technical assistance 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
16
4 
24 
10 
12 
163 
Main Donors 
Belgium, EBRD, EC, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, US, World Bank 
EC, France, Germany, Italy, UK, World Bank 
Austria, EBRD, EC, France, Italy 
Czech Republic, EC, Korea, Norway, Spain 
Germany, Netherlands, Turkey, US, World Bank, Others 
Includes US$96 million for roads and bridges, US$3 million for supply of bitumen and US$2 million for mine 
clearing. 
Includes US$15 million for railways and US$1  million for mine clearing. -5-
Roads and bridges: Bottlenecks removed 
10.  70 km of roads (  40 percent more than planned) will be rehabilitated by the end of the year with 
World Bank funding-- making it possible to use approximately 300 km  of the main network.  Thirteen 
bridges are being reconstructed, including all bridges on the main road between Sarajevo and the port of 
Place and two bridges on the Sava River connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia (contracts for the 
Orasje bridge will be awarded in  early 1997, and works on  the Brcko railway bridge have started with 
USAID financing).  The EC, the Japanese Government and the World Bank have supplied construction, 
maintenance, and quarry equipment, as well as asphalt plants.  The EBRD approved a US$19.9 million 
loan for the repair of  some 300 km of  roads and several bridges in both Entities. 
5 
Railways: Sarajevo-Place reopened 
11.  The railway line linking Sarajevo to the port of  Place on the Adriatic Coast reopened on July 30, 
1996 -- and further upgrading is  expected by mid-1997.  Works were carried out with  parallel funding 
from members of the European Union.  Although technical conditions would allow the operation of two 
pairs of trains a day at an average speed of 60 km  an  hour, persisting tension within the Federation has 
prevented the regular operation of  commercial trains.  Thus, restoring an effective transport network will 
require not only donor financing but also a real commitment by the authorities to overcoming political 
difficulties which  have  led  to  a situation where,  although  restored,  the  Sarajevo to Place line  has  no 
regular operations.  With all ongoing efforts, including those of  IFOR, the North-South railway line from 
Place to Sarajevo, Tuzla, and northern Europe could be ready to function as early as March 1997. 
Civil aviation: Sarajevo Airport re-opened 
12.  On August  15,  1996,  Sarajevo airport was  re-opened to  limited civilian traffic,  thanks to the 
efforts  of IFOR,  the  French  military  detachment  at  the  airport,  the  newly  formed  Sarajevo  Airport 
Authority, and the United States (US) Government.  The airport has not yet been re-opened to regular air 
traffic, as that will require meeting the standards set by ICAO. 
13.  Concurrently,  a  financial  package  of US$12.8  million  (in  addition  to  the  US$19.9  million 
mentioned above) was assembled by EBRD, to implement a year-long program of facility rehabilitation 
including upgrading the air traffic control system and the terminal.
6  To date, navigation aids, financed 
by  France,  have  already  been  delivered  and  procurement of air traffic  control  equipment  has  been 
initiated, with funding from Austria (civil and structural works will be carried out on the main runway 
and on the terminal building and training will be provided to the Civil Aviation Authority). 
Urban transport: Public transportation resumed 
14.  Many  governments  and  local  authorities  in  Europe  have  helped  to  restore  minimal  public 
transportation  in  the  main  cities  of Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  focusing  their  efforts  particularly  on 
Sarajevo.  Around thirty buses and twenty minibuses,  including spare parts and workshop equipment, 
have  been  delivered  through  both  the EC  Essential  Aid  Program  and  bilateral  donations.  Spain  has 
5 
6 
The loan was signed with the State and Entity Governments in December 1996. 
Aside  from  a  US$12.83  million  EBRD  loan,  funds  have  been  provided  by  nearly  all  countries  from  the 
European Union and by the EC.  Technical assistance is also provided by the US. -6 -
provided twenty second-hand  buses and Norway ten.  Italian  cities are  preparing a  special  operation 
called "1,000 buses".
7 
And by the end of 1996, the Czech Government will have provided Sarajevo with 
two new tramways and much-needed spare parts. 
Technical assistance: Supporting local consulting 
15.  Technical  assistance  was  required  mainly  for  project  design,  project  management,  and 
supervision of works.  About 350 man month of technical assistance have been provided, mainly to the 
State and Federation Ministries ofTransport.
8  Because the foreign assistance is designed to complement 
local  capacity,  not  substitute  for  it,  local  consultants  have  been  fully  involved  and  consulting 
organizations strengthened. 
Institutional developments: A major challenge 
16.  During  the  war,  separate  transport  organizations  were  established  in  Sarajevo,  Mostar  and 
Republika Srpska.  For example, there are now three railway companies-- for a prewar network of  about 
1,080 km.  All these organizations lack financial resources and qualified staff.  Efforts in  1996 targeted 
four main issues: 
•  The lack of sufficient project management capacity -- implementation units were set up  at 
the  State and  Federation  levels  to  develop  local  capacities;  a  Transport  Task  Force  was 
established  to  coordinate donor efforts  in  the  field;  and  a  program  management adviser, 
funded by the EC through the International Management Group (IMG), was appointed;9 
•  The absence of  a unified road authority in the Federation-- the prewar road organization was 
dissolved  without  an  appropriate  successor.  A  Federation  Project  Implementation 
Directorate was set up as a first step toward establishing a qualified authority; 10 
7 
This  project  would  supply  1,000  reconditioned  buses  (and  related  spare  parts)  from  Italian  municipal 
transportation  agencies.  It  will  set  up  maintenance  shops  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina  and  is  expected  to 
generate 500 to 600 local jobs. 
8 
9 
10 
Technical assistance was provided by: 
•  The Governements ofltaly, the Netherlands and Turkey, the EC and USTDA for Sarajevo Airport, 
aviation advisory services, and training; 
•  Several donors, through the International Management Group (IMG), for establishment of  the Program 
Management Adviser's office, the establishment and operation of  a transport database, and project 
management assistance; 
•  The US for the preliminary studies and design of  the Gorazde road; and 
•  The Government of  the Netherlands and the World Bank for project preparation and supervision and 
PIUs operating costs. 
The  program  management ,adviser  also  chairs  the  railway  and  road/river  working  groups  set  up  by  the 
Commission on Public Corporation and the Transport Task Force. 
The situation in Republika Srpska is slightly better: a Road Directorate and a Road Fund (for maintenance) are 
in place, though barely operating.  Still, assistance, both financial and advisory, is also critically needed. -7-
•  The  lack  of cooperation  among  the  three  railway  companies  -- a  nascent  cooperation 
between Bosniacs and Croats emerged with the reopening of  the Sarajevo-Ploce line; and 
•  The need to establish a proper civil aviation authority -- the Entities still have not reached 
agreement on forming a civil aviation authority.  Agreements should also be reached to re-
establish  overflight air routes  for  air traffic  (until  such  an  agreement  is  made,  overflight 
revenues will continue to flow into Serbia and Montenegro).  IFOR, the Office of the High 
Representative and  others  have  worked diligently to  bring about the formation  of ICAO 
required authorities.  Staffing and training needs were also identified through an EC-financed 
Civil Aviation Master Plan. 
In parallel with these efforts, the Commission on Public Corporations was established to lead inter-Entity 
discussions on the operation of  public infrastructure and utilities (box 3).  Progress has been made in this 
area, and the Commission is now focusing on developing an adequate structure for operating the railway. 
Assistance is provided by advisers from the International Union of Railways.  A Transport Law is being 
prepared. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
17.  To meet 1997 challenges US$175 million of external financing is  required.  While the focus  in 
1996 has been emergency operations, 1997 should be the y{;ar  for the donor community to support the 
restoration  of a sustainable transport system.  Two sets of issues should be  addressed  simultaneously: 
short-term  physical  reconstruction  and  maintenance  operations,  and  medium-term  institutional 
development and sustainability.  Efforts should focus on: 
•  Completing high-priority reconstruction projects; 
•  Carrying out maintenance on the most critical parts of  the networks; 
•  Developing  an  efficient  transport  system  -- coordinated  within  the  country  and 
internationally; and 
•  Taking proper organizational measures so  that rail  transport can  be  carried out efficiently, 
safely and as far as possible in a financially viable way. -8-
18.  As a first step toward achieving financial sustainability for the reconstruction program, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina authorities should contribute on an increasing basis to the costs.  In  1997, it is expected 
that they could finance up to 1  0 percent of  the civil works and the full cost of  the local transport of  goods 
procured internationally. 
Roads and bridges (US$97 million): Completing restoration of  the primary network 
19.  Road network  (US$93  million).  Reconstructing  all  first  priority  bridges  and  tunnels  and 
completing rehabilitation  of the  priority road  sections  will  require  US$93  million II  (priorities  being 
selected on the basis of  current conditions and estimated traffic).  The program includes: 
•  Rehabilitating 200 km of  roads and 2 km of landslides (US$38 million); 
•  Repairing twelve bridges, including two bridges on the Sava River (US$25 million); 
•  Rehabilitating twenty five tunnels (US$4 million); 
•  Providing road and asphalt/quarry equipment for local contractors (US$21 million); and 
•  Supporting local road maintenance units (US$5 million). 
Donors should pay particular attention to repair and  reconstruction  needs  in  Republika Srpska, where 
very few  works have  been implemented  in  1996.  Priority should also  be  given to  repairing the  few 
damaged road and bridge links that are hindering inter-Entity movements, as  well as connections with 
neighboring countries. 
20.  Road safety (US$4 million).  Discontinuities in road conditions, lack of road signs, and growing 
traffic are  likely to result  in  high  accident rates.  To  provide  minimal  road  safety,  US$4  million  is 
required to: restore adequate signaling, install crash barriers on the most dangerous parts of the primary 
network, and enhance safety of  the most dangerous road sections. 
Railways (US$40 million):  Upgrading to internationally acceptable standards 
21.  With the main railway lines to be rehabilitated by the spring of 1997, efforts need to be made to 
ensure that restored  lines  can  be  used  (current speed  limits and  line  capacities,  axle  load  and  traffic 
frequency,  are  low,  and  operation  safety  is  a  serious  concern).I
2  The  State  and  Entity Governments 
should enter into the necessary agreements as  soon as possible (box 4).  Once these arrangements are 
reached, assistance should be provided to upgrade the restored infrastructure to internationally acceptable 
standards, focusing on restoring maintenance. 
Priorities for donor support include: 
II 
I2 
Beyond the rehabilitation phase for  the primary network, the next objective (part of the  1998-99 program) 
would be to reduce as much as possible the backlog of  maintenance on the entire road network. Achieving this 
objective would require intensive participation by the local transport institutions. 
It  is  expected that the following  lines  will  be  reopened:  Sarajevo-Doboj,  Martin  Brod-Bihac and  Bosanski 
Novi-Doboj-Tuzla-Zvomik. -9-
•  Upgrading  track  and  restoring  electrification  of the  economically  sensitive  parts  of the 
network; 
•  Supplying signaling and telecommunications equipment; 
•  Restoring stations and marshaling yards; and 
•  Providing essential spare parts for rolling stock. 
Civil aviation (US$11 million):  Restoring regular flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
22.  Restoring  air traffic  between  Bosnia and  Herzegovina  and  other  countries  is  critical  to  the 
country's recovery.  Efforts should be aimed at expanding regular commercial flights  and  restoring a 
civil  aviation authority that can  handle air traffic over Bosnia and  Herzegovina -- a  major source of 
revenue before the war.  Priorities include: 
•  Upgrading civil aviation standards and ensuring countrywide coverage of  airspace control; 
•  Completing infrastructure rehabilitation, mainly at the Sarajevo Airport; 
•  Supplying additional navigational and communications equipment to the Sarajevo, Mostar, 
and Banja Luka airports; and 
•  Providing necessary assistance and training to the civil aviation staff. 
Institution building (US$4 million): Achieving a nascent sustainability 
23.  The  program  would  support  the  establishment  and  strengthening  of transport  management, 
planning and  maintenance organizations -- taking into account the Transportation Law currently being 
drafted.  Priority activities include: 
13 
The main institution-building activities are handled by the Commission on Public Corporations. - I 0-
•  Providing equipment and training to maintenance organizations; 
•  Setting up the Federation Road Directorate; 
•  Assisting  urban  transport  companies  in  improving  operations,  fare  collection,  and  cost 
recovery and possibly in privatizing suburban services; and 
•  Creating an inter-Entity planning mechanism to develop a transport strategy for the country. 
Technical assistance (US$8 million):  Moving toward locally managed projects 
24.  This component centers on  providing assistance to the Bosnia and Herzegovina governmental 
authorities to prepare and implement the 1997 program.  The objective should be to gradually phase out 
foreign  assistance and  increasingly  involve  local  consulting groups  in  project management.  In  1997 
assistance is required for: 
•  Program  management  advisory  services  in  1996,  the  EC  funded,  through  IMG,  an 
international project management adviser to the State Government; this should be continued; 
•  Financing for the operation of  the governmental authorities' implementation unit; 
•  Preparation of  the Bosnia and Herzegovina transport master plan; and 
•  Engineering  services  for  project  feasibility  studies,  and  design,  implementation,  and 
supervision of  projects. 
Implementation arrangements 
25.  In view of  experience in  1996 (box 5), several vehicles have been designed for channeling donor 
assistance in  1997.  The State and Entity Governments have prepared a comprehensive project for this 
purpose, consisting of independent modules corresponding to subsectors (e.g. roads, railways) or to 
geographic areas.  Donors are strongly encouraged to coordinate their activities within this framework. 
They can obtain information and assistance from three sources: the State and Entity Ministries for 
Transport, the program management adviser, and the Transport Task Force.  14 
14 
Particular attention should be paid to properly implementing mine-clearing activities (see section on landmines). 
Mine-clearing  agencies  should  be  involved  in  the  definition  of terms  of reference  and  the  supervision  of 
works. - 11  -
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
26.  To  develop  an  efficient and  sustainable  transport  system,  coordination  between  Government 
authorities in planning, operations and funding is crucial.  In the road sector, measures need to be worked 
out to ensure the financing of maintenance and  investments.  Fuel  and  other specific taxes should  be 
introduced; where they are already in  place but do  not reflect the full  cost of the use of infrastructure, 
they should be  increased.  Adequate revenues should be allocated to the authorities responsible for the 
roads  sector in  each  Entity.
15  Tax rates  and  tax  collection  should  also  be  coordinated  between  the 
Entities  to  avoid  tax  evasion.  In  the  railways  and  public  transportation  sector,  tariffs  should  be 
progressively  raised  to  ensure  cost-recovery -- and  well-targeted  mechanisms  should  be  designed  to 
protect low-income users. 
Toward cost-effectiveness 
27.  The transport sector is  still  managed as  it  was  in  former Yugoslavia as  a publicly owned and 
operated system, with companies monopolizing markets  in  their geographical  areas of operation.  To 
ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency in  the sector, restore satisfactory service delivery and  improve 
financial  viability,  significant  restructuring  is  needed  -- management  should  be  improved,  staffing 
adjusted.  Inter-Entity  economies  of scale  should  be  sought.  An  appropriate  regulatory  framework 
should be designed as early as possible. 
Sector governance 
28.  Instead of direct control over publicly-owned enterprises, Governments should exercise indirect 
guidance through regulation and pricing policies.  Privatization should be considered for most transport 
services.  Reintegration of the networks  is  a likely by-product of the necessary reforms of the current 
regulatory framework and the general management practices in the transport sector.  Therefore, the two 
processes should be  addressed together.  As  long as  utilities are operated by  monopolistic government 
owned companies, reintegration is  likely to remain a highly politicized issue (separate companies have 
been established to demonstrate sovereignty as well as to limit interdependence).  Reforming the utility 
sectors and cutting back on the role of public authorities are probably the best ways to  ensure service 
trade and network reintegration on an economic basis. 
15 
The EBRD will finance a road user charges system study in  1997. - 12-
29.  In  the railways sector,  investments and maintenance of the network should be  separated from 
operations.  Each  operating  company  should  be  authorized  to  operate  on  the  whole  network  on  a 
commercial basis (payment of  a uniform fee to the network companies) as per contractual arrangements. 
Third-party access should be granted automatically. TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
I.  BACKGROUND 
1.  A modern prewar telecommunications network, though with limited coverage.  By the late 1980s, 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina's telecommunications network was  relatively modern,  with  a high  degree of 
digitalization.  But coverage was limited, with only 12 telephones for every 100 people.  Several post and 
telecommunications  (PTT)  enterprises  provided  basic  telecom  service  to  approximately  750,000 
subscribers under the coordination of the Community of PTT Enterprises of Bosnia and  Herzegovina 
General Directorate.  There were 6,000 international lines, including 700 direct links with countries out 
of  the former Yugoslavia: most international calls were routed through international telephone exchanges 
in Belgrade and Zagreb. 
2.  Telecommunications disrupted by heavy war damage.  During the hostilities, the long-distance 
transmission  network  was  heavily  damaged,  disrupting  important  interurban  and  international 
communications links -- with most damage occurring near the lines of confrontation (see box 1  ).  As  a 
result, many areas now have very limited or no access to external communications links. About 215,000 
subscriber lines, or 30 percent of the local network lines, are out of order.  The PTT company was split 
up  into three separate companies, based  in  Sarajevo (PTT BiH),  Mostar (PTT HB),  and  in  Republika 
Srpska  (PTT  RS).  The  cost  of  restoring  the  sector,  including  rehabilitating  the  long-distance 
transmission network and procuring auxiliary equipment (public phones, vehicles, instruments), has been 
estimated by Swedtel, a consultant for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
at US$222 million (annex 1). - 14-
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
3.  On the basis of a detailed assessment of the war damage, the three- to four-year reconstruction 
and development program designed in December 1995 has been updated and the total external financing 
needs have  been  revised from  US$567 million to US$173  million.  While US$222  million  would be 
required to fully restore the system and an additional US$132 million for expansion and modernization 
up  to the year 2000, the priority  reconstruction  program  endorsed by the World  Bank, the European 
Community (EC), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Government 
of Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  amounts  to  US$173  million  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority 
reconstruction program (table 1  ).  It is  intended to cover only part of the total costs of restoration and 
rehabilitation, and presumes that the remaining funding can be obtained from the private sector and/or as 
contributions of  the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
•  In 1996, US$27 million was firmly committed, less than 17 percent of  the original US$160 
million estimated first-year needs; reconstruction activities suffered both from this shortfall 
in financing and from the pre-election political uncertainty (paragraphs 6 to 14); 
•  In 1997, US$60 million is required, 29 percent of  which would benefit the State, 48 percent 
the Federation and 23  percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 15 to 17).  A Jist of 
corresponding investments will be prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be held in 
early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$86 million will be needed, and, to ensure the recovery of  the 
sector, financial and institutional policy issues will need to be addressed, with strong support 
from the donor community (paragraph 18). 
Emergency repairs 
Reconstruction 
Technical assistance 
Total 
Table 1. Telecom Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/ 
Allocation 
45  7  20 
120  20  39 
8  0 
173  27  60 
1998-99 
Requirements/ 
Allocation 
18 
61 
7 
86 
4.  The  program  includes  restoring  and  modernizing  critical  parts  of the  existing  networks, 
establishing  a  Global  System  for  Mobile  Communication  (GSM)  network,  supporting  institution 
building, and providing technical assistance to the Entity Ministries for Transport and Communications 
on legal and regulatory m'atters.  Works include: 
•  Repairing the long-distance network (the backbone network); 
•  Rehabilitating  the  trunk  network  (short-distance  transmission  and  intercommunication 
network); 
•  Providing power supply equipment, particularly standby batteries; 
•  Reconstructing technical buildings and towers; - 15 -
•  Restoring priority local exchanges with a view to the number of subscribers and the extent of 
damage; 
•  Repairing local lines in affected areas; 
•  Installing a large network of  public pay phones; and 
•  Procuring tools, instruments, and vehicles. 
In  some cases,  new technological  systems should  be  used  rather than  repairing or replacing existing 
systems (for example, a wireless local  loop system rather than the traditional copper cable network). A 
detailed, prioritized list of investments has been established, as well as a Medium Term Reconstruction 
and Development Plan to guide reconstruction and development activities up to the year 2000. 
5.  Establishing a GSM is a high priority, and different options for an  initial deployment have been 
studied.  Technical and economic scenarios have been prepared for both a national GSM operator and 
three regional operators (the analysis shows that investment  in  a  GSM would be economically sound 
even  with  a  regional  approach).  Since the private sector is  the  natural  source of financing  for  such 
services, donors should focus on  providing foreign  investors with the necessary guarantees or lending 
conditions for stimulating their interest.  However, the development of a GSM cannot substitute (and 
requires for satisfactory functioning) restoration of  the conventional services. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
6.  At the end of 1995, the EBRD offered to act as lead agency in  mobilizing and coordinating the 
resources needed to reconstruct the telecom network in  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Under the auspices of 
the Office of the High Representative and  with assistance from  the International  Management Group 
(IMG),  the  EBRD  established  two  working  groups  in  February  1996,  with  representation  from  all 
relevant telecom authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
•  The technical working group, with the assistance of an  international consultant (Swedtel), 
prepared a comprehensive report assessing the damage, describing the current situation, and 
defining the  immediate and  medium-term  needs  for  restoration  and  reconstruction of the 
telecom sector.  The report was finalized in September 1996 and made available to interested 
parties.  Although  the  report  is  not  structured  as  an  investment  plan,  it  contains  the 
information needed to  select and  define the  most urgent  investment projects  in  fixed  and 
mobile telephony.  On the basis of  this report, the cost of restoring the telecom system to its 
prewar condition was estimated at US$222 million; and 
•  The policy working group provided technical assistance to the State and Entity Ministries for 
Transport and Communications in developing a modern legislative and regulatory system for 
the entire country, consistent with practices and trends in  Europe and eventually integrated 
as per the provisions of  the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement. 
7.  Donor commitments remained insufficient to undertake reconstruction activities on a large scale. 
Although needs for the first year had initially been estimated at US$150 million, only US$27 million was 
firmly committed-- by the European Commission, the Governments of Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  EBRD  (table  2).  Other  potential  donors  (including  the 
Governments of Finland, Korea, Kuwait, Spain, and Turkey) expressed interest in  providing cofinancing 
for  telecommunications,  but  have  not  yet  made  a  firm  commitment.  Private  investors  were  only - 16-
marginally involved, mainly because of the unclear legislative,  regulatory, and  political situation.  The 
three PTT companies nevertheless undertook urgent reconstruction works, relying on their own  limited 
resources.  By the end of October 1996, very limited progress had been achieved in  establishing  dir~ct 
telecommunications links between the Entities. 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Emergency repairs 
Reconstruction 
Technical assistance 
Total 
Completion of  Damage assessment 
Amount 
7.1 
19.6 
0.3 
27.0 
Main Donors 
Sweden, UK 
EBRD, EC, Italy, Norway 
Netherlands, Sweden 
8.  The technical working group has completed an inventory of  the war damage, now available to all 
interested donors and investors, providing detailed information on  each category of equipment at each 
site -- down to the level of exchanges, transmission segments, technical constructions, local  networks, 
and power supply and  indicating the replacement costs.  This information was used to define the main 
priorities for reconstruction in  1996 and 1997. 
Finalization of  a medium term reconstruction and development plan. 
9.  This plan  maps out the evolution of the  network up  to  the year 2000,  based  on  the  existing 
situation, making it possible to  link the  reconstruction activity with the development works.  Among 
other things, the plan describes the current network configuration and  the target network,  provides a 
market  and  traffic  forecast,  makes  several  recommendations  on  technology,  and  presents  a  detailed 
proposal for institutional strengthening.  In an  initial phase, efforts could concentrate on restoring local 
networks.  For the eventual rehabilitation of a countrywide system, the study recommends developing a 
ring-shaped  backbone  network  (rather  than  using  the  traditional  star  shape),  which  would  create 
interdependence  between  the ·PTT companies  by  integrating  all  parts of the  country  in  one  national 
network while maintaining some autonomy in  operation.  In addition to the two existing international 
exchanges centers in  Sarajevo and Posusje (near Mostar), the plan recommends establishing a third one 
in  Bijeljina or Banja Luka (in  Republika  Srpska)  and  using  three  transit  centers,  working  in  pairs 
(Sarajevo-Tuzla,  Posusje-Mostar,  and  Banja  Luka-Bijeljina),  to  handle  the  long-distance  traffic. 
However, all these recommendations are subject to further consideration and analysis in conjunction with 
the telecom authorities of  Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Rollout of  mobile telephony in some areas 
10.  Mobile telephony was considered an investment priority from the beginning.  But because of  the 
unclear legal framework and the differences in  views among the representatives of the three PTTs, no 
national  consensus  on  deploying  such  a  system  could  be  reached.  Instead,  all  three  PTTs  are 
independently developing regional GSM networks, following different ownership routes.  PTT Sarajevo 
has procured and is now deploying a network in the areas of Sarajevo and Tuzla and the PTTs in  Mostar 
and  in  Republika Srpska are  in  the process of selecting strategic  partners for  the  provision  of GSM - 17-
services.  Inter-Entity  cooperation  is  urgently  needed  to  reach  an  agreement  on  frequency  and 
interconnection for these GSM  networks. 
First phase of  sector policy development completed 
11.  This part of the program was aimed at assisting the Entity and State Ministries for Transport and 
Communications  in  formulating  policy  to  support  effective,  efficient  restructuring  of  the 
telecommunications sector.  It focused  on  sector policy,  telecom  Jaw,  strategy,  mobile  licensing  and 
mobile network configuration issues.  The sector policy development was coordinated with the Office of 
the High Representative (through the Joint Civilian Commission), IMG, and IFOR.  Working documents 
-- draft telecom  law,  sector policy statement,  and  GSM  license -- for  the Entities were developed  in 
cooperation with the policy working group, taking into account other European experiences and with a 
view toward eventual  integration of the networks at a State level.  Progress was slow,  in  a large part 
because of the  reluctance of Republika Srpska to  recognize any State  laws  or institutions  before the 
elections.  A second phase of technical assistance is  now being implemented; this phase will  focus  on 
building the necessary legal framework for telecommunications at the State level. 
Urgent repairs implemented 
12.  The  reconstruction  work  began  early  this  year,  almost  exclusively  on  the  basis  of bilateral 
assistance.  Reconstruction activities include: 
•  Thirty-five thousand lines of AXE switching equipment in Sarajevo (Sweden); 
•  An international EWSD exchange in Sarajevo (Germany); 
•  Power supply equipment (United Kingdom); and 
•  A microwave link between Sarajevo and Hungary (Sweden). 
The  PTTs  also  initiated  reconstruction  projects  with  their own  financing.  But the  major  objective, 
connecting the two  Entities  through  direct  lines,  was  not  met -- because  of political,  not  technical, 
reasons. 
Preparation for comprehensive rehabilitation initiated 
13.  Project preparation for the full restoration of  the telecommunications network commenced at the 
beginning of this year,  and  all  the  detailed technical  and  financial  information  needed to develop  an 
investment project is now available.  But there have been two main obstacles to the selection of concrete 
investment objectives and  initiation of the  project:  the  lack of donor support, 
1 and the  difficulties  in 
getting the necessary agreement on the network development plan, especially on the configuration of  the 
backbone network  .. 
14.  It is expected that the new, post-election Government will find a compromise solution that will 
permit commencement of the  works  on  the  country's main  telecom  highways.  A  large  mission  is 
planned  in  the  next  weeks  to  prepare  and  appraise  a  Telecom  Emergency  Reconstruction  Project. 
The lack of cofinancing prevented EBRD from using its own funds. - 18 -
Participants will include the EBRD, the Governments of Korea (MOF and EDCF) and Sweden (SIDA), 
and technical and policy consultants. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
Reaching agreement on the basic framework 
15.  In  1996, the main successes occurred in  studies and preparatory work.  In  1997, donors  should 
focus on starting physical implementation of the Telecom Emergency Reconstruction Project.  But that 
will require the State and Entity Governments to reach an agreement on the structure of  the network and 
on  the  policy  framework  within  which  it  will  operate.  A  technical  assistance  program  designed  to 
promote  such  an  agreement  is  being offered  to  telecom  authorities  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina;  this 
program would help initiate the necessary legal and regulatory reforms for operation of the national  and 
Entity telecom networks.  Both the Governments in  Bosnia and Herzegovina and the donor community 
should consider the signing of  an appropriate agreement a precondition for any significant donor support. 
Defining and implementing the project 
16.  After  agreement  has  been  reached,  the  Telecom  Emergency  Reconstruction  Project  will  be 
revised to take into account the proposed national network configuration.  Resources for defining and 
appraising  the  project  are  already  available.  If cofinancing  can  be  promptly  secured,  the  first 
disbursements for the project could be expected during the second quarter of 1997. 
2 
The Telecom Law should clearly define the roles and  responsibilities of the  State and  of the  Entities  with 
regard  to  regulations  and  licensing.  It  should  also  organize  the  State  functions  for  international  traffic 
regulation.  This is  critical for addressing important issues such as the establishment of a national  numbering 
system,  international traffic routing,  interconnection,  frequency spectrum management and tariff settlements 
and to prevent development of  non-harmonized, high cost systems and delays in restoring satisfactory telecom 
services. - 19-
Developing necessary institutions 
17.  A  Project  Implementation  Unit  (PIU)  needs  to  be  established  to  coordinate  all  project 
implementation activities (planning, procurement, technical assistance, training, and the like).  Assisted 
by foreign  experts, this unit would be  responsible for activities related to the EBRD's project and for 
coordination of  all the donors' telecommunications projects.  Local PIUs could be established at the level 
of  each PTT (boxes 3 and 4), action that would require US$5.4 million in external financing. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
18.  The policy working group, with the assistance of EBRD consultants, has initiated work on most 
of the policy, legal, and regulatory issues remaining to be resolved in the telecommunications sector and 
discussed them at the Entity level.  There is a clear trend toward integrating legislation in  line with the 
provisions of  the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement and the European Union recommendations.  Once these 
recommendations are properly implemented, and after an  initial reconstruction and buildup period (in, 
say,  two  years),  the  sector  could  be  expected  to  be  financially  sustainable,  assuming  adequate 
management and appropriate tariff levels.  To improve financial organization and management, human 
resource  management  and  development,  and  operational  and  technical  function,  a  comprehensive 
technical assistance package is envisaged as a part of  the implementation program (box 4). -20-- 21  -
Annex 1.  Restoration costs by category (US$ million) 
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------ ·-ELECTRIC POWER AND COAL MINING 
I.  BACKGROUND 
I.  Before the war, the Bosnia and Herzegovina electric power system consisted of: 
•  Thirteen hydropower plants with a total capacity of 2,034 megawatts (MW) and an  average 
output of  6,922 gigawatt hours (GWh) per year; 
•  Twelve brown coal and lignite fired thermal power plants with an installed capacity of 1,957 
MW and an output of I 0,675 GWh per year; and 
•  Transmission and distribution facilities interconnected and operated at 400, 220, 110, 35, 20, 
10 and 0.4 kilovolts (kV) levels, with about 5,400 kilometers (km) of transmission lines and 
92,000 km of  distribution lines. 
2.  The coal mining sector consisted of more than thirty coal mines, which were producing brown 
coal or lignite for both heating and power generation.  Production was about I8 million tons of coal per 
year,  of which  I 0  million  tons  was  brown  coal  and  8  million  tons  lignite.  Within  the  Federation, 
production was concentrated in the Tuzla and Zenica areas in  both open-pit and underground mines.  In 
Republika Srpska, the two main mines were Ugljevik (brown coal) and Gacko (lignite), each producing 
about 2 million tons per year. 
3.  Both the power system and the coal mining sector suffered significant damage as a direct result 
ofwar activities or due to prewar and war-related lack of  maintenance (boxes I and 2). 
4.  Before the war,  the  Bosnia and  Herzegovina power system  was  operated  by  Elektroprivreda 
Bosne i Hercegovine (EPBiH).  The status of  the coal mines varied from one area to another: the Gacko 
and Ugljevik coal mines were the only significant mines belonging to the electric power company; the 
mines of  the Tuzla region were grouped into one state-owned holding company; others were operated as 
independent state-owned enterprises. 
5.  The power system is now de facto operated by three regional companies: EPBiH, in the Bosniac 
majority part of the Federation; Elektroprivreda Herceg Bosne (EPHB) in the Croat majority part of the 
Federation; and Elektroprivreda Republike Srpske (EPRS) in  Republika Srpska.  In  the coal  sector, to 
facilitate the coordination of emergency aid and control the application of scarce resources, the mines 
located in  the Federation area have been grouped into two principal companies (Tuzla Coal Mines and 
Central Bosnia Coal Mines), which supply the  important Tuzla and Kakanj  thermal  power plants.  A -24-
third group, the Mostar Coal Mines, is of less economic importance, both in terms of output and product 
end-use.  No regrouping of  coal mines took place in Republika Srpska. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
6.  The objectives of  the reconstruction program in the electric power and coal mining sectors are: 
•  Restoration of service to acceptable levels; 
•  Restoration  of output of the  lowest-cost  mines  (that can  provide  the  largest  increase  in 
overall output relative to the required investment) to minimum levels, sufficient to restart the 
operation of the thermal power plants at the desired capacity levels and to provide adequate 
fuel for industry, district heating and households; 
•  Improvement  of sector  finances  through  increased  billing  and  collection  and  a  gradual 
phasing out of  price distortions; and 
•  Restructuring of  the electric power and coal sectors. 
7.  The reconstruction program submitted to the donors in December 1995 and April  1996 remains 
valid as an overall framework for the three- to four-year program.  It will  require US$614 million  in 
external  support  for  the  three- to  four-year  period  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority 
reconstruction program: 
•  In 1996, US$221 million was firmly committed:  a large number of activities were carried 
out successfully (paragraphs 8 to 11 ); 
•  For 1997, US$200 million in external financing will be required --- about 65  percent of 
which would benefit the Federation and 35 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 12 to 19). 
This includes the US$40 million shortfall carried over from  1996.  A  list of corresponding 
investments will be prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  For 1998-1999 an estimated US$193 million will be necessary and several policy issues 
should be addressed to ensure the longer term sustainability of  the program (paragraphs 20 to 
21). Ill. 
-25-
Table 1.  Electric Power and Coal Mining Program External Financial Requirements 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Electric Power 
Generation: hydro  60  20  30  10 
Generation: thermal  60  32  15  13 
Transmission: lines  65  34  20  11 
Transmission: substations/dispatch  80  21  19  40 
Distribution  191  62  65  64 
Communications  6  0  3  3 
Transportation  23  0  10  13 
Spare parts  30  21  5  4 
Engineering/ teGhnical assistance  25  10  8,  7 
Sub-total  540  200  175  165 
Coal Mining 
Equipment and spare parts  70  20  22  28 
Technical assistance  4  1  3  0 
Sub-total  74  21  25  28 
Total  614  221  200  193 
1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
8.  There have been many positive developments in the electric power sector since the signature of 
the  Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement.  The  US$196  million  Emergency Electric  Power Reconstruction 
Project financed  by a large number of financiers  is  being implemented and  is  progressing well.  This 
Project constitutes most of the total emergency reconstruction program for  1996 (table 2).  Under the 
auspices  of the  Office of the  High  Representative,  contacts  have  been  initiated  between  the  electric 
power  companies  of the  Federation  and  Republika  Srpska,  which  has  led  to  increased  sectoral 
cooperation.  Although much remains to be done in this area, the general managers of  the Fed~ration and 
Republika Srpska electric power companies have  met to define reconstruction  priorities and  establish 
coordination and liaison mechanisms. -26-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Electric power 
Generation 
Transmission/ distribution 
Maintenance/operation equipment 
Technical assistance 
Coal Mining 
Total 
Amount 
200 
[52] 
[ 117] 
[21] 
[I 0] 
21 
221 
Main Donors 
Czech Republic, EC, Germany, 
Switzerland, UK, US, World Bank. 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, EBRD, EC, 
France, Germany, Italy, Norway, UK, 
US, World Bank. 
Belgium, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, World Bank. 
EC, Ireland, Switzerland, World Bank, 
others 
Czech Republic, EC, Poland, UK, US, 
World Bank 
9.  The amounts shown represent firm or indicative donor commitments up to September 1996 by: 
the Governments of Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the EC, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA), and 
the  World  Bank.  Commitments  made  under  the  Emergency  Electric  Power  Reconstruction  Project 
amount to US$156 million (including the recent US  commitment of US$23  million for Kakanj  and  the 
Central Bosnia coal mines).  Commitments outside of  that project amount to US$65 million. 
10.  The  Swiss  Government  has  approved  a  commitment  of about  US$7  million  equivalent  for 
financing of Units 4 and 6 and the common facilities of the Jablanica hydro power plant.  The US  will 
fund the rehabilitation of Units 5 and 6 of the Kakanj Cogeneration Plant plus associated coal mines in 
Central  Bosnia, for  a total cost of about US$23  million.  This would leave a financing gap of US$40 
million in  the US$196 million Emergency Electric Power Reconstruction Project; this amount has been 
included  under the  1997  requirements.  The  largest  unfunded  items  of the  Project  are  currently  the 
Mostar  hydro  power  plant  (US$13.5  million)  and  distribution  components  in  various  areas  (US$12 
million). 
11.  The emergency electric power reconstruction program is making good progress: 
•  Four major 220  kV transmission lines  had  been  restored to service as  of September 
1996, between Tuzla and Zenica, Jablanica and Mostar, Kakanj and Salakovac, and  Mostar 
and Salakovac. These transmission lines will significantly improve the reliability of the 220 
kV core transmission system. 
•  The Salakovac hydro power plant will be in full operation by end December, 1996. Two 
damaged  turbine-generators,  together  with  their  auxiliary  equipment,  were  entirely 
overhauled and are being re-installed and prepared for the mechanical revolving.  Both units 
will be in full operation by end December, 1996. 
•  The Grabovica hydro power plant will  be  recommissioned  by  end December, 1996. 
Rehabilitation of  the damaged tailrace channel and stilling basin for the Grabovica plant is of 
prime  importance,  since  tailrace  failure  can  cause  loss  of the  entire  output of the  plant. 
Dredging of the tailrace channel has been  completed.  Reinforcement of the stilling basin, - 27-
retaining wall  and tailrace embankment is  well  underway.  Recommissioning of both  the 
Salakovac  and  Grabovica  hydro  power  plants  by  end  December,  1996  would  contribute 
towards relieving expected power shortages. 
•  Preparation of the rehabilitation of the Jablanica hydro power station is  in full swing. 
Major reconstruction is expected to start in early spring 1997. 
•  Rehabilitation of three major thermal power plants (Tuzla, Kakanj and Ugljevik) and 
associated coal mines has started.  The Ugljevik power plant was commissioned recently. 
Spare parts have been  provided to keep the smaller generating units of Tuzla  and  Kakanj 
operating.  Unit  6  at  the  Kakanj  power  plant  was  commissioned  at  the  beginning  of 
November, 1996, the rehabilitation of unit 5 is underway and is expected to be completed by 
mid  March  1997.  Procurement of the  major components for the Tuzla power plant,  and 
urgent spare parts for the Tuzla coal mine, are well underway.  A 200 MW unit at the Tuzla 
power plant was commissioned in the beginning ofNovember, 1996. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
12.  The priorities of  the 1997 reconstruction program are to: 
•  Carry out a long term development strategy study, which the Swiss Government has offered 
to finance; 
•  Further improve the reliability, availability and quality of supply to electricity consumers in 
Federation and Republika Srpska areas in order to facilitate economic recovery, through: (a) 
rehabilitating the distribution  network and transmission  networks;  (b) where necessary to 
reconnect  areas  that  were  cut off from  electricity  supply;  and  (c)  strengthening  power - 28-
generation  capacity,  necessary  for  domestic  electricity  consumption,  by  rehabilitating 
hydropower and thermal power plants, where justified; 
•  Enhance cooperation between Entities through a joint study on the rehabilitation of the 400 
kV transmission system, and encourage power exchange through system reintegration; 
•  Support institutional improvements in  the internal organization and operation of the electric 
utilities and coordination between them; and 
•  Help develop a suitable regulatory framework and an  improved electricity tariff structure. 
13.  To  meet these  objectives,  financial  assistance  in  the  order of about US$200  million  will  be 
required from the donor community for  1997.  This includes about US$40 million  in  unfunded project 
components from the Emergency Electric Power Sector Reconstruction Project, and  US$160 million  in 
new investments.  About one-third of all new reconstruction investments (US$50-60 million) would take 
place in Republika Srpska. 
Transmission and distribution 
14.  While local distribution will be given highest priority it will be important to rebuild selected 220 
and  110 kV transmission facilities (including transmission lines and substations).  The Banja Luka and 
Bihac regions, the Neretva Valley and the Lasva Valley are expected to be part of  the priority areas.  The 
400 kV system is mainly for interstate transmission, rehabilitation of which should wait until a thorough 
study has been completed; rehabilitation could be included in the 1998-99 program. 
15.  Consultants are being engaged under EC financing to review investment priorities throughout the 
country and to prepare cost estimates and technical specifications for bidding documents. Identification 
of the individual components to be financed within this program will be a painstaking process,  in  part 
due to the physical  dispersion of the assets as  well  as due to the fact that three  Elektroprivredas are 
involved.  Hence,  the  results  will  not be  available  until  after the  donors  conference.  It should  be 
emphasized that the cost estimate of  the 1997-99 electric power and coal mining program is tentative and 
based largely on the estimates submitted by the Elektroprivredas and the mines.  Major selection criteria 
to determine reconstruction priorities are listed in box 4. 
Generation 
16.  In  hydro power generation, priority should be  given to the Mostar (3x25  MW), Rama (2x80 
MW) and Bocac (2x55  MW) hydro power plants.  Detailed damage assessments should be carried out 
before  costs  can  be  accurately  estimated.  For example,  the  Mostar hydro  power station  was  badly 
damaged and the machine hall flooded; the generating units,  including auxiliary equipment, have been 
completely submerged  for the last three years and have to be lifted out for cleaning, damage inspection 
and  testing.  For thermal power plants and associated coal  mines,  priority should  be  given  to the 
Gacko thermal power plant (lx300 MW) and associated coal mine.  In order to review and evaluate the 
possibility of full  scale rehabilitation of the  existing 300 MW unit at the Gacko  plant,  the  status of 
turbine-generator,  boiler,  instrumentation  and  control,  electrical  and  auxiliary  and  general  station 
equipment, the fuel  requirements and supply,  and the environmental  impact and  mitigation  measures 
should be reviewed in depth. -29-
Implementation arrangements 
17.  Implementation of many of the  components of the  above  program  can  for  the  most  part  be 
undertaken  by  each  of the  three  Elektroprivredas  independently of each  other.  For  interface  areas, 
however,  implementation  requires  a  significant  degree  of cooperation  between  the  three  electricity 
companies.  While this  can,  in  principle,  be  done  by  continuing the  ad-hoc  arrangements that  have 
characterized this process thus  far,  the establishment of a  collaborative organizing framework  would 
improve this process.  In  some cases, donors may not be  willing to support investments  unless these 
better collaborative arrangements are achieved. 
18.  A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for power sector investments has been established within 
EPBiH with adequate staffing and assistance from  external experts; such external assistance should be 
continued, with an added emphasis on support for improved project management.  Similar arrangements 
should be made by the other two Elektroprivredas.  While the PIU or project management teams exercise 
control  over all  project-related  activities,  they  receive  cross  support from  other  units  of the  power 
enterprises, such as for procurement, technical support, legal matters, budgeting, accounting, disbursing 
and cost control, scheduling, manpower allocation and operational support.  The implementation of the 
sub-projects  are  the  responsibility  of the  local  generation,  transmission  and  distribution  entities. 
Replacement  of  transmission  equipment  is  performed  by  the  transmission  organizations'  own 
maintenance  staff  on  force  account,  who  have  satisfactorily  handled  similar  works  in  the  past. 
Installation of major equipment is  being done in  most instances by suppliers on a turn-key basis, using 
local construction companies as much as possible. 
19.  In the case of projects which benefit the coal sector, the mining companies would be responsible 
for project implementation. For example, under the World Bank Credit the Tuzla Mining Company has 
assumed sole responsibility for procurement and implementation.  In procurement matters it  is  assisted - 30-
by an experienced foreign trade company.  Within the Federation, the Ministry of  Energy and Industry is 
to be responsible for a sector restructuring study and for ensuring close cooperation between the mining 
and the electric power companies. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
20.  The major policy issues to be addressed over the short term are: 
•  Electric power sector financial viability.  In  1994 and 1995, the Elektroprivredas incurred 
substantial  losses.  Furthermore, due to the financial  difficulties faced  by  households and 
corporate consumers during the war, bill collection rates were very low (although collection 
performance  improved  significantly  in  1995,  reaching  around  50  percent  in  the  case  of 
EPBiH).  Billing  and  collection  rates  should  be  gradually  but  aggressively  increased  to 
approach I 00 percent at the latest by 1998.  The financial viability of the power sector also 
depends on the price of coal per kWh, which should be examined in  the context of the coal 
sector restructuring study. 
•  Coal mining sector restructuring.  Some activity, although not necessarily production,  is 
currently being maintained  in  all  twenty-eight mines  in  the Federation, although  about 70 
percent of the production originates from  four surface mines.  An assessment is  needed to 
determine which mines are the lowest-cost and most competitive producers.  Reconstruction 
efforts should focus on those mines that are capable of providing the desired coal quality and 
that are  clearly  economically  viable.  This  is  expected  to  result  in  the  concentration  of 
production in a few large mines. 
•  Coal  mining staffing  levels.  Before  the  war,  the  coal  mines  employed  about  26,000 
workers and had a low average productivity per worker.  The staffing level is currently about 
20,000, of which about 50  percent is  actually working. It should be gradually decreased so 
that productivity would be increased well above past and current levels. - 31  -
•  Coal mining production costs.  Present production costs appear to be at or above the world 
market level of coal prices. Hence,  production costs per ton  should be  reduced as  soon  as 
possible  through  reduced  staffing  levels,  selective  mine  closures,  and  better  preventive 
maintenance and spare parts management. 
21.  The major policy issues to be addressed over the medium term are: 
•  Electric power sector restructuring.  The power sector is  clearly among those which fall 
within the jurisdiction of  the Commission on Public Corporations, created by annex 9 of the 
Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement.  A working group created by the Commission has discussed 
cooperation  between  the  Entities  and  the  Commission  itself has  started  to  examine  the 
organization of the  electric power sector.  While the power system  may  be  too  small  to 
enable  effective  competition,  measures  can  and  should  be  taken  to  introduce  a  sector 
structure that would facilitate ultimate privatization.  One potential scenario is as follows: 
•  First,  inter-utility  cooperation  must  be  further  developed  so  that  the  use  of the 
existing infrastructure can  be  optimized and the rehabilitation can  be  planned and 
carried  out  in  a  coordinated  manner.  At  the  same  time,  laws  and  regulations 
governing the energy sector should be prepared, in order to set the legal framework. 
•  Second,  generation  would  be  separated  from  transmission  and  distribution  and 
responsibility  divided  among  several  generating  companies,  each  operating  on  a 
commercial  basis.  The transmission  system  should  be  operated  in  a  coordinated 
fashion throughout the country, to ensure the optimization of power transmission and 
permit effective  power trading  and  system  stabilization.  Distribution  enterprises 
would  be  organized on  a  local  basis.  An  electricity  law  would  be  passed,  under 
which a Regulatory Authority would be set up to regulate power prices and to ensure 
third-party  access  to  the  transmission  system.  Such  a  law  is  currently  being 
prepared, although there are at this stage at least three competing drafts. 
•  Third, once the new structure is  in  place and is operating with reasonable autonomy, 
the generation and distribution companies could be partially or totally privatized. 
•  Settlement of liabilities between the three existing electricity companies.  There are three 
de facto electricity companies in  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  While the different companies 
took over assets of  the prewar organization in their respective areas, they did not yet assume 
the corresponding part of  the liabilities.  This issue must be resolved. 
•  Electric power tariff increases.  Over the  medium  term,  tariff levels  should  be  raised 
progressively  to:  (i)  permit  adequate  internal  generation  of funds  to  cover  the  power 
companies' expenditures and provide modest cash balances; (ii) provide full cost recovery as 
the power companies undertake further necessary efficiency-improving investments; and (iii) 
enhance energy conservation and efficiency. 
•  Coal mines privatization.  While privatization of even the most efficient brown coal and 
lignite mines in  Bosnia and Herzegovina is  probably not an  option  in  the near term due to 
lack  of  investor  interest,  the  regulatory  framework  for  private  ownership  should  be 
established. HOUSING 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A predominantly private sector before the war 
1.  Before the start of hostilities, Bosnia and Herzegovina's 4.4 million people were generally well 
housed.  With an estimated  1,295,000 housing units, each household generally  had its own unit.  The 
housing stock was of relatively high-quality construction, and about half was built after 1971.  Coverage 
of residential infrastructure was high in  urban areas, although services often lagged behind in unplanned 
and privately developed areas in the suburbs. 
2.  As in many formerly socialist economies, the housing sector was a two-tier system consisting of 
public  and  private  housing.  In  public  housing -- multifamily  blocks of rental  apartments  -- tenure 
bestowed many of the benefits of full  ownership.  Public housing accounted for only 20 percent of the 
total housing stock, but for more than half the housing in the largest towns of Bosnia and Herzegovina--
although only 40 percent in  Sarajevo.  The rest of the urban population and all of the rural  population 
lived in  private, single-family homes financed by household savings and remittances.  By contrast with 
many of the countries in  the region, most of the housing (80 percent) was privately owned, and private 
housing production consistently outpaced public through 1991, even in urban areas. 
War damage and exodus 
3.  The hostilities wrought havoc in  the housing sector (box 1).  The damage and destruction are, 
however, spread unevenly through Bosnia and Herzegovina, with localities near the front  lines,  in  the 
Sarajevo, Bihac, and Mostar area, and minority villages in  Eastern and Central Bosnia hit particularly 
hard.  The war damage to housing has been exacerbated by collateral damage due to weather,  lack of 
maintenance, and the deterioration of infrastructure and connections to networks.  The war caused an 
exodus to  other countries  and  massive  population  movements  within  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina;  and 
further population shifts are now occurring as some of the displaced persons and refugees seek to return 
to their homes.  Creating the conditions for their return by addressing the constraints posed by inadequate 
housing, lack of  proper infrastructure, and unemployment remains an overriding priority. - 34-
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
4.  The housing reconstruction program aims to: 
•  Create conditions to enable the return of  refugees and the internally displaced; and 
•  Rapidly expand the usable housing stock for the entire population. 
5.  The program structure takes into account the reconstruction work that local contractors are able 
to undertake in  the next three years and the need to front-load the reconstruction efforts and stimulate 
investment in the first two years of  the program to improve the quality and quantity of  the housing stock 
as rapidly as possible.  It is assumed that the number of people needing direct assistance to improve their 
housing conditions will decline as the economy improves and incomes recover (so that households can 
invest  in  repair of their own  housing).  The challenge will  then  be to  leverage  household  resources, 
supplementing scarce donor grant resources through  household  investment savings or possibly,  later, 
borrowing. 
6.  The reconstruction  program  presented  in  December 1995  remains  largely  valid  as  an  overall 
framework.  The program will require US$693 million in external financial support for the three- to four-
year reconstruction period within the overall US$5 .1  billion priority reconstruction program (table 1  ): 
•  In 1996, US$273  million was firmly committed, 65  percent more than was targeted  for 
housing in  the first year (US$165  million),  and  implementation of emergency repairs  has 
been highly successful this year  (paragraphs 10 to 18); 
•  In 1997, US$150 million is required,  75  percent of  which would benefit the Federation and 
25  percent  Republika  Srpska  (paragraphs  19  to  29).  A  detailed  list  of corresponding 
investments will be prepared for the Third Donors Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$270 million will be needed, and to ensure the recovery of the 
sector, financial and institutional policy issues will need to be addressed, with strong support 
from the donor community (paragraphs 30 to 41 ). 
Table 1.  Housing Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocations  Allocations 
Emergency repairs  232  170  22  40 
Reconstruction  318  76  72  170 
Sarajevo program  123  23  50  50 
Technical assistance  20  4  6  10 
Total  693  273  150  270 
7.  The  program's  priority  is  to  seek  cost-effective  means  for  rapidly  increasing  the  number of 
usable units.  Works are limited initially to housing that can be easily brought to a minimum habitable 
standard and to restoring the external structures and common elements of public housing (damages are 
not only war-related, but also due to the lack of maintenance before and during the war).  This approach - 35-
has allowed the program to jump-start the process of increasing the supply and quality of housing units. 
To  have  an  impact on  the  overall  supply of units  and  for  equity reasons,  the  program  will  need  to 
undertake in a second phase cost-effective repairs to private units and public housing that have sustained 
greater  damage.  The  program  should  also  start  addressing  issues  of financial  and  institutional 
sustainability and establishing a policy framework to ensure sustainable recovery of  the sector. 
8.  The  geographic  distribution  of the  contributions  should  reflect  the  housing  needs  of the 
population, with priority to those areas already identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees  (UNHCR)  and  by  the  Entity  Governments  in  conjunction  with  the  Housing  Task  Force 
(paragraph 13).  To the extent possible, housing repairs should be accompanied by infrastructure projects 
to  ensure the  viability of communities  and  to  create  adequate  conditions for  the  return  of displaced 
persons (the "integrated packages" discussed in Volume 1). 
9.  The program includes four activities: 
•  Emergency repairs: rapidly increasing the stock of usable housing by rehabilitating units that 
are less than 30 percent damaged; 
•  Reconstruction: reconstructing private and public housing units that are more than 30 percent 
damaged; 
•  Sarajevo Program:  focusing on  the Sarajevo area,  where more than  50,000 units,  half the 
stock, are damaged; and 
•  Technical assistance:  providing management and  implementation support, and  institution-
building support for the design of  adequate policies. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
I 0.  During the first year of reconstruction, the priorities have been to launch an emergency housing 
repair  program  that  could  rapidly  restore  damaged  public  and  private  housing  and  to  establish 
appropriate  implementation  and  coordination  mechanisms.  Much  progress  has  been  made  on  both 
fronts.  In addition, the first steps have been taken toward introducing gradual rent increases to recover 
the costs of  housing repairs. 
11.  The extensive damage to the stock and the urgent need to restore housing to livable conditions 
have  generated  considerable  donor  response.  For the  first-year  program  donors  committed  US$273 
million for projects in different municipalities (table 2).  The speed and size of the commitments reflect 
donors'  awareness of the need to make up  the shortfall  in  usable housing, to act quickly  in  the short 
construction  period  before  the  onset  of winter,  and  to  assist  in  the  repatriation  of refugees  and 
resettlement of  the internally displaced.  The extent of the needs, combined with the priority of  targeting 
needy  households  among  the  displaced,  have  led  most  donors  to  emphasize  grants  of emergency 
assistance for private housing during the first year. Emergency repairs 
Reconstruction 
Sarajevo program 
Technical assistance 
Total 
- 36-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
170 
76 
23 
4 
273 
Main donors 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, EC, 
Finland, FYROM, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway, OIC, Romania, Spain, 
Slovenia, UK, US, World Bank. 
Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, EC, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Saudi 
Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland. 
Austria, Czech Republic, EC, Malaysia, US, 
World Bank. 
Austria, Canada, EC, Germany, Netherlands, 
World Bank 
12.  Local contractors have been able to supply adequate labor and materials for repair projects.  Both 
small and large contractors have participated in  these projects, and their capability has  been  adequate. 
The ongoing housing repair projects will generate an  estimated  180,000 man months of labor.  Despite 
the disruption in  local production, the supply of building materials has not been a constraint.  Supplier 
networks have functioned adequately to meet demand, with suppliers and contractors turning to imports 
when materials were not available locally (such as glass and electrical and plumbing fixtures).  Although 
it is unclear how much effect the reconstruction program had in stimulating the re-establishment of local 
manufacturing capacity, there are signs of  resumed production of  such items as roof tiles and cement. 
13.  The  pace  of implementation  of donor  resources  channeled  through  NGOs  in  1996  has  been 
extremely  uneven.  With  the  many  donors  and  NGOs  implementing  programs  in  the  sector,  the 
coordination of housing priorities, policies, and activities is  critical to ensure the most effective use  of 
funds.  A Housing Task Force has been established to ensure coordination (box 2). - 37-
Emergency repairs: About 14,200 units to be repaired before the winter 
14.  Emergency repairs  in  1996  will  rehabilitate  about  14,200  units,  benefiting more than  63,000 
people.  In addition, UNHCR recently established a priority list of  municipalities and identified units that 
could eventually house an estimated 184,000 refugees and displaced persons.  The bulk of  the assistance 
has  been programmed for Sarajevo and  its  suburbs, for the Neretva Canton (around Mostar), and the 
Tuzla region.  Programming in Republika Srpska has lagged behind, though projects are planned for the 
Anvil area.
1 
15.  Public housing.  This program component, managed by the PIU includes repair to the external 
structures and  common elements of public housing with joint or parallel  financing  by the European 
Union, UNHCR, the Government of the Netherlands, and the World Bank. In  1996 about 11,200 public 
housing  units  will  be  weatherproofed  before  winter  in  the  main  cities  of the  Federation,  including 
Sarajevo (box 3).  These works will facilitate future repairs to flats and will, in  some instances, lead to 
the creation of  additional dwelling units. 
16.  Private housing:  Donors have channeled financing for  rehabilitating private housing through 
NGOs, bilateral agencies or the Housing Project Implementation Unit (paragraph  17).  Overall,  I ,000 
units have been rehabilitated so far,  in  part in  the target areas defined by UNHCR, and a total of about 
3,000 units will be repaired before the end of 1996.  Projects to rehabilitate another 18,000 units are at 
various stages of implementation.  The largest bilateral program (US$25 million) is funded by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented through NGOs.  It combines housing 
repair with infrastructure rehabilitation and is expected to benefit about 2,500 households.  In addition, a 
program  developed  jointly  by  UNHCR  and  the  United  Methodist  Church  of Relief (UMCOR)  to 
distribute materials is  expected to contribute to the repair of about 6,000 houses in  the Federation and 
2,600 houses in Republika Srpska. 
Technical assistance: Coordinating numerous activities 
17.  The implementation of donor-assisted housing programs in the Federation has been enhanced by 
the establishment of a PIU in the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment.  The PIU, assisted by 
technical experts funded by the German and Dutch governments, is developing and managing part of  the 
The Anvil area, around Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, was heavily damaged in fighting in September 1995, when 
it was reconquered by the Federation.  Following the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, this area was reattached 
to the territory of Republika Srpska. - 38-
housing reconstruction program in close collaboration with the municipalities.  Since its establishment in 
May 1996, the PIU has attracted US$65  million  in  donor funds which are enough to  improve housing 
conditions for about 20,000 households.  The Governments of Italy, Japan  (through the UNDP),  and 
Saudi Arabia have made US$29 million available for the direct implementation of works by the PIU. 
Working  in  close coordination  with  UNHCR and the  Ministry of Refugees,  the PIU  had  completed 
repairs to 210 private housing units and 6,900 public housing units by October 1996. 
18.  As a  first  step  toward  cost recovery  for  the  external  repairs  to  public  housing,  the  PIU  has 
entered into agreements with municipal authorities to gradually increase rents at a rate which would at a 
minimum  recover the cost of repairs.  Decisionmaking in  selecting units for repair, assessing damage, 
and supervising repairs has been decentralized at a local level, procurement and disbursement remained 
centralized.  This  system  has  made  it  possible  to  promote  partnership  between  the  PIU  and  the 
municipalities and "ownership" of  the programs by local and national bodies and also to keep time from 
identification to completion of projects to an average of  four to five months. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
19.  Much progress has been made in  1996 in  financing and  launching emergency repair projects. 
But substantial needs remain to be addressed, particularly in  housing reconstruction  in  Sarajevo and in 
technical  assistance  to  build  institutional  and  implementation  capacity.  In  view  of both  donors' 
disbursement procedures and local implementation capacities, it is estimated that US$150 million can be 
effectively allocated to the sector in  1997 -- based on the pipeline of  projects that can be rapidly prepared 
for implementation, largely in UNHCR-identified areas? 
20.  In  1997 the program aims to enable refugees and displaced persons to return or resettle while 
focusing on general issues such as ownership and cost recovery.  The priorities include: 
2 
•  Continuing the  repair  programs  initiated  in  the  first  year,  focusing  on  units  that can  be 
rapidly restored and on target municipalities including Sarajevo; 
•  Initiating reconstruction projects to restore more heavily damaged public and private housing 
to minimally habitable standards in  target communities and in Sarajevo; 
•  Strengthening implementation and programming capacity; and 
•  Addressing sectoral issues and the institutional and financial sustainability of  reconstruction. 
In addition, UNHCR is seeking US$70 million for shelter assistance. - 39-
21.  To achieve these objectives  it  is  critical that all  parties coordinate their efforts to ensure that 
resources are used effectively.  To aid resettlement, information on how housing conditions affect the 
decisions of displaced persons to return to their homes and their ability to do so (for example, if their · 
homes are occupied by others, or are too severely damaged) needs to be collected and disseminated in  a 
more systematic fashion (box 4).  These efforts would allow a more efficient allocation of resources and 
a  more  demand-driven  approach  to  designing  programs  and  setting  priorities  than  in  1996.  Other 
priorities will  include  creating a  coherent framework  for establishing property rights,  facilitating  the 
reclamation of property by returning refugees and displaced persons, and establishing terms for "tenure" 
of  occupants of property that is not their own. 
22.  Emergency repairs (US$22 million): Ensuring minimal standards.  The program will complete 
the emergency repair phase now under implementation  -- undertaking repairs  on  an  estimated  8,000 
more  private  units.  Donors  should  select  areas  for  emergency  repairs  on  the  basis of the  UNHCR 
priority  list,  with  the  approval  of the  Entity  Ministry of Physical  Planning and  Environment and  in 
coordination with the Task Force.  Implementation should be at the municipal level, with overall project 
management, supervision, and disbursement functions at the ministerial level (through the PIU). 
23.  Reconstruction (US$72 million): Remedying heavy damage.  Reconstruction efforts will focus on 
public  and  private  units  that suffered  heavier damage,  including structural  damage to  external  walls, 
roofs, and internal walls and damage to more than 50  percent of windows and doors.  Projects should 
benefit both private and public housing units.  Projects will arrange for major repairs that are beyond the 
ability of householders, such as roof repairs and major concrete works by contractors, which should be 
selected  on  a  competitive  basis.  The  projects  could  be  implemented  by  the  PIU  and  supervised  by 
housing  reconstruction  units  to  be  set  up  within  the  Entity  Ministries  of Physical  Planning  and 
Environment. 
24.  Sarajevo Program (US$50 million): Addressing extensive needs.  This component will focus on 
substantial needs, as  identified by the Sarajevo municipality in  the public housing sector that still have 
not  been  addressed.  It will  weatherproof  buildings  by  repairing  roofs,  windows,  external  walls, 
entrances,  staircases,  and  damaged  utilities.  Repairs  inside  apartments  will  be  the  responsibility  of 
owners. -40-
25.  Technical assistance (US$6 million): Providing essential support.  Technical assistance should 
be directed to all relevant institutions in the housing sector.  The respective roles of  the different levels of 
government have not yet been defined in  either the Federation or Republika Srpska.  In the Federation, 
Cantons are likely to receive most of  the responsibilities, while the Federation Government would have a 
legislative  and  regulatory  function  (for  planning  laws,  construction  regulations,  etc.)~  technical 
assistance should not, therefore, be limited to the Federation Governments but should also be provided at 
the local and cantonal levels. 
26.  Technical assistance should be provided to support preparation, administration, and supervision 
of works.  Municipalities and implementation agencies should be the main beneficiaries of this support. 
Additional  support  would  be  needed  to  help  formulate  adequate  policies  for  guiding  housing 
reconstruction, recovery and development, including cost recovery and safety net measures-- and neither 
the  Task  Force  nor  the  PIUs  can  substitute  Entity  Governments  in  this  role.  Priorities  include 
strengthening  property  and  collateral  rights,  promoting  land  and  infrastructure  development,  and 
privatizing  housing  and  land.  Teams  of experts  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  drawn  from  the 
appropriate government and local institutions, should be formed and made responsible for the design of 
proper policies and implementation strategies, with the support of  foreign technical expertise. 
Implementation arrangements: Focusing on local implementation 
27.  Donors should focus on improving coordination to ensure an effective, consistent and equitable 
allocation of scarce resources.  To that effect, the Task Force should: 
•  Take the lead in defining eligibility and selection criteria for target areas and beneficiaries; 
•  Ensure transparency and adequacy for programming resources to target areas; and 
•  Coordinate project implementation and effectiveness. 
These actions would support a more coordinated and flexible approach based on a sound understanding 
of the determinants of demand and on experience with implementation strategies.  The Housing Task 
Force has established a policy group to ensure coordination on issues of program criteria, sustainability, 
and cost recovery.  But success depends critically on donor participation in the Task Force. 
28.  Implementing projects through the PIUs has proved to be effective: donors are encouraged to 
channel  resources  directly to  the  PIUs  and  local  offices  (which  should  enhance their capacities) to 
undertake programs and gather information at the local level.
3  The PIUs should remain responsible for 
both managing implementation of  certain assistance programs and coordinating the implementation of  all 
programs.  As a minimum requirement, donors should ensure close coordination with the PIUs to avoid 
duplication of effort and conflicting strategies.  In designing and implementing assistance programs the 
PIUs will  need to take  into account the rapidly changing environment.  Housing assistance programs 
should  evolve  as  the  economy  recovers,  local  institutional  capacity  is  restored,  building  materials 
industry  capacity  increases,  and  banks  become  able  to  handle  housing  reconstruction  loans.  These 
changes will reduce the need for donors to get directly involved in managing contracts for housing repair 
and  reconstruction.  The PIUs'  role  should  expand to  include  monitoring the sector and  developing 
information on factors affecting housing supply and demand in  different localities.  This information 
should  be  used  in  targeting  housing  assistance  and  programming  resources  to  respond  to  changing 
3 
A PIU  should be established in Republika Srpska. -41-
priorities.  Donors can obtain information and assistance from the Entity Ministries of Spatial Planning, 
and the Housing Task Force. 
29.  As  mentioned  above,  priority  should  be  given  to  identified  areas  where  physical  and  social 
infrastructure need to be rehabilitated.  UNHCR has drawn up a list of such areas, which are targets for 
the  return  of refugees  and  displaced  persons.  Housing  reconstruction  projects,  physical  and  social 
infrastructure  projects,  and  employment generation  activities  should  be  coordinated  to  maximize the 
benefits of investments.  This coordinated approach not only would create appropriate conditions for the 
return  of refugees  and  displaced  persons  and  a  return  to  normal  levels  of activity,  but  also  could 
encourage households to invest their own resources in improving their housing conditions. 
V.  STRUCTURAL Ar\JD POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
30.  In  the  short  term  there  is  a  role  for  Governments  in  managing  and  setting  pnontJes  for 
emergency housing assistance programs aimed at jump-starting the repair of  war-related damage.  In the 
short term, efforts focus on completing this repair and handling the return of the displaced population in 
light of the 1996 experience (box 5).  While housing needs go clearly beyond donors' and governments' 
capacities there are still many uncertainties about where households will  finally reside and thus where 
housing shortages will be greatest. Targeted housing assistance for some population groups will probably 
remain necessary for some time.  But such assistance programs have limited objectives and cannot assure 
the sustainable recovery of  the housing sector over the medium term. -42-
31 .  Over the medium to long term ensuring that the housing sector is able to recover and respond to 
demand will require attention to  long-standing sectoral constraints and the transition from  the supply-
driven model of  the past toward market-oriented policies.  The governments will need to take the lead in 
establishing a policy and regulatory framework that encourages private investment and development of a 
housing market.  This work should begin as soon as possible.  Though burdened by the inefficiencies of a 
legal and regulatory framework focused on social production, the prewar housing sector in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina demonstrated considerable capacity by the private sector to construct and finance housing. 
There is every reason to believe that the private sector can resume this role within an enabling policy and 
institutional  framework  as  the  economy recovers.  Donors  should  ensure that adequate  measures are 
taken -- since this will make it possible for them to reduce their support. 
32.  Experience with transition  in  the housing sectors of other countries of the  region  may not be 
fully representative of  the nature and sequencing of reforms needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  None of 
these  countries  faced  the  dramatic  decline  in  the  quality  and  quantity  of housing  that  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina has as a result of  the war, and thus the urgency of stimulating production and investment in 
the immediate term.  In Bosnia and Herzegovina the challenge of overcoming war-generated shortages 
will  remain  a  priority  for  some  time,  but  several  other  issues  also  need  to  be  addressed  to  ensure 
sustainable recovery of  the sector. 
Financial issues 
33.  Introducing cost recovery.  During the first year of the reconstruction program, most programs 
have overlooked cost recovery and transparency or equity in the design of grant funding in the interest of 
responding rapidly to an  emergency situation.  Assistance has  been  provided without consideration of 
households'  ability  to  pay,  and  different  programs  have  established  different  ceilings  for  grants  to 
beneficiaries and allocation criteria.  But given the scarce resources and the enormity of the need, this 
approach  is  not sustainable over the medium term:  it  induces  lack of efficiency  in  the  allocation  of 
resources as well as considerable inequities.  There is  a need to ensure that available resources provide 
_ the greatest benefit to the largest number of people in a transparent, equitable, and well-targeted manner. 
The Governments are aware of this issue and are interested in  applying cost recovery principles in  both 
private and public sector programs. 
34.  Introducing  cost  recovery  for  private  housing  would  provide  incentives  for  beneficiaries  to 
utilize resources more effectively and involve them directly in the decisions to repair their homes.  One 
option would be to provide a one-time grant from donor resources to supplement loans based on ability 
to pay.  Such grants should be based on clearly defined eligibility criteria to ensure that resources reach 
the neediest, complement household resources, and support cost recovery.  Above all, the use of grants 
for housing assistance should be consistent across donor programs. 
35.  Introducing  cost  recovery  and  more  targeted  subsidies  would  require  changes  in  the 
implementation  mechanisms  established  during  the  emergency  period.  It  would  also  require 
strengthening  administrative  capacity  for  implementing  targeted  assistance  programs  and  collecting 
adequate information to ensure that the choice of instruments is appropriate and to monitor their impact. 
36.  Rationalizing rental charges in public housing.  Enterprises and municipalities do  not have the 
resources to maintain the system of subsidized production and  maintenance of housing in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Moreover,  in  the past this  system  was  neither efficient nor equitable  in  responding to 
housing demand.  Over the medium term, as the economy recovers, rental  rates should be  set so as to 
cover the full costs of  maintenance and operations for both legal tenants and occupants in order to ensure -43-
that repairs are maintained.
4 
To avoid causing hardship for the poorest households, who may not be able 
to afford increased rental rates, some form of  housing allowance could be considered.  Rationalizing and 
reducing  subsidies  in  the  public  housing  stock  would  also  require  improving  the  efficiency  of 
management and maintenance by introducing competition in contracting for these functions. 
3  7.  Developing housing finance.  The lack of credit to finance housing has always been a constraint 
to development of private sector housing.  Remittances and savings have often been the only recourse for 
the  private  sector.  Over the  long  term  developing  housing  finance  will  be  critical  to  the  sector's 
recovery.  It will  depend on  progress  in  overall  reforming  and  strengthening of the  banking system, 
reforming the housing sector, and clarifying property rights.
5  Until  long-term financing through banks 
becomes available, consideration could be given to using donor resources to establish lines of credit or a 
revolving  fund  for  housing  as  a  limited  interim  measure.  This  solution  should  be  combined  with 
measures to address long-term constraints on housing finance development, such as reforming the legal 
framework for collateral security, enforcing and ensuring transparency in the property rights system, and 
reforming and developing the banking system and financial sector. 
Institutional issues 
38.  Clarifying property rights.  A clearly defined, fair, stable, and enforceable property rights system 
for land and housing is key to the effective development of  housing markets.  Perhaps the most important 
institutional constraint to the housing sector's recovery in the short and medium term is the complex set 
of  disputes over property rights that have arisen as a result of  the war.  Households that have lost or been 
displaced from  their own homes are occupying units to which they have no  legal  claims as tenants or 
owners.  A  Commission  for  the  Real  Property  Claims  of Displaced  Persons  and  Refugees  has  been 
established in  accordance with the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement to settle disputed claims by owners 
and tenants and lease and mortgage properties.
6  While establishing mechanisms for settling claims will 
be a lengthy and difficult process, priority should be given to assuring that there is  a clear registry of 
ownership and tenancy rights and claims, and to defining terms for leasing by those occupying property 
that is not their own.  Restitution rights may complicate the resolution of  the property issues.  It is critical 
that all these issues be addressed within a comprehensive and coherent framework to avoid conflicting 
strategies and delays in establishing an  enforceable system of property rights. 
39.  Privatizing housing.  A housing privatization law  is  under discussion  in  the Federation but its 
presentation to the parliament was postponed  until  after the elections.  The draft legislation  proposes 
privatizing the public housing stock over a three-year period and to offer rights of first refusal to legal 
4 
5 
6 
The Emergency Repair project has begun making public housing repairs conditional on  incremental increases 
in rents.  While this is a modest step, as present rental rates still are lower than prewar rates, it has encouraged 
municipal  authorities  to  increase  rental  rates  to  cover  repair  costs  and  some  costs  of operations  and 
maintenance. 
Progress in the development of well-functioning market-based mortgage finance systems in other countries in 
the  region  has  been  extremely  slow.  It  has  depended  on  macroeconomic  conditions  and  on  reform  and 
developments  in  the  financial  and  housing  sectors,  particularly  those  related  to  property  rights  and  the 
enforceability of contracts.  Specialized institutions to fill  the void and meet financing needs have been  less 
effective in postwar situations (such as in Lebanon) than a system of  targeted direct grants to households or of 
credit administered through the banking system. 
Funding requirements for this body are part of  the 1997 UN Consolidated Appeal. -44-
tenants.  No similar legislation has been prepared in  Republika Srpska.  Privatizing housing would help 
reduce  the  budgetary  outlays  of local  governments  and  contribute  to  the  development  of housing 
markets.  Experience  in  other countries  has  shown  that the  success  of housing  privatization  efforts 
depends on  accompanying reforms  in  tenancy rights  and  controlled rental  charges.  In  the  long  term 
success also depends on  a legal  framework that establishes the rights and  obligations of owners with 
regard to maintenance and management costs and clear and tradable ownership rights.  Also important is 
to  separate  public  housing  from  enterprises  so  as  not  to  deter  privatization  in  other  sectors  of the 
economy.  Most housing privatizations in  transitional economies have been  undertaken directly by the 
municipalities after a transfer of the stock to municipal authorities, rather than through the enterprises or 
a separate privatization agency. 
40.  The  speed  with  which  privatization  can  occur will  depend  initially  on  progress  in  clarifying 
tenancy rights and the status of  occupants who are not legal tenants.  Because many occupants, unable to 
find  other accommodations, are  likely to  remain as  "tenants," priority should be  given  to establishing 
registries ofthe status by legal tenants and occupants in public housing. 
41.  Reforming the  legal  and regulatory framework.  The  basic  laws  and  regulations  governing 
housing are oriented toward a social housing finance and production system. These laws define tenancy 
rights, rental charges, enterprise finance for housing, and housing standards.  In the prewar period much 
informal  but  good-quality  private  housing  was  developed  in  contravention  of existing  landuse  and 
building regulations -- but at unnecessarily high cost.  Reform of the legal and regulatory framework is 
needed to encourage  private  investment in  rental  and  own  housing,  as  well  as  the  development of a 
housing market.  In addition to clarifying property rights, building development standards and  land  use 
regulations will need to be eased and simplified to ensure a responsive supply of land and housing by the 
private sector.  The legal and regulatory framework also should be reviewed to ensure that constraints to 
developing land and infrastructure due to restrictive zoning codes are reduced. DISTRICT HEATING AND NATURAL GAS 
I.  BACKGROUND 
District Heating 
1.  In  1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina had district heating systems in  most major towns and cities 
with a population in  excess of 25,000 inhabitants.  Throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, district heating 
systems served a total of 120,000 customers, equivalent to 445,000 inhabitants, or 10 percent of  the total 
population.  The systems were generally run  by  municipally-owned district heating enterprises which 
ensured the supply and distribution of heat.  Cogeneration was provided by the combined heat and power 
plants in Tuzla and Kakanj, as well as by local industries such as the steel industry in Zenica; in all other 
cases heat was generated by local heat-only boilers. 
2.  All district heating enterprises, except in  Zenica, were created and controlled by municipalities. 
Heat prices differed from one municipality to another based on the cost of  the inputs (primarily fuel) and 
on  whether or not the municipality helped finance investments, debt service and other costs.  Hence, in 
many cases district heating prices were well  below economic levels,  as  were the prices of most other 
fuels.  The average subsidy was US$1 00 per annum per consumer, compared to an  average annual heat 
bill of about US$370 per consumer.  The situation in the district heating sector as a result of the war is 
summarized in box 1. -46-
Natural Gas 
3.  Development of the natural  gas system  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina began  in  1975.  As of the 
beginning of 1992,  gas  was  used  primarily  for  industrial  and  commercial  needs  along  the  Zvornik-
Sarajevo-Zenica  pipeline  and  for  space  heating  in  Sarajevo  and  Zenica.  The  gas  supply  network 
consisted of: 
•  Some  190  km  of transmission  mains  (16  inch/50  bar)  and  offtake  pipes,  running  from 
Zvornik to the Sarajevo area via Semizovac, and from Semizovac to Zenica; 
•  Eight large regulation stations in Sarajevo, Ilijas, Visoko, Kakanj, Zenica, and Zvornik; and 
•  A distribution network of  450 km with about fourty smaller regulation stations. 
4.  Gas consumption peaked in  1990 at 610 mill ion cubic meters, constituting 8 percent of the total 
energy consumption in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In  Sarajevo there were 15,000 household connections, 
and all  major boiler houses of the city's district heating system had  been converted from  coal to gas-
firing. 
5.  Gas has been imported under a contract between Energopetrol (a Bosnian oil and gas company) 
and Gazexport (the export branch of Russia's Gazprom).  Gas imports are metered at the border of the 
Ukraine  (Beregov,  the  contractual  point  of delivery  of the  gas)  and  Hungary.  From  there,  gas  is 
transported through the Hungarian and Serbian transmission systems to Zvornik, in Republika Srpska, at 
the border with Serbia (where it is  also metered).  The transport cost of the gas from  Russia to Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina through Hungary and Serbia is  paid in kind (in gas) and averages about 40 percent of 
the contracted gas volume,  much  higher than  standard for  such transit.  This  is  primarily due to the 
"penalties" being  levied  by  Serbia.  Transmission, distribution, and  maintenance of the gas  networks 
throughout the country was the responsibility of Sarajevogas, a utility company owned by the city of 
Sarajevo.  During the war, Sarajevogas split into two companies, one of which is active in the Federation 
(Sarajevogas) and the other one in Repub1ika Srpska (Sarajevogas-Lukavica). 
6.  Since  the  Dayton-Paris  Peace  Agreement  was  concluded  gas  has  been  supplied  without 
interruption,  although  Gazexport  threatened  repeatedly  to  interrupt  supplies.  Payment  for  gas 
consumption was only partial (28 percent of  the total due by the Government of  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and 20 percent by the Netherlands), corresponding roughly to the actual estimated consumption in  the 
Federation.  The  number  of normalized  gas  connections  increased  from  15,000  to  25,000,  thus -47-
decreasing the number of illegal connections from  74,000 to 64,000.  The situation  in  the natural  gas 
sector as a result of  the war is summarized in box 2. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
District Heating 
7.  The objectives of  the district heating reconstruction program are to: 
•  Repair  the  district  heating  systems  to  restore  urban  heating  services  to  adequate  levels, 
particularly in the most populated cities; 
•  Rehabilitate building internal heating installations; 
•  Strengthen sector institutions and  introduce a  program to gradually  increase cost recovery 
during 1996-99; 
•  Undertake  master plan  studies for the optimal  configuration of each  city's future  heating 
system; and 
•  Mitigate  the  energy  security  risk  associated  with  a  single  source  of energy  supply:  by 
ensuring  that  the  oil-firing  capacity  of the  Sarajevo  district  heating  system's  boilers  is 
operational, Bosnia and Herzegovina could potentially reduce its reliance on natural gas. 
8.  The district heating reconstruction program submitted to the donors in December 1995 and April 
1996  remains  valid  as  an  overall  framework  for the  1997-99  program.  It will  require  an  estimated 
US$171  million  in  external support for the three- to four-year period within the overall US$5.1  billion 
priority reconstruction program (table 1  ): 
•  In 1996, US$29 million has been firmly committed: reconstruction has  been  carried out 
very successfully this year in  Sarajevo despite an exceedingly tight deadline (paragraphs 12 
and  13); a financing gap of about US$11  million (27 percent of the US$40 million project 
cost) remains to be covered; 
•  In  1997,  US$76  million  in  external  financing  will  be  required  --- about  73  percent 
(US$55.5 million) would benefit the Federation and 27 percent (US$20 million) Republika 
Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 20); this amount includes the US$11  million shortfall carried over 
from  1996;  a  list  of corresponding  investments  will  be  prepared  for  the  Third  Donor 
Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  For 1998-99, an estimated US$66  million  will  be  necessary and  several  policy  issues 
should be addressed to ensure the longer term sustainability of the program (paragraphs 26 
and 27). -48-
Table 1.  District Heating Reconstruction Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Heat sources  80.6  7.5  37.0  36.1 
Heat distribution  28.8  5.5  12.5  10.8 
Heat substations  27.1  2.5  14.0  10.6 
Internal installations  14.0  7.0  4.0  3.0 
Heat meters  3.6  1.5  1.0  1.1 
Control equipment  5.0  0.0  3.0  2.0 
Other equipment  1.5  1.5  0.0  0.0 
Site preparation  1.5  0.5  1.0  0.0 
Technical assistance  8.9  3.5  3.0  2.4 
Total  171.0  29.5  75.5  66.0 
Note:  Costs include physical contingencies of20 percent but exclude spare parts, taxes and 
duties. 
Natural Gas 
9.  The objectives of  the natural gas reconstruction program are to: 
•  Reconfigure the gas network and restore safe service to an acceptable level; 
•  Ensure  demand  management  through  disconnection  of  illegal  consumers  that  can  be 
reconnected to the district heating system, introduction of energy efficient appliances, and 
through gradually increased cost recovery during the period 1996-99; and 
•  Strengthen sector institutions. 
10.  The natural gas reconstruction program submitted to the donors in  December 1995  and April 
1996 remains valid as an overall framework for the 1997-99 program.  It will require US$81 million in 
external support for the 3-4 year period within the overall US$5.1 billion priority reconstruction program 
(table 2):
1 
•  In  1996,  US$17  million  has  been  committed:  despite  a  69  percent  (US$38  million) 
financing gap over the US$55 million first-year estimate, a  number of activities have been 
carried out successfully this year, thanks in particular to additional donations from various 
cities, not reported here (paragraphs 14 to 16); 
Additional financing would be needed to meet requirements made by the Entity Governments to: (i) develop a 
gas distribution system in Zvomik (Republika Srpska) for 20,000 households and (ii) restore the main pipe 
from Sarajevo to Zenica.  These projects have, however, not been incorporated in  the priority reconstruction 
program: in Zvomik, the proposed project is a development activity -- not rehabilitation; the restoration of the 
Sarajevo - Zenica main pipe would mainly benefit the steel plant in Zenica and should therefore be examined 
in the context of  the overall restructuring of  this factory. -49-
•  In 1997, US$53 million in external financing will be required--- about 78 percent (US$41 
million) would benefit the Federation and 22  percent (US$12  million)  Republika Srpska 
(paragraphs 21  to 23).  This amount includes the US$40 million carried over from  1996.  A 
list  of corresponding  investments  will  be  prepared  for  the  February  1997  Third  Donor 
Conference; and 
•  For 1998-99 US$10 million will be necessary.  This amount could however be reduced to 
take into account in-kind contributions and volunteer work (paragraph  11 ).  Several policy 
issues should be addressed to ensure the long-term sustainability of the program (paragraphs 
25 and 26). 
11.  In addition to donor commitments as reported in tables 2 and 4, several italian cities, the city of 
Ankara and the city of Sarajevo provided in-kind contribution, and volunteers carried out civil works --
all these could be valued at about US$1 0-12 million. 
Table 2.  Natural Gas System Reconstruction Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Engineering  5.0  1.4  3.6  0.0 
Transmission  9.8  1.2  7.1  1.5 
Distribution  42.8  2.0  32.2  8.6 
Strategic planning, T  A  1.2  0.3  0.9  0.0 
Billing  0.7  0.2  0.5  0.0 
software&equipment 
Land mine clearing  1.1  0.0  0.8  0.3 
Sub-total  60.6  5.1  45.1  10.4 
Payment for gas supply  20.0  12.0  8.0  0.0 
Total  80.6  17.1  53.1  10.4 
Note: Costs include a physical contingency of 10 percent but exclude the costs of spare parts, taxes 
and duties. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
District Heating 
12.  The ongoing US$40 million Emergency District Heating Reconstruction Project  is  focused on 
Sarajevo but also contains a US$0.5 million project preparation component for Banja Luka.  Financing is 
provided  by the  Government of Finland,  the  European Commission,  and  the  World  Bank (table 3). 
Hence, the financing gap to be covered in  1997 is about US$11 million. District Heating 
Total 
-50-
Table 3.  Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
29.5 
29.5 
Main Donors 
Finland, Netherlands, EC, Luxembourg, 
World Bank 
13.  The  project  is  progressing  extremely  well  and  is  expected  to  be  completed  on  schedule  by 
September 30,  1997.  In  the space of  just five months and under a very tight deadline (the start of the 
1995/96 heating season), the following major successes were achieved: 
•  The  entire  district  heating  system  underwent  an  engineering  survey  and  assessment  to 
determine the system's condition and possibilities for system improvements; 
•  To ensure that priority targets would  be  met,  reconstruction works to  be  undertaken  were 
divided  into  a  fast-track  program (implemented through November  1996) and  a  one-year 
program (through September 1997); 
•  Approximately 45,000 flats  were surveyed to determine the exact damage to the  building 
internal heating installations; 
•  About 32,000 flats were reconnected to the district heating system by mid-November 1996, 
after extensive rehabilitation of building  internal  heating  installations;  another 4,000 flats 
will  be  reconnected  by  end-December  1996  and  the  remaining  flats  will  be  reconnected 
progressively through September 1997; 
•  Most of  the boilers and substations were repaired to a level sufficient to operate on base load 
(meeting 60-80 percent of  peak heat demand) throughout the winter of 1996-97; 
•  About 3.0 km of  network pipes were replaced; 
•  A new billing and collection system, including software and hardware, was introduced and 
the entire database of  flat owners/occupants and addresses was updated; and 
•  A  draft  master  plan  has  been  developed  for  a  redesigned,  interconnected  future  district 
heating system; the final version is expected by March 1997 and implementation will start at 
that  time.  Based  on  the  master  plan,  three  separate  interconnected  areas  would  be 
constructed, replacing twelve previously independent networks  and  eliminating thirty-two 
highly inefficient boiler plants.  This would bring the total number of independent networks 
down from  forty-four to thirty-five and enhance energy efficiency within the system.  The 
savings resulting from increased energy efficiency and from elimination of boiler plants that 
would otherwise need reconstruction would more than offset the cost of interconnection. 
Natural Gas 
14.  Gazexport's past threats to cut off the gas supply due to non-payment have made the conclusion 
of a reliable long-term gas supply agreement with credible payment mechanisms between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  and  Gazexport  a  prerequisite  for  funding  by  major  financiers.  Despite  this,  some 
significant progress was made during 1996 (table 4). -51 -
Table 4.  Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Repair  works  and  technical 
assistance 
Payment for gas supply 
Total 
Amount 
5.1 
12.0 
17.1 
Main Donors 
EC, Netherlands, UK, World Bank 
Netherlands, Turkey 
15.  ODA,  the  European  Commission,  other  European  and  Middle  Eastern  donors,  the  City  of 
Sarajevo and citizen volunteer labor financed equipment and works valued at about US$13 million.  This 
resulted in the following achievements: 
•  About  40  percent  of the  engineering  for  the  transmission  and  distribution  system  was 
completed; 
•  About 20 percent of  the transmission system reconstruction was completed, especially repair 
ofthe block valve, cleaning, transmission  metering and regulating stations; 
•  Cathodic protection replacement and repair has been completed; 
•  Distribution system repair is about 34 percent complete. The majority of  the large consumers 
had their regulating and metering facilities repaired; 
•  Approximately 200 km  of network piping  has  been  installed.  Most of this  was  installed 
utilizing "citizen self help"; and 
•  About 30 percent of the measurement and  regulating works for residential consumers and 
about 12 percent of  the in-house installations (interior piping, heaters and cookers) have been 
completed. 
16.  The World Bank recently released US$2 million in project start-up advance funds to help finance 
gas  equipment for the district heating boilers and to  finance the  installation of regulators and  meters 
(provided by the European Commission) to normalize about 3,500 illegal connections. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
District Heating 
17.  The district heating program  for  1997-98 would consist of the  highest priority reconstruction 
requirements for the district heating systems in  a  large number of cities (possibly up  to thirty-seven) 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which up to thirty-four in the Federation and three in Republika 
Srpska (Banja Luka, Doboj and the  Serb part of Sarajevo).  For 1997,  commitments of about US$75 
million would be  required to finance  part of this program. Included in  this amount is  US$6.5  million 
necessary  to  remedy  the  financing  gap  of the  ongoing  Emergency  District  Heating  Reconstruction 
Project  in  Sarajevo.  This amount would  be  primarily used  to finance  the  interconnection  of twelve 
networks within the system and for individual heat metering -52-
18.  Damage to the district heating systems of individual cities was typically caused by direct shelling 
and/or indirect damage due to corrosion and cracking of boilers, substations and pipes in  the network. 
Lack of maintenance due to war shortages has further compounded the above problems.  In many cities, 
fuel supplies were interrupted during the war.  Due to non-usage of  most of  the system, damage has been 
caused by corrosion, freezing and cracking, compounded by a lack of maintenance and repair.  Building 
internals  (pipes,  radiators and  valves) may also  have  incurred  substantial  damage due to rusting  and 
cracking.  In some cities a large influx of refugees would also warrant expansion of the district heating 
system. 
19.  Within the 1997 district heating reconstruction program priority should be given to those cities 
where the largest impact can be made in terms of enabling apartment dwellers to switch back to district 
heating, instead of using wood and coal for their space heating needs.  Prime candidates (in alphabetical 
order) are the cities of Banja Luka, Bihac, Doboj, Mostar, Tuzla, Vitez and Zenica.  Medium-sized cities 
for which rehabilitation has been requested are Gorazde, Jajce, Livno, Maglaj, Novi Travnik, Prozor-
Rama, Sanski Most, Sarajevo (Serb part), and Travnik.  Smaller cities for which significant funding has 
been  requested  include  Banovici,  Bosanska  Krupa,  Bosanski  Petrovac,  Busovaca,  Cazin,  Capljina, 
Citluk, Drvar, Glamoc, Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kladanj, K1juc,  Konjic,  Kupres, Ljubuski, Lukavac, Tesanj, 
Tomislavgrad, Velika Kladusa, and Zepce. 
20.  Consultants are being engaged under EC financing to review investment priorities in  each city's 
district  heating  system  throughout  the  country  and  to  prepare  cost  estimates  and  the  technical 
specifications for bidding documents. Identification of the individual components to be financed within 
this  program  will  be  a  painstaking  and  time  consuming  process,  in  part  due  to  the  geographical 
dispersion  of the  systems.  It should  be  emphasized  that the  cost of the  1997-1999  district heating 
program is tentative and based largely on the estimates submitted by the district heating enterprises.  In 
some cases emergency reconstruction costs appear to have been significantly underestimated, while in 
other cases they may have been overestimated. 
Natural Gas 
21.  The US$45 million natural gas program would consist of: (i) about US$40 million to close the 
financing gap for the proposed Emergency Natural Gas System Reconstruction  Project, of which  the 
World  Bank  would  finance  an  additional  US$13  million  (paragraph  13);  and  (ii)  US$5  million  to 
regularize about 3,300 improvised gas connections in  the Serb part of Sarajevo.  No funding has been 
provided for the reconstruction of the Semizovac-Zenica transmission pipeline portion (US$17 million), 
since this is closely linked to the future of the Zenica steelworks.  Also not included is a request for an 
estimated  US$2 I  million  for  the  construction  of a  new  gas  distribution  network  for  about  20,000 
individual  consumers  in  Zvornik,  since  this  falls  outside the  scope of the  emergency reconstruction 
program.  Currently, only the district heating boilers in Zvornik receive gas. 
22.  Within this program priorities include:  (i) engineering analysis and design;  (ii) reconstruction 
and rehabilitation works on both the transmission pipeline and the distribution network (for Sarajevo the 
latter includes, as a major component, the normalization of illegal connections in areas not served by the 
district  heating  system  and  where  gas  heating  constitutes  an  economically justifiable  option);  (iii) 
procurement of spare parts and service vehicles; and (iv) technical assistance for project implementation 
and institution building. 
23.  Works on the transmission pipeline include repairs of: (a) the most heavily damaged parts of  the 
pipeline; and (b) the valve, measurement, regulating and metering stations in  Butila, Hum and Kladanj. -53-
Works  on  the  distribution  network  include:  (a)  converting  improvised  connections  to  standard 
connections for those consumers that can not be connected to the district heating system, and introducing 
energy efficient appliances;  (b)  construction  of distribution  piping to  safely expand  the  network;  (c) 
measurement and regulation installation; and (d) measurement calibration and reinstallation of meters for 
large consumers. 
Implementation Arrangements 
District Heating 
24.  In  each of the cities where rehabilitation work  is  to  be  undertaken,  implementation would  be 
ensured by the municipal district heating companies.  Project management units should be set up within 
each district heating enterprise or group of enterprises, depending on  size, needs,  proximity, and other 
factors.  In the case of projects funded in  part by the World Bank, Project Implementation Units (PIUs) 
would be set up.  For example, the PIU of Toplane-Sarajevo (the district heating company) consists of 
about  12  Toplane  engineers  and  about  8  expatriate  engineers.  It  is  responsible  for  overall  project 
scheduling, coordination, procurement of goods and services, management of funds,  proj~ct monitoring 
and progress reporting. 
Natural Gas 
25.  With some assistance in  project engineering, management, and supervision, Sarajevogas would 
be able to implement the reconstruction program.  The company has already a functioning PIU.  Most of 
the needs of the 1996-97 project are in  the Federation area.  Implementation of the works to be carried 
out within the Federation would be the responsibility of Sarajevogas.  Cooperation with  Sarajevogas-
Lukavica (in Republika Srpska) will be necessary, particularly for those works to be carried out on the 
transmission  system  between  Zvornik  and  Kladanj.  Cooperation  between  the  two  companies  is 
satisfactory. -54-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
26.  The major short-term policy issues to be addressed in  light of  the 1996 experience (box 3) in the 
district heating and natural gas sectors are: 
•  Cost  recovery.  Because  of the  financial  difficulties  faced  by  consumers,  billing  and 
collection  of both  district  heating  and  gas  was  suspended  for  household  consumers 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These billing systems must now be restored, upgraded 
and reintroduced; this task is complicated by the numerous changes in  owners/occupants of 
dwellings  and  in  street  names.  Metering,  billing  and  collection  must  be  gradually  but 
aggressively increased to ensure full cost recovery in the sector at the latest by the end of the 
transition period. While households may not be able to afford to pay much at this time,  it is 
important that the household tariff levels (which currently cover only about 20 percent of 
economic costs) be  increased as rapidly as possible during  1996-98 to cover all  operating 
costs.  This would both generate critically needed cash flow for the enterprises and suppress 
uneconomic demand (e.g.  inefficient home-made appliances and  leaking pipes have driven 
up per capita gas consumption to a level that is  perhaps twice as high as it would be under 
normal circumstances);  Y 
•  Payment for current gas consumption.  This issue is  linked to the above and of primary 
importance for the natural gas sector in order to achieve the conclusion of a sound long-term 
gas supply agreement with Gazexport (paragraph 13); and 
•  Institution building.  A portion of  the technical assistance effort should be concentrated on 
training  management and  staff of the district heating  and  natural  gas  entities  in  modern 
utility management and operating techniques. 
27.  The major medium-term policy issues to be  addressed  in  the district heating and  natural  gas 
sectors are: 
•  Network  reconfiguration.  Network  planning  studies  should  be  launched  to  guide 
rehabilitation beyond the priority repairs and to prepare the optimal configuration of each 
city's future heating and natural gas system; 
•  Settlement of past debts to Gazexport.  Normalization of  the financial arrangements in the 
gas sector and determination of the share of the debt to be repaid by Republika Srpska and 
the Federation, respectively, for their gas consumption since 1992 will be essential; and 
•  Sector restructuring.  Special attention should be paid to sector restructuring options such 
as  breaking  up  Sarajevogas  into  a  transmission  company  and  several  independent  local 
distribution companies, and in the long run possibly privatization of selected components of 
the system.  Since most district heating systems are too small to warrant splitting production, 
transmission and distribution, there appears to be very limited scope for restructuring in  the 
sector other than eventual privatization. WATER AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A well-functioning system of  water, sanitation and solid waste collection devastated by 
the war 
1.  Before the war, water and  waste management services in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina were good, 
both  in  coverage and  in  quality.  In  urban areas,  piped water served 94  percent of the  inhabitants and 
sewerage 72  percent; water production capacity kept pace with  demand,  and twenty-four hour service 
was the norm.  In rural areas, 3  5 percent of the population was connected to piped water supply systems 
and  10  percent  to  sewerage  systems,  a  rate  comparable  to  that  in  most  industrial  countries.  Trash 
collection services were well managed, leaving urban areas reasonably free of litter; however, services 
were locally organized, using highly inefficient collection equipment with no recycling.  Solid waste was 
disposed of in landfills, but few of  the facilities were properly designed or managed to mod~rn standards. 
Investment  was  adequate  in  water  supply  and  solid  waste  disposal,  but  insufficient  in  wastewater 
collection  and  disposal.  Thus,  sewerage  coverage  lagged  well  behind  water  supply  coverage,  and 
secondary treatment of wastewater was limited to Sarajevo and seven other medium-size cities. 
2.  Massive population movements during the war and high population concentrations in the parts of 
the country considered to be the safest intensified the effect of direct war damage, resulting  in  major 
problems in the delivery of basic water and sanitation services.  Leakage losses increased, reaching up to 
50  percent (compared to 30 percent before the war).  In  the Federation, twenty-seven of the sixty-nine 
municipalities  no  longer have  twenty-four hour service,  and  clogged  sewerage  and  drainage  systems 
have  left  areas  flooded  for  extensive  periods.  In  Republika  Srpska,  war  damage  to  facilities  seems 
relatively minor,  but all  facilities  have  suffered from  lack of maintenance.  The problems  have  been 
exacerbated by the division of  the country: water sources for municipalities in one Entity that originate in 
the  other Entity  are  no  longer functioning,  largely  because  access  is  denied.  The  war  has  severely 
impaired the quality of solid waste services.  In  addition to extensive damage to collection equipment 
accessibility to  landfills has been severely limited by  landmines and the overburdening of small urban 
tipping areas. 
Neglect and lack of  maintenance of  irrigation and flood control systems 
3.  Infrastructure  for  irrigation,  flood  control,  and  drainage  was  not  extensive  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina before the war.  Irrigation was developed in  the southern  part of the country, to  produce 
Mediterranean crops.  Most of the irrigation systems relied on piped delivery systems used primarily for 
conveying drinking water.  Flood control works comprised river draining and levees and were limited to 
the  main  streams of the  Sava,  Neretva,  Bosna,  Sana,  and  Una river basins.  In  the  Sava river basin, 
drainage canals were constructed to reclaim poorly drained land for development. 
4.  Damage to  irrigation systems during the war came mainly from  neglect,  and  rehabilitation of 
these systems is  a relatively low priority, except where required to  restore drinking water service.  In 
some  areas  flood  control  embankments  were  extensively  damaged  by  the  digging  of trenches,  the 
building of bunkers, the passing of heavy military vehicles, or artillery bombardments.  Several drainage -56-
pumping stations that pump water from behind the levees were military targets during the fighting and no 
longer function.  Repair of  these systems is critical to prevent future flood damage. 
Disorganized institutions 
5.  Before the war, the municipalities were responsible for providing water supply, solid waste, and 
sanitation services in  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These services were ensured by komunalcos (municipal 
service companies), which functioned  as  municipally-owned joint-stock companies.  The  Government 
was responsible for  policy, master planning, regulation, technical support, flood  control, and  regional 
water  systems  construction  and  for  providing  most  of  the  major  investment  financing  to  the 
municipalities.  Government functions were ensured by the Ministry of  Agriculture, Water Management, 
and Forestry through  its  implementing agency, Vodoprivreda Bosnia and  Herzegovina with a  staff of 
about  350.  Investment  proposals  were  generally  initiated  by  the  komunalcos.  Planning  and 
implementation were the responsibility of  the komunalcos for local projects requiring no federal funding 
and of  VBH for regional projects. 
6.  The war had a major impact both on the structure and the effectiveness of sectoral institutions. 
Though the division of responsibilities between the central Government and the munidpalities did not 
change, the Federation and Republika Srpska now have  independent water management enterprises --
Vodoprivreda Bosnia and Herzegovina (VBH) in the Federation and Zavod za Vodoprivredu Republike 
Srpske (ZVRS) in  Republika Srpska.  In the Federation, most of the cantons formed water management 
departments, though with unclear responsibilities -- a further modification of institution arrangements. 
Staffing was severely reduced at both the Government and municipal level, as most qualified personnel 
left the country. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGE 
7.  The three- to four-year reconstruction program aims to: 
•  Restore water, sewerage, solid waste disposal, flood control, and irrigation systems to prewar 
levels; and 
•  Establish the proper institutional arrangements to make the improvements sustainable. 
8.  The program prepared in  1995 remains valid as an  overall framework.  It will  require US$363 
million for implementation over the three- to four-year reconstruction period within the overall US$5.1 
billion priority reconstruction program (table 1): 
•  In 1996, US$83 million was firmly committed, leaving a financing gap of US$57 million 
in  the  first-year  program  requirements  (originally  estimated  at  US$140  million); 
achievements in  1996 were nonetheless significant (paragraphs 10 to 17); 
•  In 1997, US$100 million is required, 51  percent of  which would benefit the Federation, and 
49 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 25).  A list of corresponding investments will 
be prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  In  1998  and  1999,  US$180  million  will  be  needed,  and  issues  of sector  organization, 
investments priorities, and sanitation services upgrading would be addressed to ensure the -57-
medium-term sustainability of  the reconstruction program, which would require a continued 
involvement of  the donor community (paragraph 26). 
Table 1.  Water and Waste Management Reconstruction Program 
External Financial Requirements (US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Federation 
Works and goods  238  74  44  120 
Water supply  [188]  [65]  [28]  [95] 
Wastewater  [20]  [5]  [6]  [9] 
Solid waste  (20]  (0]  (8]  [12] 
Flood control and irrigation  [1 0]  (4]  [2]  (4] 
Institutional strengthening  16  7  5  4 
Recurrent costs  4  1  2 
Sub-total  258  82  51  125 
Republika Srpska 
Works and goods W  95  0  44  51 
Institutional strengthening  8  1  4  3 
Recurrent costs  2  0 
Sub-total  105  1  49  55 
Total  363  83  100  180 
W Breakdown to be added after finalization ofRepublika Srpska's plan. 
9.  The priority reconstruction program includes several components: 
•  Works and goods:  rehabilitation, reconstruction and upgrading beyond prewar levels when 
economically justified (for example,  in  case  of demand  shifts  as  a  result  of population 
movements);  a  detailed  reconstruction  plan,  including  needs  assessments  and  priority 
projects,  was  completed  in  September  1996  for  the  Federation;  a  similar  plan  is  to  be 
finalized by December 1996 for Republika Srpska; 
•  Institution strengthening:  technical  assistance, training,  reconstruction of office facilities, 
and  recurrent  cost  financing  aimed  at  both  strengthening  the  Entity  Vodoprivredas  and 
Project Implementation Units (PIUs) to give them the capacity to manage the reconstruction 
program (see below); and preparing an institutional assessment of  the sector and developing 
a long-term strategy for the sustainability of  the reconstruction measures. 
•  Recurrent costs:  although there is a need for recurrent cost financing for system operations, 
the amount budgeted is for implementation of the reconstruction program; the funds will be 
used  mainly for  institutional support of the Vodoprivredas, the new  canton organizations, 
and the komunalcos, not for operating costs. -58-
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
10.  The objectives of  the first year's program were to: 
•  Organize and plan the reconstruction effort for the sector; and 
•  Implement emergency measures. 
Donors have provided substantial funding to that effect (table 2). 
Water supply 
Wastewater 
Solid waste 
Flood control and irrigation 
Institutional strengthening 
Recurrent costs 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
Amount 
65.0 
5.0 
0.5 
4.0 
7.5 
1.0 
83.0 
Main Donors 
Austria, Canada, EC, France, Germany, ICRC, 
Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, 
Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, World 
Bank 
Austria, EC, Luxembourg, US, World Bank 
y 
EC, WHO 
us 
Netherlands, Switzerland, WHO, World Bank 
Netherlands, World Bank 
11.  In 1996, activities concentrated mainly on emergency water works and equipment supply to the 
Federation municipalities.  Significant efforts were also made to reactivate and  strengthen the Entity 
Vodoprivredas. 
Rehabilitation works: Emergency waterworks and equipment supply 
12.  Many successful reconstruction or rehabilitation works were undertaken in  1996.  Daily water 
service was reestablished in  Sarajevo (although only for two hours a day in many areas).  Materials and 
equipment were supplied, and repairs were made to improve the situation in a number of municipalities. 
An exhaustive list of  the projects undertaken is reported in annex I. 
13.  Two different types of  implementation arrangements have been used: 
•  Some  donors  have  implemented  projects  directly,  the  largest  effort  of this  type  is  the 
European Commission's (EC) supply of materials and equipment to rehabilitate forty-seven 
Federation water and sewerage systems; the EC worked closely with VBH to design standard 
equipment and material packages based on the number of customers served but it carried out 
procurement and delivery of the packages directly.  The Swiss Government is  funding  a 
directly  implemented  institution  building  program  in  the  Bihac  canton,  the  Austrian 
Government is  financing system upgrading projects in  three municipalities, and the United 
Kingdom  Overseas  Development  Administration  (ODA),  the  United  States  Agency  for 
International  Development (USAID), the  Red  Cross,  and  the  World Health  Organization 
(WHO) are implementing their own programs (box I); and -59-
•  Others have relied  upon  the Vodoprivredas (mainly VBH  in  the Federation) to  implement 
their projects, for example, the governments of France, Italy, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and 
the World Bank. 
Institution development: Reactivating the Vodoprivredas 
14.  The main institutional success has been the reactivation of the Federation Vodoprivreda, VBH. 
VBH is  implementing twenty-five projects (twelve of them emergency measures of a high priority) and 
preparing  an  additional  twenty-one  for  future  implementation,  with  a  staff  of  forty-five.  The 
strengthening ofVBH was made possible by a grant from the Government of  the Netherlands, which was 
used to outfit VBH with computers, vehicles, office machines, office furniture, and  instruments and to 
provide computer training for key staff.  Similar progress has been initiated in Republika Srpska. 
15.  In  the  Federation,  the  newly  strengthened  VBH  assumed  primary  responsibility  for  the 
reconstruction program  including setting priorities, and carrying out the contracting for projects using 
funds under government control.  The municipalities were responsible for supervising the contracts after 
award. 
16.  Another major contribution to the organization and planning of the reconstruction effort was the 
completion of sector needs assessments and sector emergency reconstruction and development plans for 
the  Federation  and  Republika  Srpska.  The  plans  identify  and  prioritize  projects  water  supply, 
wastewater,  and  solid  waste  disposal  and  identify  but  do  not  prioritize  essential  flood  control  and 
irrigation projects.  The Federation plan  includes a proposal  for restructuring the solid waste disposal 
sector at the  canton  level  in  order to  increase  efficiency and  reduce  costs.  The  proposal  has  been 
accepted by the Government, and all proposed measures in the solid waste disposal sector are consistent 
with the plan. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
17.  In  1997,  donors  should  maintain  the  momentum  of 1996  and  expand  their  activities  into 
Republika Srpska.  For 1997, US$100 million is needed to: 
•  Implement  new  investments  within  the  framework  of Federation  and  Republika  Srpska 
priority programs; - 60-
•  Strengthen institutions, by:  preparing an institutional assessment and a strategic plan for the 
institutional strengthening and restructuring of  the sector; obtaining from each beneficiary of 
the program cost recovery and system operation and maintenance plans as a first step toward 
sustatinability;  and  establish  a  monitoring  system  and  indicators  for  measuring 
reconstruction progress; and 
•  Cover minimal recurrent expenditures. 
Emergency plans and physical investments identified (US$88 million) 
18.  The proposed physical investments for the 1997 program in  the Federation, which are based on 
the emergency plan priorities have been selected and prioritized on the basis of a comprehensive needs 
assessment and a systematic approach to priority setting
1 (annex  I).  A similar list of projects will  be 
completed by January 1997 for Rep  ubi ika Srpska.  Listed measures are grouped into one of  the following 
three categories: 
•  Emergency measures, projects that can be implemented for less that US$150,000, completed 
in less than one year, and have an immediate positive impact;  y 
•  Reconstruction  measures,  larger  projects  designed  to  eventually  restore  prewar  service 
levels; and 
•  Development measures, designed to meet service levels in the future. 
Strengthening institutions:  A first step toward sustainability (US$9 million) 
19.  Institutional assessment and strategic plan.  Even before the war, water management in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was highly centralized and services were heavily subsidized.  The resulting investment 
planning  and  implementation  were  inefficient,  and  maintenance  was  poor  (with  a  high  level  of 
unaccounted-for water).  Setting up  a  new  structure  is  a  precondition  for  achieving  sustainability of 
reconstruction  investments.  As  a  first  step toward restructuring the  sector, the  institutional  situation 
should  be  assessed,  from  the  municipal  level  up;  in  particular,  the  role  of the  cantons  in  water 
management  should  be  defined.  A  plan  could  then  be  drafted  addressing  organizational  changes, 
personnel requirements, water management policy, privatization, and regulatory policy. The assessment 
and strategic plan should be completed and agreed on in  1997 for implementation beginning in  1998. 
20.  Cost-recovery and operation and maintenance plans.  Setting up  cost-recovery mechanisms is 
critical in view of the magnitude of the investments required, the need for covering the operating costs, 
and the lack of budgetary resources.  Donors should ensure that municipalities are prepared to  use the 
investments  properly.  Each  municipality  or  other  organization  to  receive  donor  funds  should  be 
obligated first to submit a cost-recovery plan for operating and maintaining water supply, sewerage, and 
solid  waste  collection  systems.  The  cost-recovery  plans  should  be  gradual,  targeting  recovery  of 
First, the desired level of services were defined in  consultation with the Vodoprivredas.  Gaps  between  the 
actual situation and desired service level were quantified and measures were formulated to bridge the gaps and 
provide the desired service levels.  A multicriteria evaluation computer program, PrimaVera, was applied to set 
priorities.  Criteria used consisted of location factors  such  as  the  refugee situation,  damage to  housing, the 
potential  in  the  region  for economic revival, and  project  benefits  such  as  cost-benefit ratio  and  number of 
persons benefited. - 61  -
operating costs  in  three years and  full  cost recovery  in  five  years.  The  plan  should also  detail  how 
operational costs would be met during the first three years. 
21.  Monitoring system.  To further improve donor coordination and ensure that scarce resources are 
directed  to  meet priority needs,  a  systematic monitoring and  reporting system  should  be  established. 
Reports would be distributed to all  members of the  water management task force  (paragraph 25) and 
would be available to all potential donors. 
Recurrent Costs: Supporting current operations (US$3 million) 
22.  In  the  interim  period,  financial  support  is  needed  to  cover  operating  expenditures  of the 
Vodoprivedas, the new canton organizations (in the  Federation), and  the komunalcos.  Donors should 
not, however, support recurrent costs for system operations. 
Implementation arrangements 
23.  Donor support can be provided in three ways: 
•  Grants or credits to the Governments; 
•  Direct assistance to the benefiting municipality or canton; and 
•  A World Bank-administered trust fund (funds must be untied, and procurement is subject to 
World Bank procedures). 
The Vodoprivredas in the Federation and in Republika Srpska should play an increasingly greater role in 
implementing projects,  including  preparing engineering designs and  bidding documents,  handling the 
bidding process, contracting, and administering contracts.  The municipality water companies should be 
made responsible for contract supervision and for approving payments to contractors. 
24.  Regardless of the  implementation arrangements, donors  should coordinate their activities with 
the PIUs set up in the Entity Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Management.  The PIUs act 
as a clearinghouse for all assistance and monitor implementation of  projects.  The PIUs together with the 
Vodoprivredas  also  decide  on  priorities  with  the  assistance  of the  International  Management  Group 
(IMG).  Donors should consult with the PIUs before allocating resources to specific projects to ensure 
that works they plan to undertake are a priority and  are not already being financed  by another donor. 
During implementation, donors should keep the PIUs informed on  a regular basis about their activities 
and the progress of  their projects. 
25.  A Water, Sanitation, and Solid Waste Task Force has been established under IMG-chairmanship 
to review the status of donor activities in the sector, discuss mutual problems and concerns, and address 
policy issues.  The Task Force, which meets about once a quarter, includes representatives from the main 
donors in the field, from the Vodoprivredas, and from the PIUs. - 62-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
26.  Most structural issues should be identified and addressed through the sector strategy plan, which 
is  a  component  of the  1997  program.  The  recommended  measures  should  then  be  implemented, 
including: 
•  Maintenance and further strengthening of existing capacities through training and technical 
assistance (technical assistance could take the form of twinning arrangements to emphasize 
financial management and commercial orientation); 
•  Private sector participation in, at least, providing selected services and running operations; 
•  Changes required in the regulatory framework; and 
•  Prioritization  of investments,  with  a  gradual  transition  from  restoring  basic  services  to 
enhancing service quality and  upgrading sanitation and solid waste services, which  are of 
particular concern from a public health perspective. - 63-
Annex 1.  Federation Projects for the 1997 Program 
2 
Total amount includes US$2 million of  project management costs (institutional strengthening). LANDMINE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 
I.  BACKGROUND 
1.  With more than 15,000 mine fields already identified, large areas in both Entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are inaccessible because of the threat of mines.  Mine contamination is  particularly severe 
in  bands  of contamination  about  5  km  wide  along  former  confrontation  lines;  unexploded  ordnance 
remains in most places where fighting occurred; "booby traps" pollute former areas of confrontation and 
regions from which ethnic minorities have been expelled; 
1 and uncertainty about the location and extent 
of  mine fields exacerbates the problem --since land is prevented from being used due not only to mines, 
but also to the fear resulting from the lack of information on the mine situation. 
2.  Clearing all mines will take years -- probably decades -- and  implementation will  have to rely 
primarily on local capacities because of the high cost of clearing mines through international contracts. 
Developing adequate local capacity is however a major challenge, since mine-clearing is a new sector in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as it would be in  most countries: while in  all other areas of the reconstruction 
program, structures and experienced capacities already existed prior to the war, in the case of landmines 
new institutions and operational organizations have to  be created, staffed, trained and equipped -- and 
time to address this  issue  is  very short, since the nascent sector has to face the challenge of urgently 
undertaking an  enormous amount of mine-clearing.  During the first  phase of reconstruction,  interim 
implementation arrangements to carry out urgent works shall be put in place. 
3.  Landmine contamination is  a bottleneck for all  aspects of Bosnia and Herzegovina's recovery. 
Mines were laid to prevent the use and the rehabilitation of infrastructure (e.g. bridges, buildings, water 
wells)  and  reconstruction  contracts cannot be  implemented  until  mine  hazards  have  been  eradicated. 
Resettlement of refugees and  displaced persons  is  slowed  down  by the  threat (real  and perceived) of 
mines -- to which  these  populations  are  particularly vulnerable  since they  have  no  simple access to 
reliable mine information.  Community revival is often endangered by mine hazards.  For the authorities 
in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina, the  implementation of a mine-clearing program  is  therefore a  priority to 
prevent delays in every aspect of reconstruction and community recovery-- and a substantial amount of 
assistance, both financial and advisory, is needed from the international community to support this effort. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
4.  The objectives of the landmine program are to  make land available for  use -- by both clearing 
identified mine fields and systematically surveying "priority areas" to remove most of the uncertainty on 
For  the  remainder  of this  text,  the  term  "landmine"  or  "mine"  will  include  anti-tank  and  anti-personnel 
landmines, unexploded ordnance (mainly shells) and "booby traps" (i.e. concealed explosive devices contrived 
to go off  when some harmless-looking object is touched). -66-
the mine situation -- and to prevent mine-related accidents.  These activities are to be carried out to 
support reconstruction and resettlement objectives, and to provide assistance to communities at risk.
2 
5.  The overall reconstruction program designed to reach these objectives as submitted in December 
1995 and April  1996 remains valid.  It will require US$203 million in  external financial support for the 
three- to four-year period within the overall US$5.1 billion priority reconstruction program: 
•  In 1996, US$43  million was committed; despite a  38 percent financing  gap over initial 
estimates of the first-year needs (US$70 million), a  number of activities have been carried 
out successfully this year (paragraph 7 to 17); 
•  In 1997, US$60  million of external financing is  required -- 65  percent of which would 
benefit the Federation and  35  percent Republika Srpska (paragraph  18  to 28).  A  list of 
corresponding investments will be prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be held  in 
early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$100 million will be necessary -- and policy issues should be 
addressed  to  ensure  medium-term  sustainability  of the  program,  which  may  require  a 
continued  -- although  substantially  reduced  -- involvement  of the  donor  community 
(paragraph 29). 
Table 1 below shows a breakdown of  these amounts by activity. 
Table 1.  Landmine Program External Financial Requirements 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Institution building  21  9  8  4 
Local capacity building  30  22  6  2 
Mine awareness  10  3  6 
Mine hazard assessment  4  0  I  3 
Marking and clearing  138  11  42  85 
Total  203  43  60  100 
6.  Five priority actions are to be carried out to implement the program: 
2 
•  Institution building:  setting up  and developing  local  institutions,  at a  sufficient level  to 
conduct mine-clearing operations effectively over the medium-term; 
•  Local capacity building: developing and strengthening local implementation capacities (e.g. 
commercial companies, NGOs); 
A distinction has  sometimes been  made  between  "humanitarian mine-clearing", aimed at  diminishing mine-
related  risks  in  everyday  life  and  "reconstruction  mine-clearing",  in  support of rehabilitation  projects.  In 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  links  between  the  various  aspects  of the  country's  recovery  (reconstruction, 
reintegration of refugees and  displaced persons, revival  of communities) make  it  impossible to  draw  a clear 
line  between various  "types" of mine  clearing (clearing mines  to  rehabilitate housing  in  a village to  which 
refugees are to return is a mix of support to reconstruction and resettlement, and has a significant humanitarian 
impact). -67 -
•  Mine awareness: reinforcing mine awareness to  prevent accidents, particularly among the 
most vulnerable groups (e.g. returnees, children); 
•  Mine hazard assessment: conducting surveys in  priority areas (particularly reconstruction 
sites  and  target  resettlement  areas)  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  thereby  shrink  the  areas 
considered inaccessible; and 
•  Marking and clearing: marking known mine fields, that cannot be cleared in the very short 
term, and carrying out urgent mine-clearing, wherever necessary.
3 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
7.  The aim of the 1996 program was to simultaneously (i) establish the core capacity for handling 
mine-clearing  over  the  next  years  and  (ii)  conduct  mine  fields  surveys  and  urgent  mine-clearing. 
Through the combined efforts of bilateral and multilateral donors, IFOR, NGOs, and the governmental 
authorities  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  progress  was  made  on  the  institutional  side,  with  the 
establishment of mine-clearing agencies (by the State and Entity Governments as well as by the United 
Nations), emergency mine-clearing took place, while no significant infrastructure reconstruction contract 
was held-up for mine-related reasons. 
8.  However,  much  less  emergency  mine-clearing  took  place  than  had  been  expected,  mainly 
because  of the  weakness  of the  local  mine-clearing  sector  (which  was  almost  non-existent  at  the 
beginning of the year).  Recognizing the capacity constraints, the Mine-Clearing Program submitted in 
December  1995  recommended a two-pronged  approach,  i.e.  making  use  of international  capacity for 
urgent  mine-clearing,  while  simultaneously building  local  capacity.  This  approach  was  modified  in 
practice, because of the Government's desire to maximize the use of local  mine clearers from the start 
and to avoid the relatively high costs associated with the use of foreign companies.  The development of 
appropriate  alternative  approaches  (e.g.  joint  ventures,  use  of international  consultancies  for  team 
management and  site supervision, etc.) has however taken time.  Additional difficulties resulted from 
persistent disagreements between the State and  Entity Governments on the sharing of responsibilities. 
Works started on a small scale in Fall 1996. 
9.  The  main  donor  commitments  for  mine-clearing  operations  are  shown  in  table  2.  The 
achievements made possible by these contributions are described in more detail below. 
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Institution building 
Local capacity building 
Mine awareness 
Mine hazard assessment 
Marking and clearing 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
9 
22 
I 
0.1 
II 
43 
Main donors 
EC, Japan, Sweden, US, World Bank 
Denmark, EC, Italy, Norway, US 
Denmark, Sweden 
World Bank 
Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, World Bank 
Clearing mines is an extremely slow process and should be reserved for critical situations.  Speed depends on 
the nature of the area to be cleared (vegetation, ground, topography, etc.) and on  the techniques  used,  and 
planning figure for manual clearing with probes ranges from 2 to  I 0 square meters an  hour for 2 persons, i.e. 
circa 1.4 to 7 square kilometer for  I,OOO persons during a year (weather conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
make it impossible to clear mines from December to March). - 68-
Institution building: Mine-clearing agencies established 
10.  1996  has  been  the  year  for  the  authorities  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  as  well  as  for  the 
international community to set up -- and to make operational -- a core institutional structure for mine-
related issues (box 1  ), and particularly for: 
4 
5 
•  Mine information management; 
•  Contracting, supervision of  works and quality assurance; 
•  Design of procedures (e.g. for prioritization or safety standards); and 
•  Coordination of  mine-clearing activities. 
The Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement did not specify the respective roles of the State and the Entities in the field 
of mine-clearing.  The Republika Srpska Government has therefore refused to recognize the State-established 
mine-clearing  agency,  while  the  State  Government  is  attempting  to  use  it  as  the  leading  mine-clearing 
institution  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina.  Representatives  of the  Croat-majority part of the  Federation  have 
expressed concerns similar to those of  the Republika Srpska Government.  While temporary arrangements are 
currently in place, a medium-term acceptable solution is still to be designed. 
The Mine-Clearance Policy Group was dissolved following the elections. -69-
Local capacity building: Close to 600 mine-clearers being trained 
11 .  Because local implementation capacity is still at a nascent stage, mine-clearing efforts were slow 
throughout 1996.  Most of  the existing mine-clearing organizations lack equipment and skilled personnel 
-- the  military  mine-clearing experience of many  demobilized  soldiers  is  not  readily transferable to 
civilian operations (box 2).  Efforts in  1996 were directed toward providing training for mine clearers 
and  site  supervisors,  designing  employment  mechanisms  for  newly-trained  specialists,  and  making 
equipment available to them: 
•  The United States (US) is funding the training and employment (for one year) of about 165 
mine-clearers.  The total cost of the operation in  1996 and  1997 amounts to US$15 million. 
Training  has  been  completed  and  survey  and  demining  operations  commenced  early 
November  in  the  Banja  Luka,  Tuzla,  Sarajevo  and  Mostar  areas;  other  operations  are 
expected to commence in  the Jablanica and Trebinje areas during December; the US  also 
established  a  small  school  for  deminer and  mine  dog  training  at  Brus  (close  to  Pale,  in 
Republika Srpska); 
•  The  European  Commission  (EC)  is  financing  a  similar  program  for  250  mine-clearers 
expected to be operational by early spring 1997 (US$8 million); and 
•  The Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has established, with Norwegian Government funding 
(US$5  million), a training school in Srebrenik, near Tuzla, and has trained 60 mine-clearers. 
These programs are expected to meet between a third and a half of  the required capacity for 1997. 
Mine awareness: A focus on the most vulnerable groups 
12.  Mine  awareness  programs  have  been  developed  and  implemented  by  both  the  governmental 
authorities and the international community throughout the war.  These activities continued  into  1996 
with  a  special  focus  on  the  most vulnerable  groups  (e.g.  returnees,  children).  The  State  and  Entity 
Governments,  together  with  local  and  international  NGOs,  have  used  TV  broadcasts  and  programs 
implemented through the Ministries of Education to raise awareness of mine dangers.  Through  local 
initiatives, IFOR has also contributed to community-level mine awareness. -70-
Mine hazard assessments: More than 15,000 mine fields identified 
13.  Identifying the  location  and  the  extent of minefields  by collecting,  validating  and  recording 
information -- from the former warring factions, as required by the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, or 
from local residents -- was a high priority in  1996.  IFOR made a significant contribution by identifying 
15,407  mine  fields,  with  the  assistance  of the  local  armed  forces  and  building on  the  initiatives of 
UNPROFOR.  Information has been forwarded to a centralized data base, established with the financial 
support of the United  States  and  currently  managed  by  the  United  Nations-established  Mine Action 
Center (MAC).  The database is  however incomplete and  believed to encompass to date only 50 to 60 
percent of  the total number of  mine fields. 
14.  In parallel, an  initial list of priority areas for reconstruction, recovery and resettlement, has been 
assembled under the Government's responsibility.  Preliminary surveys (mainly compilation of existing 
information, such as police and civil defense reports, and interviews with local authorities and residents) 
were conducted to define the level of mine-related risk for each of these areas.  Based on these surveys, 
the Government issued "Risk Assessment Certificates".
6  A mine-clearing works program can now be 
designed  by  integrating  data  from  the  MAC-managed  data  base  with  information  related  to  the 
scheduling of  subsequent activities on the site. 
Marking and clearing: A slow start 
15.  While marking minefields was  not planned to  start before  1997  (since mine fields  had  to  be 
identified and surveyed first), urgent mine-clearing was required for many areas-- where reconstruction 
was  urgently  needed,  where  refugees  or displaced  persons  were  prevented  from  returning  by  mine 
hazard, or where communities are at risk.  Funds were made available for this purpose, in the framework 
of the Emergency Landmine Clearing Project designed by the State and Entity Governments with  the 
support of the World Bank and the MAC  in  early summer 1996 and aimed at clearing mine fields,  in 
support  of reconstruction,  reintegration  of refugees  and  displaced  persons,  as  well  as  community 
recovery,  and  at  supporting  local  mine-clearing  institutions.  The  main  donors  were  Italy  (US$3.9 
million), the Netherlands (US$1.8  million) and the World  Bank (US$7.5  million),  while  interest was 
indicated  by  Belgium  (US$0.9  million),  Canada  (US$0.8  million)  and  several  other  donors.  First 
contracts have been awarded  in  various  parts of the Federation, while activities  in  Republika Srpska 
should start by spring 1997 (box 3). 
6 
Three categories of area are  defined:  "low risk"  areas,  where  human  activities  can  start  immediately;  "high 
risk"  areas,  where mine-clearing works  have to  be  carried out first;  and "unknown  status"  where  additional 
surveys (with mine-detecting dogs or specific equipment) are required to complete available information. - 71  -
16.  IFOR engineers have also been engaged in  clearing areas of importance for military operations 
(e.g. Sarajevo airport, Mostar airport, railways bridges, camp areas), either by using international troops 
or by contracting local companies.  These works have often had major benefits for civilian populations 
and reconstruction activities.  IFOR has also supervised the lifting of mines by soldiers from the former 
warring  factions:  mines  have  been  removed  from  about  1,600  mine  fields  (11  percent of the  total 
number).  However,  such  "lifting of mines"  often  does  not  meet civilian  standards,  and  IFOR  has 
repeatedly warned that the corresponding areas should not be considered fully cleared. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
Overall objectives and financing requirements 
17.  Challenges in  1997 result from the combination of two factors:  the major reconstruction effort 
underway requires the surveying of a large number of areas and the probable clearing of many of them; 
and the mine-clearing sector is  still  nascent and  capacities are  limited.  Thus donor support  in  1997 
should focus on: 
•  Transforming  the  1996  core  capacities  into  a  developed  mine-clearing  sector  that  can 
implement large-scale activities over the medium-term; and 
•  Carrying out urgent works as required for implementation of  the reconstruction program, for 
resettlement of refugees and  displaced  persons and  for  a  reduction of mine hazard  at the 
community level --which will require training, surveying, mine clearing and promotion of 
mine-awareness. 
18.  To  achieve  these  objectives  and  prevent  mine-related  delays  in  the  implementation  of the 
reconstruction and resettlement programs, financial  assistance of some US$60 million will be required 
from  the donor community -- and  part of this support is  particularly urgent (e.g.  funding for training 
programs which  have to  be  conducted  from  January through  April  1997,  for  strengthening the  local 
capacity before spring). - 72-
Institution building (US$8 million): Strengthening local agencies 
19.  Continued financial  and technical  assistance  is  needed to  strengthen the Governments'  mine-
clearing agencies.  By the end of the year, these institutions should have the necessary expertise, skills 
and capacities to implement large-scale mine-clearing activities (including developing a work program, 
preparing  mine-clearance  contracts,  establishing  and  monitoring  accounting  procedures,  designing 
technical and safety standards, and ensuring the quality of the works) with limited external assistance. 
To reach and maintain the required level of  effectiveness, the State and the Entity Governments will also 
have to clarify the respective roles of  the three agencies. 
7 
20.  While  the  local  agencies  are  being  progressively  strengthened,  the  United  Nations-managed 
MAC  will  have  to  play  a  critical  role  by  providing  the  necessary  technical  expertise.
8  Continued 
financial  support (in terms of both staffing and cash) should be provided by the donor community.  In 
October  1996,  the  United  Nations  (UN)  submitted  a  comprehensive  budget  for  that  purpose  to  the 
international community
9 (in addition to providing technical support, the MAC plans to establish mine-
clearing teams, initially working under its supervision until ultimate employment mechanisms have been 
determined). 
21.  A  special  effort  should  also  be  made  to  continue  developing  the  mine  information  system 
established within the MAC, by collecting additional  information, checking and updating existing data 
and  making  them  widely  available.  Donor  assistance  is  required  not  only  to  cover  the  (limited) 
incremental operating costs but also to ensure that information collected during implementation of their 
projects  is  properly communicated to the central  data base.  The continued operational  assistance of 
IFOR, or its successor organization, in this respect is critical. 
Local capacity building (US$6 million): Developing an industry and removing a 
bottleneck 
22.  Insufficient mine-clearing capacity remains a potential bottleneck for the implementation of the 
1997  reconstruction  and  repatriation  programs.  Significant  support,  both  financial  and  technical,  is 
urgently required to develop the mine-clearing sector, i.e.: 
7 
8 
9 
•  Providing training:  according to the MAC's first estimate, up to  1,200 mine-clearers and 
site supervisors should be trained by spring 1997 (mainly through three-week sessions for 
Currently, the State-level MPRA has a largely technical role while the Entity-level PIUs are responsible for 
implementation of some donor-funded projects.  Adjustments are however necessary to  avoid overlapping of 
authority -- and should be made on  the basis of economic considerations,  in  the  post-election context.  To 
reduce cost and increase safety, the State agency (once it  is  recognized by all  relevant authorities) should be 
responsible  for,  inter  alia,  setting  up  and  enforcing  appropriate  technical  standards,  formulating  policy, 
coordinating aid,  and  ensuring  inter-Entity  prioritization.  To  ensure  effectiveness,  the  setting of priorities 
should remain the responsibility of  the Entities. 
The MAC  is  planned to  be handed over to  the governmental authorities  within  a year and  much  attention 
should be given to the transfer process, which should be smooth and gradual -- the role of  the MAC should be 
reduced progressively while the capacities of  the governmental agencies are developed. 
The cost estimate underlying the UN's appeal, for a total of US$38.9 million, is  consistent with the estimates 
of the EC and World Bank.  Apparent differences result from two factors:  (i) the UN  plan covers the period 
January - September 1997, while this report outlines requirements for the whole year 1997; and (ii) the UN 
expects significant in-kind contributions (mainly international staff) in addition to the indicated amount. - 73-
demobilized soldiers); donors could either provide further support to those organizations that 
have  already  established  training  facilities  (e.g.  NPA  or  the  US  demining  coordination 
center) or assist the Governments' agencies in  setting up  new training capacities to address 
10  uncovered needs;  and 
•  Establishing  employment  mechanisms:  Experience  in  other  countries  has  shown  that 
employment  opportunities  must  exist  in  order  for  training  programs  to  be  effective. 
Therefore,  donors  who  support  training  activities  should  ensure  that  adequate  structures 
(such  as  commercial  or governmentally-controlled  companies)  will  have  the  capacity  to 
employ the newly-trained mine clearers and that corresponding resources (for mine-clearing) 
are  available;  in  some  cases,  it  will  be  needed  to  provide  support to  such  organizations 
during the start-up phase. 
23.  In the absence of  appropriate employment mechanisms, several donors established in  1996 mine-
clearing capacities operating under their direct control, with a view to eventually hand them over to the 
Governments or to local structures once strengthened -- probably in  1997.  The transfer of  capacities 
should be carefully designed to ensure not only that the handed-over capacities can be used in an optimal 
way, but also that the transfer process does not result in weakening other components of  the mine-
clearing sector (for example, the hand-over of large capacities to public authorities could destabilize the 
newly-established commercial sector). 
Mine awareness (US$3 million): Preparing the medium-term. 
24.  To prevent accidents in  the years -- and  possibly in  the decades -- to come, awareness of the 
mine-related risks has to be continuously reinforced within the population.  Financial support should be 
provided  to  the  Governments  and  to  experienced  NGOs  to  both  continue  projects  currently  under 
implementation (e.g. broadcasting, distribution of "mine-awareness comics") and initiate new activities 
(mainly at the  community  level),  with  a  special  focus  on  the  most vulnerable  groups  (e.g.  children, 
displaced persons and refugees).  Assistance should however not be  limited to short-term activities and 
should focus on developing the medium-term capacities which are required to address this issue beyond 
the three- to four-year reconstruction program. 
10 
The MAC is  proposing to establish a central training facility  in  the Mostar area to train deminers during the 
winter. -74-
Surveying, marking, and clearing (US$43 million):
11  Surveying and clearing priority 
areas, and marking known mine fields 
25.  Information is still insufficient to clarify the mine risk (real and perceived) in all areas.  Because 
mine-clearing is  a very slow process,  it  should be limited to those areas where the presence of mines 
constitutes a bottleneck to critical activities or where communities are exposed to an  unacceptable level 
of  risk.  A two-pronged strategy is proposed: 
•  Priority areas for reconstruction, community recovery, or resettlement purposes should 
be systematically surveyed prior to starting implementation of any activity; once the 
likelihood of the existence of mine fields within the considered areas has been assessed, a 
decision should be made as to whether development activity can proceed or mine-clearing is 
required (should this be the case, clearing should be undertaken as soon as possible); and 
•  Identified mine fields should be marked, whether the corresponding areas are considered 
priorities or not, pending the eventual  removal of mines, to  prevent accidents and reduce 
risks to local inhabitants. 
Implementing mine-clearing operations: A multi-pronged approach 
26.  Donors  in  1996  carried  out  mine-clearing  works  through  two  main  sets  of implementation 
arrangements. 
•  Awarding  contracts  to  local  commercial  companies  through  a  competitive  bidding 
process;  the  State  and  Entity  Governments  are  supporting  this  "competitive  contracting 
approach" (in Croatia, Government's initial investigations indicate that this is the most cost-
effective  option);  the  World  Bank-supported  Emergency  Landmine  Clearing  Project 
provides a useful vehicle for that purpose; and 
•  Funding  local  or international  NGOs  operating  under  direct  donor  superviSIOn;  this 
approach  was  used  successfully  in  1996  mainly  by NPA for  mine-clearing  in  support of 
reconstruction projects and humanitarian activities. 
In parallel, several actors in the field have proposed alternative implementation methods: 
II 
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•  Establishing a  transitional mine-clearance capability, initially under the control  of the 
MAC, and eventually handed over to  local  authorities;  it would be  reinforced by qualified 
foreign specialists to instruct, manage, and supervise mine-clearance teams; 
12 this option has 
been developed successfully by the UN in a number of  countries (e.g. Cambodia); and 
•  Establishing operational teams under the control of governmental authorities;  under 
this scheme, donor efforts would be limited to providing training and equipment, possibly to 
the  armies;  the  Governments  -- State,  Entities,  or Cantons  -- would  be  responsible  for 
carrying out works effectively. 
Preliminary steps have been made to establish a detailed list of projects.  Such a list will be formalized after the 
appointment of  the new State and Entity Governments. 
International staff could be either provided by  donors  as  in-kind contributions or recruited by  the  UN  if no 
other employment mechanism can be put in place rapidly. - 75-
Since mine-clearing is a new activity in  Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is  believed that following a multi-
pronged approach in  1997 would minimize the risks associated to the program.  The outcome should be 
reviewed at the end of the year to take stock of the progress and best advise the donor community for 
further  financing.  Subject to  the  availability  of necessary  resources,  different  arrangements  would 
therefore be developed simultaneously and in a coordinated way. 
27.  Additional recommendations can be made in view of  the past year's experience: 
•  Mine-clearing activities in support of infrastructure reconstruction projects should be 
funded as part of the corresponding sectoral programs, to ensure adequate financing and 
smooth  implementation  -- donors  should  be  ready  to  allocate  part  of  their  sectoral 
infrastructure contributions to the required mine-clearing activities.  The sectoral PIUs would 
be  responsible  for  defining  detailed  mine-clearing  requirements  as  well  as  for  overall 
implementation;  they  should  however  delegate  the  contracting  and  supervision  of mine-
clearing to the Government mine-clearing agencies; 
•  The governmental mine-clearing agencies established at State and Entity levels should 
be made fully responsible for implementing all mine-clearing activities not directly related 
to sectoral programs (e.g. training, mine awareness, mine-clearing in support of  communities 
at risk); and 
•  Coordination of donor activities in the field  is  essential to ensure complementarity of 
the activities and avoid overlapping or inconsistencies (such as the use of non-compatible 
equipment), as well as to ensure that funds are spent in  support of  the Governments'  priority 
program; all donors should support the UN-led Sectoral Task Force in  its efforts to maximize 
the value and impact of  foreign funding. -76-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
28.  Substantial  resources  will  be  needed  in  the  years,  and  possibly  in  the  decades,  to  come  to 
progressively reduce the mine-related risks.  Financial support from the international community, while 
necessary in the short-term, cannot substitute in the medium-term for locally-generated resources and the 
Governments will have to design adequate mechanisms to mobilize the necessary funds: 
•  Mine-clearing  in  support  of technical  sectors  (mainly  construction  and  rehabilitation  of 
various kinds  of infrastructure and facilities)  should  increasingly be  funded  through  each 
sector's  income  (e.g.  through  fuel  or vehicle  taxes  for  the  road  sector,  electric  power 
company revenues for the power sector); and 
•  For activities with no  prospect of revenue generation (such as mine-clearing of community 
areas), donor funding is likely to remain necessary for some time to come; donors should be 
prepared to extend their contribution over the three- to four-year reconstruction program (as 
has been the practice in  most other mine-polluted countries), but the Governments will need 
to contribute to the costs on an increasing basis. INDUSTRY AND FINANCE 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Before the war an important sector on its way to a market economy 
1.  Before the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina had considerable industrial activity, natural resources, 
capital  stock,  and  technical  and  commercial  human  skills.  Industry contributed  about  half of gross 
national product (GNP) and nearly half of nonagricultural employment.  There were about a dozen large 
conglomerates, generally export oriented, and about a thousand small and medium-size firms supplying 
local markets.  Production ranged from  intermediate industrial products to consumer goods.  Companies 
were  managed  according to  "market socialism"  and  "self-management"  principles.  Enterprises  were 
"socially owned": assets were owned by the society at large (there was no  state property) and workers 
councils  ran  the  companies.  In  principle,  key  decisions  were  made  by  workers;  in  practice, 
decisionmaking was delegated to managers formally selected by workers councils and tacitly approved 
by  the  political  system.  Although  there  was  some competition  in  product markets,  competition  and 
mobility in the labor and financial markets were restricted.  Commercial banks were the only source of 
institutional capital, and bank credit was the only form of financing for enterprises.  Banks were owned 
and controlled by large companies, which used them to obtain financing on favorable terms. 
2.  Yugoslavia  initiated  structural  reforms  in  1988-89  to  improve  the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework for private enterprises and to restructure socially owned companies.  After independence in 
1991,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  prepared  further  reforms,  but  the  outbreak  of war  prevented  any 
significant progress.  Since 1992, three legal frameworks have been developed in parallel.  The Bosniac-
majority  part  of the  Federation  and  Republika  Srpska  established  centralized  systems  of control 
(primarily for  military reasons):  socially owned assets were nationalized and new management boards 
were appointed.  The Croat-majority part of the Federation made some progress toward privatization and 
authorized  companies  to  develop joint ventures  and  similar types  of private  business  arrangements, 
although the authorities reserved the right to appoint enterprise management. 
Opportunities for revival despite the impact of  the war 
3.  The industrial sector today is a shadow of its former self.  The war severely set back industrial 
development, not only because of the extensive physical destruction, but also because of the disruption 
of trade  links  (particularly  within  the  former  Yugoslavia)  and  the  legal  confusion  it  created.  The 
industrial sector operates at just 10 to 30 percent of its capacity, and the unemployment rate outside of 
agriculture is devastatingly high at around 50 percent in the Federation and over 60 percent in  Republika 
Srpska. Contraction of output has been uneven throughout the country: 
•  The Bosniac-majority part of  the Federation suffered the heaviest physical capacity damage, 
with production currently at 15 to 20 percent of its prewar level; 
•  Republika  Srpska  suffered  less  extensive  physical  damage,  but  industry  was  severely 
affected by the economic embargo; production is  currently at 8 to 10  percent of its  prewar 
level; and - 78-
•  The Croat-majority part of the Federation  maintained production and trade throughout the 
war, although at a reduced level; it has a larger number of private enterprises, liberal foreign 
investment policies, and strong links to foreign countries. 
4.  The  banking  sector  also  suffered  from  the  war.  Foreign  currency  assets  were  frozen  at  the 
beginning of the war, which created deep distrust of banks.  The banking system  is  largely devoid of 
funds, and enterprises lack critical cash resources.  Large amounts of nonperforming loans in the banks' 
assets, extensive foreign exchange deposit liabilities, and the virtual extinction through hyperinflation of 
the real deposit base in  local currency have all undermined the ability of banks to extend credit, generate 
income,  and  help  restore  confidence  in  the  banking  system.  Household  deposits  are  negligible, 
commercial  and  public  sector  deposits  are  low,  and  only  a  limited  amount  of short-term  credit  is 
extended -- which is  insufficient to finance the investments needed to revive the economy.  In  addition 
accounting standards need to be improved to reflect balance sheet values and income and  loss streams; 
there are currently no suitable loan classification standards and loan loss provisioning requirements, and 
the regulatory framework is insufficient for developing a market-based banking sector. 
5.  There is, however, a real potential for revitalizing the industrial sector despite  the overall bleak 
picture (box 1  ).  Box 2, later in  the text, presents the preliminary results of a survey conducted to assess 
the importance of  various  factors as impediments to business revival. 
II.  RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
6.  The primary aim of  the industry and finance recovery program is to stimulate sustainable growth 
and employment by: - 79-
•  Facilitating  private  sector  involvement  and  preventing  the  re-emergence  of  direct 
government involvement in  industrial production and transactions; 
•  Developing  small  and  medium-sized  economic activities  -- an  effective  way of creating 
long-term employment opportunities; 
•  Focusing  assistance  on  competitive  enterprises  or  commercially  viable  parts  of  larger 
enterprises; 
•  Improving operational  efficiency,  resource  allocation  and  output quality  through  targeted 
investment projects; 
•  Helping enterprises to restore trade links with foreign partners; and 
•  Facilitating expansion of financial intermediation and enhancement of the saving-investment 
process. 
7.  The overall framework and priorities submitted in  December 1995 and April  1996 remain valid. 
A series of investment projects have been prepared to rehabilitate the industry sector.  US$612 million in 
external financial support will be required for implementation within the overall US$5.1  birtion priority 
reconstruction  program  (table  I) -- a  substantial  increase from  the initial  assessment for the three- to 
four-year program (US$400 million): 
•  In 1996, US$167 million was firmly committed, substantially more than the initial estimate 
of first-year need (US$120 million), and several activities were successfully carried out this 
year (paragraphs 11  to 18); 
•  In 1997, US$180  million in  external financing is  required, 62  percent of which  would 
benefit the  Federation and  38 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs  19  to 31).  A  list of 
corresponding investments will be prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be  held  111 
early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$265 million will be necessary.  Private capital, both domestic 
and foreign, is expected to gradually replace donor assistance, but several policy issues will 
need to be addressed first (paragraph 32). 
Table 1.  Industrial Recovery Program External Financal Requirements 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Lines of credit  293  103  80  110 
Political risk guarantee  135  0  65  70 
Technical assistance  60  30  10  20 
Equity funds  118  28  25  65 
Critical inputs and equipment  6  6  0  0 
Total  612  167  180  265 - 80-
8.  The program includes four main elements: 
•  Debt financing schemes to provide short- to medium-term financing for small to  medium-
scale private sector activities, mainly through  lines of credit and through targeted programs 
for microenterprises that lack access to formal banking institutions; 
•  Equity financing schemes  to  provide  longer-term  foreign  financing  to  domestic firms,  to 
facilitate the development of  joint ventures, and to strengthen the capital base and operations 
of  suitable private banks; 
•  Guarantee schemes to  provide coverage against noncommercial  risks  for  foreign  business 
partners and to support the revival of trade with foreign partners (especially for viable parts 
of large industrial enterprises); and 
•  Targeted technical assistance  to  support small  and  medium-size  enterprise  development, 
enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization,  and  financial  sector  development,  and  also  to 
provide access to modern technology. 
Specific  projects  have  been  designed  for  each  component.  The  International  Financial  Institutions 
(mainly  the  World  Bank,  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  and  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development) have prepared projects which can be used as vehicles for channeling 
donor resources.  In addition, several donors (including the Governments of Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Sweden  and  Switzerland) provided critical  inputs and  equipment as  emergency assistance to  selected 
enterprises. 
Policy environment:  Reform programs for private and financial sector development 
9.  To stimulate the recovery process,  maintain  its  pace,  and  ensure  its  sustainability beyond the 
initial reconstruction period, in-depth reforms are needed (box 3).  Changes in  policies should be aimed 
at  developing  a  market  economy,  promoting  private  sector  development  and  building  an  open  and 
integrated economy within a reasonably short period of time.  The reform process should be initiated at 
the early stage of the reconstruction period.  The transition has been difficult in  many Central European 
countries,  and  will  be  even  more  so  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina,  where  reforms,  reconstruction  and 
development of governmental  structures have to  be  carried  out simultaneously.  Generating the  right 
industrial  strategies  and  regulatory  regime,  building  a  consensus  on  the  required  reforms,  and 
strengthening  commitment for  their  implementation  is  urgent.  Donor  assistance  will  be  needed  to 
facilitate the transition and assist Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities in designing and implementing the 
necessary reforms, with a particular emphasis on: 
•  Building a  new  legal  and  institutional  framework  with  a  substantially  smaller and  more 
efficient  public  sector,  functioning  market  mechanisms  for  allocation  of resources  and 
income distribution and improved conditions for foreign investment; 
•  Pursuing crucial  reforms in trade, tax, and  labor regulations to minimize barriers to internal 
and external trade and to enhance the mobility of  finance and labor; 
•  Clarifying and implementing new fiscal arrangements between the State and the Entities; and 
•  Adopting uniform foreign trade and customs tariff policies. 
The  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  the  European  Commission  (EC)  and  the  World  Bank,  in 
cooperation  with  several  multilateral  and  bilateral  agencies,  are  preparing  programs to  address  these 
issues.  Implementation  will  start  in  the  next  months  and  should  help  to  create  an  appropriate 
environment  for  restructuring  enterprises  and  banks,  stimulating  private  sector-led  growth  and - 81  -
encouraging  critically  needed  foreign  investments. 
implementation of  the industry recovery program. 
This  will  complement  and  facilitate  the - 82-
Donor support programs 
10.  The  recovery  program  should  be  seen  as  a  several-year  strategy,  with  priorities  gradually 
changing from emergency support to longer-term assistance: 
•  Substantial  financial  resources were required  in  1996  to jump-start industrial  activities --
which  could  benefit  from  growth  opportunities  generated  by  the  large-scale  aid  effort. 
Programs focused on lines of credit and technical assistance.  Tangible results were achieved 
as a result of  significant net resources transfers to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
•  In this perspective, donor assistance should increase and peak in  1997.  Activities pursued in 
1996  should  be  continued,  and  new  programs  should  be  initiated  to  help  prepare  and 
implement  in-depth  policy  reforms  (while  providing  critical  assistance  for  enterprises' 
operations and development).  Focus should progressively shift from "simple" lines of credit 
to  new  financing  schemes,  including:  an  "enhanced"  line  of credit  aimed  at  promoting 
banking  sector  reform,  microcredit  schemes,  and  projects  aimed  at  encouraging  foreign 
private sector involvement (e.g. equity funds, political risk guarantees, etc.); and 
•  At the same time, an  adequate regulatory framework should be put in  place for stimulating 
recovery, maintaining its pace and ensuring its sustainability beyond the three- to four-year 
reconstruction  program  when  donor  resources  are  no  longer  available.  A  recovery  and 
reform  strategy for the pre-war conglomerates should be designed to  guide both  domestic 
and  foreign  investors  -- it  should  be  aimed  at  the  economically  viable  parts  of the 
conglomerates  (box  3)  with  the  objective  of re-starting  and  eventually  privatizing  them. 
Simultaneously,  reforms  should  be  implemented  to  liberalize  the  economic  system  and 
address the issue of social ownership (and enterprises' governance), as a precondition (and 
efficient incentive) for large-scale investments; 
•  Beyond 1997, external financing requirements will decrease and should focus on completing 
implementation of the existing projects.  Donor assistance could  be gradually replaced  by 
both  local  financing sources and  (non-debt creating)  investments from  the foreign  private 
sector-- conditional on continued recovery,  implementation of reforms, and economic and 
political stability. - 83 -
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
11.  Notable progress was made in  1996 in carrying out the ambitious reconstruction program, thanks 
to the complementary efforts of the donor community and governmental authorities.  Donors committed 
US$162 million to recovery of industry and  industrial finance.  Commitments for lines of credit (more 
than  US$100  million  in  the  Federation)  and  for  technical  assistance  (US$30  million)  exceeded  the 
estimated first-year requirements, while guarantee schemes and equity funds, introduced late in the year, 
remain  underfunded.  Only  25  percent of commitments  have  been  disbursed,  however.  The  major 
contributions are shown in table 2 (annex for a detailed breakdown). 
Lines of  credit 
Political risk guarantee 
Technical assistance 
Equity funds 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
103 
0 
30 
Main Donors 
Italy, Kuwait, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, USAID, 
World Bank 
Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, V 
Malaysia, USAID, World Bank 
EBRD, Italy, IFC, USAID 
Critical inputs and equipment 
28 
6  Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland 
Total  167 
Lines of credit:  Over US$100 million committed in the Federation 
12.  Strong donor support to small and medium-size enterprises has had tangible results in  reviving 
economic activity, particularly commerce; facilitating enterprise development;  improving productivity; 
and  generating employment.  Several  lines of credit were established  in  the  Federation to jump-start 
commercially viable companies, especially small and  medium-size private enterprises, and to promote 
the development of a true private sector.  In  addition, US$103  million was committed by donors and 
US$35 million disbursed to small and medium-size enterprises engaged in  numerous activities including 
agroprocessing,  light manufacturing, and services (box 4).  These programs gave enterprises access to 
cash, which was critically needed for working capital and to rehabilitate equipment: lines of credit were 
almost the only sources of  cash resources for enterprises in  1996. 
•  The Governments of Italy and the Netherlands and the World Bank cofinanced a US$23  million 
line of credit for small and medium-size enterprises implemented by the State Ministry of  Finance, 
with technical assistance by the German Government; to date,  141  credit applications have been 
processed:  53  approved, 22  rejected, and 66  are  under review; some US$7.5  million has already 
been disbursed; 
•  The Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia established similar credit lines, for a total of US$20 
million; however, no disbursement has taken place yet; and 
•  The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) established a  US$60 million 
line of credit for small businesses, with an  initial fqcus on the Tuzla area; the project was directly 
implemented  by  a  group of US  bankers  in  coordination  with the National  Bank of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; two-thirds of  the total amount (US$40 million) has already been disbursed. - 84-
Political risk guarantees and equity funds: Involving the private sector 
13.  Later  in  the  year,  assistance  focused  on  preparing  projects  to  attract financing  from  foreign 
private sources as soon as the situation allows for  it.
1  These projects wi II  help to make the recovery 
sustainable by gradually decreasing dependency on  donor funds.  Both Entity Governments, with  the 
support of the  European Bank for  Reconstruction and  Development (EBRD), the IFC  and the  World 
Bank,  have  designed  schemes to  promote foreign  private  involvement through  long-term  investments 
(equity  funds)  and  short- to  medium-term  transactions  (guarantees).  Firm  commitments  to  these 
projects have been made by the Governments of Italy, Malaysia, and  Switzerland and by USAID, IFC, 
and the World Bank.  These projects are described in more detail in paragraphs 25 to 27 and 30 to 31 . 
14.  EBRD is planning to take equity stakes in  four to five private banks in  the two Entities; EBRD 
would  then  use  its  representation  in  the  supervisory  boards  and  organize  twinning  programs  with 
Western banks to strengthen banks' capacities.  Banks with currently a thin capital and skills base could 
play an  active role  in  supporting the  emerging private sector.  US$3.4  million  per bank (on  average) 
would be required, including an equity component, project preparation costs, and technical assistance for 
implementation.  Technical assistance and, in some cases, part of  the equity contribution will be financed 
by bilateral grant funds.  Preparatory steps have been made with four banks in the Federation so far, with 
funding from  the European Union, the Government of the Netherlands, and the UK Know-How Fund. 
One operation is expected to be approved by the end of 1996 --a second is  likely to follow early 1997. 
This project is  complementary to the World Bank's planned "enhanced lines of credit" (paragraph 23) 
and implementation of  the two projects will be coordinated. 
Guarantee schemes against noncommercial risk could not have been initiated before the elections. - 85-
Technical assistance: Improving conditions for private sector growth 
15.  A number of critical  reforms were to  be  made to  improve the  environment for  private  sector 
development.  In  addition,  assistance  was  required  in  restoring  normal  operating  conditions  and 
financing mechanisms for  both enterprises and  banks.  Commitments have  been  larger than expected, 
with more than US$30 million committed and partly disbursed, including US$23  million from  USAID, 
to support enterprises and banks, as well as the overall reform process.  However, only a relatively small 
part of  donor commitments (less than a fourth) were disbursed in  1996. 
16.  There has  been  some financial  sector reform  in  the  Federation  and  some  improvement  in  the 
banking system, notably the recent establishment of  the Federation Banking Agency?  Republika Srpska 
currently lags behind but is committed to following a similar program of reform.  Still, major legislative 
and regulatory reforms remain on the agenda for both Entities. 
17.  Technical  assistance  has  aimed  at  fostering  private  sector  act1v1t1es  by  developing  a 
commercially viable banking system and improving the internal efficiency of  enterprises. 
•  Along with the  lines of credit USAID provided technical assistance to develop credit risk 
evaluation  skills  within  the  banks  (US$1 0  million)  and  to  help  enterprises  in  preparing 
business plans, defining development strategies, and applying for credit (US$5 million).  The 
World Bank provided similar services, although on a smaller scale; and 
•  The  Governments  of Germany,  Indonesia,  Japan,  and  Malaysia  have  committed  US$6.7 
million to improving the performance and productivity of  small and medium-size enterprises 
(including developing  marketing and  management  skills  for  dealing  with  foreign  buyers, 
suppliers, and competitors).  However, only US$1  million has been disbursed. 
18.  USAID, the World Bank/ and others provided technical assistance to the authorities in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina for addressing macroeconomic issues such as privatization, bank reform, and enterprise 
reform policies. 
2 
3 
•  Privatization.  Support  was  provided  to  develop  a  privatization  program  and  to  draft 
privatization laws.  The World Bank organized seminars on privatization (inside and outside 
of Bosnia and  Herzegovina),  highlighting  other countries'  experiences with  privatization. 
USAID provided direct assistance in establishing the Federation Privatization Agency and in 
implementing  transactions  (an  international  consulting  group  was  contracted  to  provide 
training  and  assistance).  Recently,  discussions  were  held  with  the  Government  of the 
Republika Srpska to initiate a similar process; 
•  Bank  reform.  Support  was  directed  at  strengthening  bank  policies,  procedures,  and 
management.  In-depth working sessions were organized to disseminate the experience of 
other countries.  USAID  provided  a  significant part of this  assistance  (US$4.8  million), 
including support to starting up operations of the newly created Federation Banking Agency 
and assistance in developing and implementing prudential banking regulations; and 
Encouragement was given by the World Bank:  its first adjustment operation in the Federation, the Transition 
Assistance Credit, included conditionality related to the drafting of the Federation Privatization Agency Law, 
and to the adoption of  the Federation Banking Agency Law. 
The World Bank provided US$1  million for  privatization  implementation (80 percent disbursed) and  US$1 
million earmarked to support the operational expenses of the recently established Federation Banking Agency 
(FBA), as part of  its Emergency Recovery Project. - 86-
•  Enterprise reform.  Noticeable progress was achieved  in  designing strategies for  preparing 
enterprises  for  privatization,  and  a  comprehensive  review  of the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework was initiated. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
19.  In  1996 donors focused  on jump-starting economic activity through  lines of credit and  related 
technical assistance.  Support is now needed to continue stimulating the recovery process, to maintain its 
pace and  to ensure  its  sustainability.  This  will  require  longer-term  investments and  involvement of 
foreign business.  In  light of the 1996 experience (box 5) donor assistance should therefore be increased 
and  gradually  shift from  lines  of credit,  which  received  much  of the  support  in  1996,  to  the  other 
components of the  program:  guarantee  schemes  are  essential  for  restoring  commercial  links  and  re-
starting viable activities; equity funds are the first long-term non-debt financing schemes.  In Republika 
Srpska, lines of credit should be developed, since no such assistance was received in  1996 and there is a 
need to make up for lost time.  Donor coordination and policy consistency will be increasingly important 
to ensure a balance of  support across regiofls and activities. 
20.  To meet 1997 targets, US$180 million of external financing is required.  In view of experience in 
1996, donors should pay particular attention to coordinating their efforts to ensure an adequate balance of 
support across programs and regions.  Efforts should aim to: 
•  Assist recovery of  the banking sector through well-targeted lines of  credit; 
•  Restore commercial links with foreign partners through political risk guarantee schemes; 
•  Support continued reform through technical assistance; and 
•  Promote  foreign  investments through  venture  capital  funds  (as  a  first  nondebt  long-term 
financing scheme). 
Several programs and initiatives prepared by the IMF, the EC, and the World Bank, for implementation 
in  1997, aimed at providing incentives for strong private sector involvement, by implementing the most 
crucial reforms in trade regime, and tax and expenditures policies and administration. - 87-
Lines of  credit (US$80 million): Restructuring the banking system and providing 
resources to banks for on-lending 
21 .  While donor support to industry finance  in  1996 occurred largely outside the domestic banking 
sector, greater attention by donors has to be paid to establishing a viable domestic banking sector in  1997 
so  that  finance  can  be  sustained  over  the  long-term,  with  increasing  share  of resources  mobilized 
domestically.  Donor support in  1997 therefore needs to focus on: 
•  Restructuring  and  privatization  of banks  along  with  the  development  of government's 
regulatory and supervisory capacity for the banking sector; 
•  Provision  of required  resources  to  industry,  such  as  lines  of credit,  through  those  banks 
which have clear plans for restructuring and privatization, and which are showing significant 
improvement in their portfolio management; and 
•  Specific  micro-credit  programs  to  support  those  micro  and  small  enterprises  that  have 
difficulties in obtaining small amounts of  working capital from the formal banking sector. 
22.  Banking sector reform.  Major reforms are urgently needed  in  the banking sector to develop its 
intermediation  capacity  in  line  with  the  requirements  of a  market-oriented  economy.  Reforms  are 
needed to: 
•  Clarify ownership and clearly define the governance structure of banks; 
•  Clean-up and improve financial conditions of  the banks; and 
•  Improve managerial capacity in saving mobilization and lending practices. 
Furthermore, new banking legislation needs to be adopted throughout the country to provide a consistent 
and  modern  framework  for  banking,  and  prudential  regulation  and  supervisory  standards  need  to  be 
introduced.  Institutions  for  bank  supervision  need  to  be  established  (in  the  Republika  Srpska)  and 
strengthened (in both Entities).  This process will require intensive technical assistance to both individual 
banks and to the authorities. 
23.  Lines  of Credit.  As  the  economy recovers,  deman- d  for  working capital  is  growing  rapidly. 
However, domestic savings are still  low and  resources are hard to mobilize, even for those banks with 
better  prospects  for  growth.  Donor  provision  of lines  of credit  to  those  qualified  banks  would 
substantially strengthen the domestic banking sector, while at the same time also deliver needed funds 
for  industrial  revival.  An  estimated  total of US$70  million  will  be  required  to  support  continued 
industrial  recovery in  both  Entities in  the  1997 program.  Within this program, there is  a need to pay 
special attention to the funding requirements  in  the Republika Srpska, as  enterprises in  the Republika 
Srpska had no access to donor-financed lines of  credit in  1996. 
24.  Microcredit program.  Micro- and  small  enterprises  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  often  have 
difficulty obtaining working capital since they have no access to the formal banking sector.  Experience 
in  other  Central  European  countries  shows  that  these  enterprises  can  often  generate  employment 
opportunities beyond the family circle, and that their development impact on the poorest segments of the 
society is  significant.  A "Local Initiatives Project" has been developed with the support of the World 
Bank to provide a combination of credit and technical assistance to groups currently relying heavily on 
social assistance -- widowed women refugees, unemployed, new microenterprises.  In  addition, a large 
group of donors has agreed to sponsor a complementary project, the establishment of the Bosnia Micro-- 88-
Credit Bank,  including the EBRD,  the  EC,  the  Internationale  Projekt Consult (IPC),
4  several  private 
firms, and the World Bank.  This new institution, to be operated as a commercial bank with a capital of 
US$2 million,  would extend  small  loans (under US$20,000 and  averaging US$10,000) to  micro and 
small enterprises that were hurt by the war and that have no access to the formal  banking sector.  The 
loans, which would be extended on commercial terms, would be used mainly to finance working capital. 
Since the shareholders share a common commercial orientation, the level of initial capitalization of the 
project has been designed to make the Micro-Credit Bank sustainable (and profitable) quickly-- so that 
its  impact will  be  maximized.  Services will  be  progressively extended to all  regions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
Political risk guarantees (US$65 million): Restoring links with foreign business partners 
25.  Political risk guarantees.  Restoring industrial capacities in Bosnia and Herzegovina will require 
the  re-establishment of links  with  foreign  business  partners,  whether  investors,  suppliers,  or  buyers. 
International  companies  have  shown  a  strong  interest  in  restarting  commercial  operations  with 
companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based largely on the companies' past performance and on prewar 
relations.  Several  international  companies  have  already  identified  deals  they  would  like  to  make. 
However,  political  uncertainty,  threat  of renewed  hostilities,  and  lack  of confidence  in  the  new 
governmental structures hold them back.  Two main schemes have been designed to encourage foreign 
private entrepreneurs to enter into business relationships with companies from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and donor assistance is  required to get them  started.  One is  a  political  risk guarantee for  short-term 
business transactions, the other a noncommercial risk guarantee facility for long-term investments. 
4 
5 
The !PC, a German consulting firm  specialized  in micro-finance, will provide a cash contribution  and  also be 
responsible  for  staff  training,  introduction  of  management  information  systems,  and  overall  project 
management. 
The funds made available under the World Bank credit and not used for paying claims would be spent after the 
guarantee has expired to finance critical imports for industry. - 89-
26.  US$35  million  in  cofinancing  is  required  to  support  a  political  risk  guarantee  facility  to 
encourage foreign  investors,  input suppliers,  trading companies,  and  financial  institutions to  provide 
financing for short- to medium-term transactions with industrial enterprises of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
6 
This project was prepared by the State and both Entity Governments, with the World Bank's support to 
provide  guarantees  against  noncommercial  risks  (mainly  renewed  hostilities  and  misgovernance)  to 
cover such transactions.  In  view of the special  nature of this  project (funds are disbursed only if a 
guarantee is called), donor contributions could be made either in cash or in  promissory notes to backstop 
the guarantees (box 6). 
27.  Insuring equity in the longer term.  After resumption of short-term business transactions, interest 
in  longer-term investments is expected to pick up.  For such longer-term (equity) investments, a parallel 
guarantee system for noncommercial risk should be established to cover such risks as renewed hostilities, 
civil  disturbance, expropriation,  breach  of contract, and  nonconvertibility of local  currency for  sound 
investment projects contributing to employment generation, technology transfer, and export generation. 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MJGA) has designed a Sponsorship Trust Fund for that 
purpose.
7  The Trust Fund's capital base is  expected to be set initially at US$30 million, including cash 
contributions and promissory notes.  The Fund will be liquidated on a date agreed on by the sponsors --
or when its capital base is exhausted as a consequence of  claims.  · 
Technical assistance (US$10 million): Helping restructure conglomerates and banks 
28.  A  comprehensive  restructuring  and  privatization  strategy  is  needed  to  revitalize  the  prewar 
conglomerates,  where  possible,  and  to  endow them  with  appropriate  and  competitive  structures  (as 
described  in  box 3).  Technical assistance is  required to assist in  this process -- including diagnostic 
studies,  definition  of detailed  measures  to  be  undertaken,  assistance  for  implementation  of these 
measures, and match-making with foreign partners.  USAID, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO), the IFC, and the World Bank are currently working on this issue. 
29.  Technical assistance is also required for restructuring the banking sector.  To be successful, this 
effort should be linked to the strengthening of bank lines of  credit.  Reforms should focus on: 
6 
7 
•  Improving the  legal and institutional environment by establishing a viable and harmonized 
legal and regulatory framework and corresponding enforcement capacity; 
•  Establishing Entity-level institutions  in  support of  bank restructuring and privatization to 
handle unrecoverable assets  (Asset Liquidation Fund) and frozen foreign exchange deposits 
(Settlement Agency), with the overall objective of  facilitating the workout of  bank problems, 
accelerating privatization, and providing compensation to household depositors; and 
•  Developing and implementing a bank restructuring and privatization program. 
While  indications  are  that transactions to  be  covered  could exceed  US$100  million,  the  Governments  have 
fixed  an  initial  target of US$50  million  -- Switzerland has  already  committed US$5  million  and  the  World 
Bank recently approved a US$10 million credit on concessional terms. 
The  Fund  will  be  administrated  by  MIGA  on  behalf of the  sponsors -- including the  evaluation  of investor 
claims in accordance with the MIGA guidelines. -90-
Equity funds (US$25 million): Promoting long-term investment 
30.  The EBRD is developing a Bosnia and Herzegovina Reconstruction Equity Fund (BREF).  This 
US$35 million fund, cofinanced by the EBRD and the European Commission, will provide equity (and 
quasi-equity) capital  to  selected  small  and  medium-size  enterprises  -- with  a  view  to  participate  to 
corporate governance and provide management support.  The Government of Italy will provide a US$7.5 
million of grant financing to meet operating costs during the early years of operation.  The fund will be 
managed by a private firm with direct equity investment management experience (competitively selected 
by the EBRD); investments will range from US$35,000 to US$3.5 million and will consist of minority 
equity  stakes  combined  with  debt  or  quasi-equity  instruments.  It  will  initially  focus  on  private 
enterprises with a successful prewar record of operations, which need capital to re-start; later, after they 
will  be privatized,  it  will  support former government-owned enterprises (box 7  shows the  result of a 
survey undertaken during the preparation of  the fund). 
31.  The EBRD and the IFC are cosponsoring a  venture capital fund  initially estimated at US$20 
million.
8 
The fund would finance the creation, modernization, expansion, and restructuring of small and 
medium-size enterprises,  and would  be directed  at private companies and  public enterprises that are 
being privatized, whether local  firms or joint-ventures. Initial  investments are  likely to remain  small 
(generally between US$50,000 and US$250,000) and targeted at companies which produce goods and 
services necessary for the reconstruction effort.  The fund will  be allowed to take majority ownership 
positions in  firms.  Larger investments may be considered at a  later stage.  The fund will  be dissolved 
after ten years (with a possible two-year extension to liquidate its portfolio). 
8 
The fund will be managed by Horizonte, an asset management company based in  Vienna, Austria. - 91  -
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE YEARS AHEAD 
32.  Reaching  consensus  on  the  reforms  required  for  the  revival  of the  industry  sector has  been 
difficult.  Decisionmakers  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  should  not  be  misled  by  postwar difficulties 
(particularly  the  need  to  generate  employment  rapidly):  while  special  conditions  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina may create a temptation to revert to centralized government-controlled industry, only strong 
involvement of the private sector will  help to ensure a  sustainable revival of the sector -- which will 
require comprehensive reforms of the existing economic framework.  Governments should  limit their 
role  to  creating  conditions  for  the  private  sector  to  develop:  maintaining  a  sound  macroeconomic 
environment,  establishing  an  appropriate  legal  and  regulatory  framework  that  promotes  the  smooth 
functioning  of free  markets  and  facilitates  both  domestic  and  foreign  investments,  and  providing 
essential public goods and social services.  Such principles should now be transformed into well-targeted 
and properly enforced regulations and Government authorities should initiate the reform process as soon 
as possible for implementation of the major policy changes in  1997.  Donor support in  this endeavor is 
essential, both in  providing financial and advisory assistance and in  ensuring that funds are targeted and 
channeled in appropriate ways to promote the needed reforms.  Economic reform issues will  be discussed 
at length in another report.
9  Box 8 identifies key areas requiring attention. 
9  To be submitted to the donor community during the February  1997 Donor Conference. I.  BACKGROUND 
EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AND 
LABOR MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Unemployment was increasing even before the war 
1.  Unemployment is one of the most fundamental postwar issues that Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
to  face.  Even  before  the  war,  unemployment  was  becoming  a  serious  problem  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, as it was in the neighboring Yugoslav republics.  The economy began to deteriorate in  the 
1980s, and  by  1991  an  estimated 27  percent of the  1.3  million of the non-agricultural  labor force was 
unemployed.  This problem was in  part rooted in the economic transition just beginning throughout the 
region.  Enterprise restructuring prior to the war was already leading to changes in  the labor force that 
were resulting in rising unemployment.  Labor policies and institutions, however, were not responding to 
the changes in the economy, leading to a widening divergence between labor supply and demand. 
The war has left a majority of  the labor force jobless 
2.  The virtual collapse of the economy during the war means that unemployment today is  nearly 
double that of 1991.  Though there are no reliable data on unemployment, estimates put unemployment 
at  50  to  60  percent  of the  current  labor  force  of about  1.1  million.  There  is  also  significant 
underemployment, as many who once had formal  sector jobs now rely on  informal sector activities and 
agriculture to make a living. 
Lack of  job opportunities impedes successful demobilization and the return of  refugees 
3.  Of particular  concern  are  the  job prospects  for  those  most  directly  affected  by  the  war  --
demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons, war widows, and returning refugees.  About 425,000 
soldiers  have  been  or  are  being  demobilized  (245,000  in  the  Federation  and  180,000  in  Republika 
Srpska),  many  of them  with  lower than  average  educational  and  professional  qualifications  that  are 
unsuited  to  the  changing  economic  environment.  More  than  13,000  people,  most  of them  former 
soldiers, have permanent physical disabilities from war injuries (including 5,000 people who lost limbs), 
which prevent them from resuming their former occupations.  If not given appropriate assistance, many 
demobilized  soldiers could end  up  among the  long-term  structurally unemployed  requiring  long-term 
income support. 
4.  People  displaced  during the  war and  unable  to  return  to  their homes  and  previous jobs face 
particular difficulties reintegrating into the labor market, as do the widows of soldiers killed during the 
war.  Unexpectedly made heads of households, these women are forced to find employment to support 
their families and yet they often lack appropriate qualifications to do so. 
5.  The return and reinsertion into the  labor market of refugees also represents a major challenge 
that needs  to  be addressed  with  a measure of sensitivity.  Over one  million  refugees,  representing a -94-
potentially  significant proportion  of the  labor force,  still  reside  outside of Bosnia and  Herzegovina. 
Many of  those who left the country to escape the effects of war possess important skills that are needed 
for the immediate reconstruction process as well as for  longer-term economic development.  There  is, 
however,  a  national  consensus that those  who  fled  during  the  war should  not  be  given  preferential 
treatment for employment to encourage their return.  The issue takes on added delicacy in  light of the 
country's 50 to 60 percent unemployment rate.  A further complication is that half the refugees who fled 
abroad are  from  areas  in  which they would  now be  a minority  if they were to  return.  Nevertheless, 
employment opportunities are a vital component of the preconditions necessary to encourage refugees to 
return. 
6.  Overall, there is no doubt that unemployment is an overwhelming economic and social problem 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Continued lack of employment opportunities could undermine economic 
and social reintegration and contribute to a resurgence of social tensions.  However, investment in  the 
reconstruction  and  recovery  program  alone  will  not  ensure  sustained  growth  in  employment  and 
earnings.  Cross-country evidence clearly indicates that economic growth alone is not sufficient to create 
employment.  The structure of the labor market is fundamental to employment growth.  Thus there is a 
need for active measures to ensure that the  labor force  is  suitably skilled to meet the demands of the 
labor market and that labor policies and institutions are in place to ensure labor force mobility. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
7.  Employment generation is  an  overriding objective of the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery 
Program  and  a  cross-cutting  issue that needs to  be  integrated  into  all  sectoral  investment  strategies. 
Reconstruction  and  recovery  activities  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  are  generating  considerable 
employment,  especially  in  housing  and  infrastructure  reconstruction  and  in  industry.  An  estimated 
250,000 jobs were created  at the  peak of the  1996  Reconstruction  Program.  But further  efforts are 
needed to maximize the employment impact of the Reconstruction Program and to ensure that the labor 
market policies are in place to guard against long-term structural unemployment.  Hence, the need for an 
active employment program that: 
•  In the short-term ( 1996-97), focuses on  employment creation schemes, particularly for the 
most  vulnerable  groups,  and  on  maximizing  the  employment  creation  potential  of 
reconstruction projects.  Work also needs to begin  immediately on  reforming labor market 
policies. 
•  In the medium to long term, turns toward the structural issues underlying unemployment --
towards  institutional  and  policy  reform  to  ensure  a  well-functioning  labor  market  and 
investments  in  training and  enterprise promotion  to  help  the  unemployed  find  permanent 
jobs in  a  market economy.  Unless these  issues are addressed head-on, they are  likely to 
disrupt the transition to a more market-oriented economy. 
8.  The  Employment Generation  Program  focuses  on  investments that have job creation  as  their 
primary objective.  It also highlights the structural and policy issues that need to be addressed to ensure a 
well-functioning labor market (these issues are addressed in more depth in the Economic Report that will 
be submitted at the February 1997 Donor Conference).  In  concept and scope, the overall employment 
generation program  submitted in  April  1996 remains  unchanged.  Implementation will  require US$76 
million  in  external support for the three- to four-year reconstruction period within the overall  US$5.1 
billion priority reconstruction program (table 1  ): - 95-
•  In 1996, US$42  million was firmly committed, representing  56  percent of the  original 
US$75 million in estimated needs (paragraphs 11  to 20); 
•  In 1997,  US$30  million of external financing  is  required, with  a  greater share of the 
resources going to Republika Srpska to  make up  for the  lack of investment in  Republika 
Srpska  during  1996  (paragraphs  21  to  28);  a  list  of corresponding  investments  will  be 
prepared for the Third Donor Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  In 1998-99, US$4 million in investment will be necessary, and policy issues will  need to 
be increasingly addressed to ensure the sustainability of  employment (paragraphs 29 to 32). 
Table 1.  Employment Generation Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm 
1997  1998-99  Program  Requirements/ 
Commitments  Requirements/  Allocation 
Allocation 
Public employment  32.8  14.7  17.1  1.0 
Microenterprise development  21.9  14.7  5.2  2.0 
Employment counseling  3.3  2.1  1.2  0.0 
Training  12.0  5.1  5.9  1.0 
Institution building  5.6  5.0  0.6  0.0 
Total  75.6  41.6  30.0  4.0 
9.  There are five main areas of investment under the Employment Generation Program: 
•  Public employment: provision of rapid, short-term employment opportunities; 
•  Microenterprise  development:  promotion  of  self-employment,  microcredit  and 
microentreneurship; 
•  Employment  counseling:  proviSIOn  of counseling  and  placement services,  particularly  for 
demobilized soldiers and refugees wishing to return; 
•  Training:  retraining and education to assist workers to gain the skills necessary for a more 
market-oriented economy; and 
•  Institution building: provision of  demand-driven services to the unemployed. 
I 0.  For  these  investments  to  have  the  desired  employment  impact,  policy  reforms  are  critical. 
Employment  generation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  still  impeded  by  restrictive  labor  laws  that 
artificially drive up  the  real  cost of labor.  If measures are  not taken  in  the short term,  high  rates of 
unemployment are likely to persist. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
I 1.  The  primary objective of the  Employment Generation  Program  in  I 996  was  to  create  rapid 
employment opportunities for those made jobless by the war and to start up  other active employment 
programs Uob  placement, retraining,  microenterprise development) while  simultaneously building the 
institutional capacity through which to finance such programs and to provide employment and training 
services.  The main 1996 donor commitments to employment generation activities are shown in  table 2. Public employment 
Microenterprise development 
Employment counseling 
Education and training 
Institution building 
Total 
-96-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount  Main Donors 
14.7  EC,  Netherlands,  Norway,  UNDP, 
Bank 
US,  World 
14.7  EC,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Turkey,  UNHCR,  US, 
World Bank 
2.1  World Bank 
5.1  Austria, Netherlands, World Bank 
5.0  EC, Netherlands, World Bank 
41.6 
Public employment: 10,000 months of  employment already created through public works 
schemes 
12.  Good  progress  was  made  on  implementing  public  employment  schemes  in  1996.  The 
Governments  of the  Netherlands  and  Norway,  and  the  World  Bank-financed  a  Public  Works  and 
Employment Project implemented through Employment and Training Foundations (ETF) established in 
the  Federation  and  in  Republika  Srpska (box  1).  By  the  end  of 1996,  the  ETFs  will  already  have 
contracted an  estimated US$6 million  in  public works  projects, creating more than  10,000 months of 
work (or 3,000 temporary jobs based on  an  average project implementation  period of three  months). 
Several bilateral donors, notably the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), also allocated 
funds  for small  quick-impact rehabilitation projects that aimed to create jobs rapidly  in  their areas of 
military command.  IFOR troops played a central role in  identifying and supervising these projects.  By 
the end of October  1996,  US$15  million  had  been  committed to  such  projects  in  the  Federation  and 
Republika Srpska, and about 600 projects had  been  approved. 
1  During  1996, the International Labor 
Office  (ILO)  also  carried  out preparatory work  for  a  prospective  Emergency Employment Program, 
based on the creation of "unemployment companies", a model which has worked successfully in  eastern 
Germany. 
These amounts channeled through IFOR are not reported in table 2.  The UK Government has provided about 
US$10 million in  financing to such schemes in  Multinational Division South West and the  US  Government 
US$5 million in Multinational Division North East. -97-
Microenterprise development:  From dependence on humanitarian assistance to 
economic independenc~ 
13.  During 1996, microenterprises and other income-generating activities received growing attention 
as a means of helping people move from  unemployment and dependency on humanitarian assistance to 
active employment and economic independence.  Since Bosnia and Herzegovina has had little experience 
with microenterprise financing, the Government of the Netherlands funded, through the World Bank, a 
pilot Local Initiatives Project (microcredit) in  Tuzla in  February 1996 with three NGOs -- BOSPO (a 
local  NGO), International  Rescue Committee, and  World Vision?  Loans  up  to  a  maximum of DM 
10,000 were provided to displaced women, demobilized soldiers, and other rural  and  urban  would-be 
microentrepreneurs.  World  Vision  also  provided  business  management  training  to  potential 
microentrepreneurs.  Activities financed include trade, services, small-scale production, and agriculture. 
In  August  1996,  with  financial  support  from  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner for  Refugees 
(UNHCR), the pilot program was expanded to  Bihac, Gorazde,  Mostar, and Sarajevo. By the end of 
1996,  it  is  projected that some 400  loans will  have been disbursed for a total value of approximately 
US$800,000.  The pilot phase has demonstrated a high demand for such small amounts of credit ( 10,000 
DM  and  less)  and  has  shown  that NGOs  can  reach  the  target  population  and  manage  microcredit 
programs that achieve high repayment rates (90 to 100  percent) provided sufficient technical assistance 
and  training are  provided.  The Local  Initiatives Project will  become operational  in  December  1996 
under the management of the ETFs.  As well as providing financing for microcredit programs managed 
by NGOs,  this  project will  finance  considerable  technical  assistance  and  training  to  help  build  the 
capacity of these organizations to develop financially sustainable microfinance operations over the long 
term. 
14.  In  September  1996,  the  US  Government  launched  the  Bosnian  Women's  Initiative,  a  US$5 
million  fund,  administered by UNHCR and run  by NGOs.  The initiative supports  income-generating 
skills and training programs for returning refugee, displaced, and other war-affected women.  Projects 
financed  include  tailoring  and  hairdressing  workshops  for  women,  as  well  as  microcredit  schemes 
targeted to women.  Close collaboration  is  needed  between  the  Bosnian  Women's Initiative  and  the 
Local  Initiatives  Project  to  ensure  a  common  policy  framework  on  credit  delivery  and  a  common 
institution-building approach to microenterprise development 
2 
This represented the  pilot phase of a full-scale  US$18  million  Local Initiatives Project which is  expected  to 
become  effective  in  December,  1996.  The  Local  Initiatives  Project complements  the  International  Finance 
Corporation  (IFC) and  the  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development (EBRD)  project to  setup  a 
microenterprise  bank  by  targeting  a  "pre-entrepreneurial"  class  of borrower  at  the  lowest  end  of the 
microenterprise spectrum  (see  the "Industry and  Finance" sector report).  The  IFC/EBRD-sponsored  micro-
credit bank would support existing micro and small businesses at the higher end of  the spectrum. - 98-
15.  In  October 1996, the ILO began work on  the  local  economic development component of the 
Program for Rehabilitation and Sustainable Social Development (PROGRESS), financed  by the United 
Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and 
the  Government of Italy.  This  component  will  include  a  small-scale  microcredit  program  in  three 
municipalities in the Una-Sana canton (Bihac) and Banja Luka region.  UNDP also started a program to 
set  up  enterprise  assistance  bureaus  in  Bihac,  Central  Bosnia,  and  Mostar,  beginning  with  Bihac  in 
October 1996.  These bureaus will  provide business development services for enterprises of all  sizes, 
including microenterprises, with an  initial  focus  on  providing information on  how to  access available 
financial and technical assistance. 
Employment counseling and  job-finding services: Matching job seekers with job 
vacancies 
16.  In  September  1996  employment  counseling  and  job-finding  services  started,  with  primary 
attention to demobilized soldiers and refugees wishing to return.  In  October, the Federation ETF signed 
its  first  contract with  an  NGO, the  International Catholic Migration Commission  (ICMC), to  provide 
counseling and job-finding services for demobilized soldiers.  More contracts will  be signed by the end 
of 1996.  The International Organization for Migration (IOM) took the lead  in  trying to match refugees 
with job opportunities in  Bosnia and Herzegovina and  in  providing assistance for them to return.  The 
lack of  job opportunities represented a major constraint to the return of refugees on  any large scale in 
1996. 
17.  An  integral  part of job-finding services  is  having sufficient information on  the  labor market -
who  are  the  unemployed,  where  are  they,  what  skills  do  they  have,  where  and  what  types  of job 
opportunities are available?  Work started  in  September 1996 on examining labor market information 
systems and  discussing  improvements to the current system  of Employment  Institutes  and  municipal 
employment  offices  in  the  Federation  and  Republika  Srpska.  Under  the  Demobilization  and 
Reintegration Project, the World Bank has committed US$1.5  million to  upgrading,  broadening, and 
automating the labor market information systems operated by municipal employment services, including 
ensuring that  good  data are  available  on job vacancies  and  on  those  seeking employment.  The  US 
Department of Labor (USDOL) is  providing technical  assistance  in  this effort.  In  October  1996, the 
USDOL organized a study tour to employment bureaus in  Ireland, Poland and the United States for key 
management and technical staff from the Employment Institutes and the ETFs of both the Federation and 
Republika Srpska.  The ILO also sent a technical specialist to examine issues  related  to  labor market 
information during 1996.  The ILO is coordinating closely with the USDOL to ensure that a coherent and 
unified labor market information system emerges. 
Education and training: Getting ready for jobs in a restructured economy 
18.  Training and  skills  upgrading will  be  essential  to  ensure that the  unemployed  have the  skills 
needed to  qualify for jobs in  a  changing economy.  With  the  collapse of the  prewar socially owned 
industrial sector,  many prewar jobs no  longer exist.  The  industrial  sector needs to  be  restructured to 
compete in  a market economy, and the demand for labor will shift accordingly.  To find jobs, many of 
the  unemployed  will  need  to  upgrade their skills.  Through  the  ETFs,  the  World  Bank  is  providing 
financing  to  local  service  providers  (enterprises,  NGOs,  private  and  public  training  institutions)  to 
provide on-the-job and other skills training, particularly for demobilized soldiers.  Two service contracts 
for skills training programs had been signed as of mid-October (one with an  enterprise and one with an -99-
NGO), and over ninety  proposals to provide training services, solicited through promotional campaigns, 
are now being appraised.  The programs should provide training for over 2,000 people. 
Institution building: Channeling resources and integrating employment services 
19.  Two important institutional initiatives took place in  1996.  The first was to establish ETFs in the 
Federation and  in  Republika Srpska to  channel  grant financing to  public,  nongovernment,  or  private 
sector institutions for employment and training activities.  The ETFs are governed by boards of directors 
made up  of ministry representatives of both Governments (including the Ministries of Finance, Social 
Policy and Refugees,  and  Physical  Planning), and  nongovernment entities,  including the Chamber of 
Commerce, Employment Institutes, and trade unions.  The Federation ETF was fully operational by July 
1996,  and  the  Republika  Srpska  ETF  by  October  1996.  By the  end  of 1996,  the  ETFs  will  have 
significant  capacity  to  channel  donor  financing  for  local  initiatives  related  to  public  employment 
schemes, microenterprise development, and job counseling and training.  Technical assistance is  being 
provided to the ETFs by the US Department of  Labor and by several international experts in microcredit. 
20.  The second initiative was to explore ways to strengthen and improve the Employment Institutes, 
with donor support from the ILO and the World Bank.  The Federation has, de facto, two Employment 
Institutes, one each in  Sarajevo and Mostar, which operate virtually independently.  To be effective in 
providing job listings  and job search assistance and  to  encourage movement of labor throughout the 
Federation, these institutes and their information systems and services need to be better integrated. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
21.  Two areas should receive primary attention in  1997.  One is to scale-up and increase the impact 
of  employment generation programs.  The return of  refugees is likely to increase in  1997, and efforts will 
be  needed  to  improve  mechanisms to  help  refugees  find  employment and  to  reintegrate  into  the job 
market.  The  second  is  to  broaden  and  deepen  the  labor  market development agenda to  address the 
structural and policy issues underlying unemployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These activities will 
require an estimated US$30 million in financing from the donor community (table 1). 
Public employment (US$17.1 million): Continuing employment for the most vulnerable 
22.  High  unemployment  is  likely to continue  in  1997,  and  in  the  short term  public employment 
schemes will remain an  important means of providing jobs for the unemployed, particularly for the most 
vulnerable, least skilled workers.  For 1997, the ETFs aim to implement up to US$17 million in  public 
works  and  employment projects  prepared  by  municipalities  and  local  communities,  creating at  least 
40,000  months of work.  Particular attention  will  be  paid  to  getting  projects  underway  in  Republika 
Srpska and to setting up  employment creation schemes in  areas where refugees are expected to  return 
and  in  more  remote,  marginal  areas.  Additional  donor  cofinancing  is  urgently  needed  since  funds 
available from  1996 commitments are expected to be fully contracted by Aprill997. 
23.  The ILO is also seeking financing for an Emergency Employment Program for 1997 that would 
help  establish private employment companies with  services concentrated on  demobilized soldiers and 
war invalids.  Staff would  be  recruited from  the ranks of the unemployed,  particularly among former 
employees of large state-owned enterprises.  The project would finance the wages of the workers, who 
would be employed immediately and paid by the employment company, which would seek contracts for - 100-
projects in  areas such as infrastructure rehabilitation, repair of war damage, industrial renewal schemes, 
environmental projects, and the like. 
24.  Because it will take time for the economy to  recover and for permanent employment to reach 
desirable levels, every effort should be made to maximize employment during the three to four years of 
the Reconstruction Program by emphasizing the employment creation impact of other investments under 
the Reconstruction Program.  This can be done, for example, by using employment-intensive methods 
instead of capital-intensive methods, where that makes economic sense.  Preparing trenches for water 
pipes  and  other network  systems  is  one  area  in  which  manual  labor  could  be  more  economic  than 
machines. 
Microenterprise and micro-finance development and self-employment (US$5.2 million): 
Building sustainable financing mechanisms 
25.  In  1997,  the  objective  for  microenterprise  development  is  to  deepen  and  broaden  business 
training and other financial and related services available to people wishing to become self-employed or 
to start up  microenterprises.  One such effort is the Local Initiatives Project, which will begin full-scale 
operations  in  December  1996  under the  management of the  ETFs (paragraph  12).  The  project will 
provide credit and business services to people from economically disadvantaged groups who wish to start 
income-generating activities and  microenterprises.  Loan funds  will  be  managed at the  local  level  by 
contracted  NGOs,  mainly  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  selected  for  their  potential  to  develop 
microcredit  programs of a  large  enough  scale  and  reach  to  become  financially  sustainable  over the 
medium to long term; the NGOs will receive substantial technical assistance and training to reach this 
goal.  Attention also needs to be focused on the legal and regulatory framework for microenterprises and 
for non-bank financial  institutions to create an  environment that encourages microenterprise growth and 
the development of institutions that can serve their financial needs. 
Employment counseling and  job-finding services (US$1.2 million): Stepping up the pace 
26.  Because of the  economic  collapse  brought on  by  the  war,  many  highly  skilled  people  from 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina are  unable  to  find  work.  Such  people  require  active  assistance  in  finding 
employment.  Areas  in  need  of continuing  improvement  in  1997  and  beyond  include  employment 
services  (job  placement  and  related  counseling  services)  through  both  public  and  private  service 
providers, and intensive job--seeking assistance for displaced workers, particularly for those with higher-
level skills, including refugees outside the country.  A system is  needed for consolidating available job 
information and circulating it effectively to refugees in  asylum countries, so that they can compete for 
employment on an equal basis.  The 10M has formed a working group under the auspices of the ILO-led 
Task  Force  on  Employment  and  Training  to  address  these  issues  in  coordination  with  other 
organizations, ministries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and asylum country governments. 
Education and training (US$5.9 million): Learning the skills for a competitive market 
economy 
27.  A  stronger focus  on  vocational  and  skills  training (both  on-the-job training and  institutional 
training), is needed in  1997 to identify the skill requirements of employers, so that training programs can 
respond to market demand and achieve high job placement rates.  All programs must meet the criteria of 
being  demand  driven  and  cost effective.  Nearly  US$6  million  in  new  commitments  is  required  to 
implement education and training activities on  a significant scale.  Areas  in  need of attention  include - 101  -
strengthening  trammg  institutes,  developing  new  training  courses,  training  trainers,  and  making 
managers  and  technicians  more  aware  of modern  management  techniques  and  new  technologies. 
Modern broadcast media are one avenue for heightening awareness and providing on-air training.  Other 
countries  have  used  the  broadcast  media  to  present  open  university  type  programs,  debates, 
documentaries, 'soaps' , and other programming to get economic reform and other messages across to a 
broad public.  These types of initiatives should be encouraged and developed during 1997. 
Institution building (US$0.6 million): Getting labor markets to function efficiently 
28.  A major challenge in  1997 will  be to get labor market and employment services in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to function efficiently.  The State Government also wishes to integrate the labor markets to 
the extent possible.  Today, labor markets function separately in  the Federation and Republika Srpska 
and,  within  the  Federation,  in  Bosniac- and  Croat-majority areas.  This  separation  is  reflected  in  the 
institutional arrangements: one Employment Institute based in  Sarajevo deals with the Bosniac-majority 
part of the  Federation, one in  Mostar deals with the Croat-majority part, and  one  in  Republika Srpska 
deals  with that  area.  Each  institute  has  local  employment offices that are  supposed to  collect  labor 
market information and provide job placement and counseling services.  Many ofthe~e local offices were 
damaged during the war and are barely functioning, particularly in the Bosniac  part of the Federation. 
Some linkages were established between these institutes during 1996, and they need to be encouraged in 
1997 to facilitate  increased  labor mobility throughout the territory of Bosnia and  Herzegovina and to 
enhance labor market information systems and employment services. The ETFs will also need continued 
financial and technical assistance to play an increasingly significant role in  implementing and financing 
effective employment-related activities. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS A HEAD 
29.  A major issue is the sustainability of  employment creation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Many of 
the jobs created to date are temporary public works jobs or jobs related to reconstruction and will come 
to an end once the donor-financed reconstruction effort is completed.  To encourage sustained growth in 
employment and permanent job opportunities, in  light of the 1996 experience (box 2), the challenge for 
the future is to ensure an open labor market and the right skills mix in the labor force. 
Labor policy reform to respond to the needs of a market economy 
30.  Government authorities and  the  Employment Institutes  in  both  the Federation  and  Republika 
Srpska are well  aware that labor codes and  other labor-related  legislation  do  not meet the needs  of a 
market  economy.  Current laws  and  regulations tend  to  reflect a  paternalistic  attitude toward  worker 
protection, which restricts employment growth and labor mobility.  Areas  in  particular need of reform 
include:
3 
3 
•  Extremely high payroll taxes.  Wage taxes, including social charges, stand at over 50 percent 
of gross salary.  By comparison, the average is  18  percent for most OECD countries and 30 
percent for eastern and central European countries.  Such high rates are likely to be a major 
constraint to the expansion of  employment. 
A more complete discussion  of these issues  is  provided  in  an  economic report to  be  submitted  in  February 
1997. - 102-
•  Restrictive  work  practices  and  contracts  that  limit  the  flexibility  of  employment 
relationships.  Employment contracts in  Bosnia and Herzegovina are a  holdover from  the 
times  of the  former  Yugoslavia,  when  employees  were  typically  guaranteed  lifetime 
employment with  generous  leave  time  and  extensive  protection  against  dismissal.  In  a 
market economy, private sector employers are likely to begin to avoid legal labor contracts, 
as they have in  all other transition economies, because of their restrictiveness.  Workers in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina will find this avoidance of legal contracts acceptable because of  the 
high  unemployment rates and  currently low wage levels.  With a growing informal  labor 
market, tax avoidance will spread and minimum standards of worker protection will not be 
upheld.  Hence, the need for reform. 
•  Arbitrarily set minimum wages and wage schedules.  By law, official wage scales are still set 
in  both the Federation and Republika Srpska.  However, with private sector growth, these 
wage  levels  are  increasingly  being  ignored,  and  employers  are  setting  wages  based  on 
market conditions.  Official  minimum  wages  are  also  set on  a  monthly  basis.  A  system 
needs to be put in place to ensure that the minimum wage is set at an affordable level and is 
not subject to such frequent change. 
•  Restrictions on hiring unemployed workers and on the listing of  job vacancies.  In the former 
Yugoslavia the  employment  bureau  was  the  only  source  of job  listings  for  unemployed 
workers.  Under current laws, this system is  still  in  effect.  In  OECD countries, even those 
with effective government-operated  labor exchanges, private employment services and the 
listing of  job vacancies in newspapers account for a substantial number of  job placements.  If 
employment is to recover quickly in  Bosnia and Herzegovina, the development of a variety 
of  job placement avenues needs to be supported by legislation. 
o  Restrictions  on  labor  management relations.  A  single  tripartite  labor  contract  between 
unions, employers, and government has traditionally been part of the regulatory framework. 
But in  a  market economy,  union  officials can no  longer count on  a completely unionized 
work  force.  To  the  extent  that the  tripartite  agreement  contains  provisions  that  are  not 
acceptable to small and private sector employers, nonunion employment is  likely to expand. 
Focused discussions among unions, employers, and government will  be  essential  to ensure 
that all interests are taken into consideration during the process of  privatization. 
31.  All these areas are being addressed by several international organizations, including the ILO and 
the World Bank, in the context of the overall macroeconomic discussions and government policymaking 
currently going on. 
Income support measures to ease the transition for the most vulnerable 
32.  The  unemployed  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina face  the  double  hardship  of finding  a job  in  a 
postwar environment after four years of unemployment and  of adapting to  a changing job market  in 
which their skills may no  longer match market demand.  Their hardship  is  intensified  by the fact that 
currently virtually no  unemployment benefits are being paid.  Income support measures are  needed to 
reduce the hardship faced by the unemployed: unemployment benefits need to be reintroduced, but they 
need to be at a financially sustainable level and narrowly targeted.  Particular attention needs to be given 
to  temporary  income  support  for  demobilized  soldiers,  displaced  workers,  war  invalids,  and  other 
vulnerable groups. AGRICULTURE 
I.  BACKGROUND 
An essential sector before the war 
1.  Agriculture has always played a central role in  Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy, providing 
full- or  part-time  employment  to  some  40  percent  of the  population.  However,  because  prewar 
productivity was low -- particularly in  the 540,000 small private farms which owned 94 percent of the 
land -- the sector accounted for only 14 percent of  the Gross Social Product (GSP) in the late 1980s.  Just 
before  the  war,  between  one-third  and  one-half of the  country's  basic  food  requirements  had  to  be 
imported, mainly from other parts of the former Yugoslavia.  Moreover, production varies substantially 
throughout the country: livestock (dairy and meat) predominates in the hilly and mountainous central and 
western parts of the Federation, horticulture plays an important role in  the south with its mediterranean 
climate, and  wheat and grains grow along the northern fertile  plains of the Sava river -- generating a 
wheat surplus in Republika Srpska while the Federation remains dependent on wheat and flour imports. 
2.  Bosnia and Herzegovina's forests, which cover about half of the country's land area, provided 
substantial  and  high-quality  wood  materials  to  industry  before  the  war.  Forestry  and  wood-based 
industries accounted for more than 10 percent of GSP and generated some US$200 million in  net export 
income.  Forestry production is equally important in both Entities. 
A sector devastated by war 
3.  The war had  a devastating effect on agriculture, forestry,  and  food  production (box 1  ).  As a 
result, by the end of  the war, nearly 80 percent of the population depended on imported donor food aid, 
valued at US$20 million a month. - 104-
4.  Agriculture  and  food  production  have  rebounded  significantly  since  the  end  of hostilities. 
During 1996 many farmers were able to return to their fields and to resume production at a subsistence 
level.  Village-based  markets  have  reappeared,  indicating  surplus  production.  Still,  significant 
challenges -- making sufficient agricultural assets available to farmers and revitalizing agriculture and 
forestry  based on  market principles -- must be addressed  by  the Entity Governments.  Considerable 
support, both financial and advisory, is required from the international donor community. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
5.  The  reconstruction  program  for  agriculture,  food  production,  and  forestry  is  aimed  at 
redeveloping sustainable, private sector-led agriculture and forestry sectors.  Achieving this goal would ) 
diminish Bosnia and Herzegovina's food dependency, stimulate rural employment, increase farm income, 
eventually generate export revenues, and create favorable conditions for the return of  refugees. 
6.  The overall framework designed to meet these objectives, submitted in  December 1995 and April 
1996, remains valid.  It will require US$304 million in  external financial support over a three- to four-
year period within the overall US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program (table I): 
•  In 1996, US$63 million has been firmly committed;  despite a financing gap of 35 percent 
(the first-year program  was initially estimated at US$97 million),  a  number of successful 
activities have been carried out this year (paragraphs 8 to 16); 
•  In 1997, US$90 million of  external financing is required-- 52 percent ofwhich should go 
to  the Federation  and  48  percent to  Republika  Srpska (paragraphs  17  to 29).  A  list of 
corresponding investments will  be  prepared for the Third Donor Conference to  be  held  in 
early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$151 million will be necessary-- and a multitude of structural 
and  policy issues should be  addressed to ensure the competitiveness and  sustainability of 
agriculture and forestry activities (paragraphs 30 to 35). 
Table 1.  Agriculture Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Imported seasonal farm  inputs  20  10  5  5 
Livestock and farm equipment  89  43  25  21 
Seed multiplication development  7  4  3  0 
Fruit trees and vineyards rehabilitation  30  0  10  20 
Forestry rehabilitation  40  0  25  15 
Rural financial markets development  20  0  5  15 
Rural industries and services  40  0  0  40 
Farmer support services development  30  3  7  20 
Agricultural policy development/Tech. Asst.  7  0  3  4 
Incremental recurrent costs  21  3  7  1  I 
Total  304  63  90  151 - 105-
7.  The priority reconstruction program includes several components: 
•  Ensuring the availability of (mainly imported) critical inputs and equipment, including key 
seasonal inputs, farm equipment and livestock, and seeds; 
•  Rehabilitating critical  sectors with  potential  for export,  including high-value orchards and 
vineyards, forestry activities and wood processing; 
•  Redeveloping support services,  including rural  financial  markets  (to  provide farmers  and 
agroindustries  with  financing  solutions  for  both  working  capital  and  investments),  rural 
industries  and  services,  and  farmer  support  services  (including  minimum  extension  and 
veterinary services); and 
•  Supporting  institutional  development,  including  assistance  to  authorities  in  formulating 
agriculture policies and technical assistance for program preparation and implementation. 
In  parallel, a number of policy issues (trade and price policies, property rights, privatization) should be 
addressed to ensure the sustainability of  the recovery effort. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
8.  Donor assistance to  agriculture  in  1996  focused  on  emergency-type  projects  with  immediate 
impacts  and  high  rates  of return  -- preparing  a  gradual  transition  from  ad  hoc  assistance,  typically 
provided by  nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), toward economic recovery financed  by bilateral 
and multilateral donors.  Efforts focused on  providing key inputs and equipment (through soft loans or 
grants) to farmers in order to: 
•  Sharply  increase  domestic  food  production  and  decrease  dependency  on  donor  food  aid 
(box 2); 
•  Facilitate  the  return  of displaced  or  refugee  farmers  to  their  land  and  forest  workers 
reintegration; 
•  Support subsistence agriculture to meet the minimal needs of  the rural population; 
•  Increase the use of farm land and return war-damaged farms to production; and 
•  Ensure donor coordination to avoid duplication of  efforts and waste of  scarce resources. 
9.  The combined efforts of bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs, and the authorities in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina have led to a high degree of  success in  implementing the 1996 agriculture program.  Of 
a total  1996 program of US$97 million, some US$63  million was firmly committed by thirteen donor 
countries and agencies (table 2 and annex for a detailed breakdown)-- leaving a sectoral financing gap 
for 1996 of  about US$34 million (35 percent). - 106-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million)
3 
Imported seasonal farm inputs 
Livestock and farm equipment 
Seed multiplication development 
Fruit trees and vineyards rehabilitation 
Farmer support services development 
Incremental recurrent costs 
Total 
Amount 
10.5 
42.6 
3.7 
0.3 
2.9 
3.2 
63.2 
Main Donors 
EC, Germany, Islamic Development Bank 
!FAD, EC, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, World Bank 
Japan, Norway, Switzerland 
Norway 
Germany, Sweden 
EC, IFAD, Netherlands, World Bank 
a No commitments were made for the following components: forestry rehabilitation; rural financial markets development; 
rural industries and services; and agricultural policy development/technical assistance. 
Import and distribution of  inputs:  Requirements have been met 
1  0.  Seasonal farm inputs and seeds multiplication.  In  1996 the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO),  other donors  (table  2),  and NGOs  supplied  some  US$10.5  million  of seeds,  fertilizers,  and 
pesticides.  About 70 percent of this assistance benefited the Federation -- where minimum emergency 
requirements,  as  estimated  by  the  F AO,  were  adequately  met  for  many  inputs  -- and  30  percent 
Republika Srpska.  The balance of  input requirements was procured by farmers on a commercial basis. 
11.  Livestock.  The  International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Development  (IF  AD)  provided  US$6.3 
million to the Federation for the import of 3,900 pregnant heifers and  1, 700 goats.  Parallel financing 
(US$1  million) was provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia for the purchase of an additional 700 - 107-
heifers.  The !FAD-funded animals were distributed to farmers between September and November 1996 
on  a  credit  basis  (beneficiaries  were  selected  by  municipalities  based  on  an  agreed  list  of criteria 
developed  from  comprehensive  surveys).  Various  NGOs,  including  the  United  Methodist  Church 
Organization  Relief,  Action  Internationale  Contre  Ia  Faim,  and  Mercy  International,  have  also 
implemented a number of livestock programs  in  both  Entities,  including the  supply  of  heifers, goats, 
chicken, and rabbits. 
12.  Farm  equipment.  Financing was provided by the European Commission (US$5.8  million  for 
tractors in the Federation) and the World Bank (for import to the Federation of 2,600 small tractors and 
14  combine harvesters).  Most of this machinery will  be delivered to Federation farmers  (on  a credit 
basis) by the end of 1996.  NGOs such as Intervenir carried out additional programs aimed at supplying 
agricultural hand tools to farmers. 
Rehabilitation of fruit trees, vineyards and forestry: Preparing future financing 
13.  While financial assistance has focused on the provision of  critical inputs, detailed programs have 
been prepared for the rehabilitation of orchards, vineyards, and forestry as potential vehicles for future 
donor financing.  The FAO has designed a US$10 million project aimed at replacing damaged high-value 
fruit trees and vineyards, primarily in the southern part of  the country.  The Government of  Norway has a 
program in Tuzla to revitalize orchards.  The two Entity Governments (with the World Bank's support) 
have drafted a US$35 million forestry rehabilitation program that would benefit both the Federation and 
Republika Srpska. 
Redeveloping support services:  A good start 
14.  Rural  financial  markets  development  and  rural  industries  and  services.  The  European 
Commission (EC) has committed US$1  million to support the dairy industry.  The agriculture sector has 
also benefited from  projects  implemented as  part of the  industry and  industrial finance  reconstruction 
effort.  From a credit line funded by the Governments of  the Netherlands and Italy, and the World Bank, 
loans  totaling  about  US$5  million  have  been  allocated  to  small  and  medium-size  enterprises  in  the 
agroprocessing sector (shown as part of  the Industry sector and not reflected in Agriculture sector totals). 
Credit lines opened under the United States-financed "Bosnia and Herzegovina Reconstruction Finance 
Facility" have also been partly disbursed in  the agriculture sector.  (These amounts are reported in  the 
"Industry and Finance" section). 
15.  Farmer support services development. The Government of Germany provided US$2.6 million to 
repair  and  re-equip  forty  veterinary  stations  in  the  Federation  -- deliveries  of drugs  and  diagnostic 
equipment will be completed by the end of 1996.  The EC committed an additional US$0.3 million for a 
veterinary support program in Banja Luka. 
Support to institutions:  Government counterparts established 
16.  Agricultural policy development,  implementation support,  and recurrent costs financing.  The 
1996 agriculture reconstruction program  limited expenditures for technical  assistance and  institutional 
development to the minimum required for rapid and successful program  implementation.  Although  no 
significant funding was made available for agricultural policy, strategy, and  institutional development, 
resources were provided by the International Fund for Agriculture Development, the Government of the 
Netherlands, and the World Bank to establish a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) within the Federation - 108-
Ministry for Agriculture, Water Works, and Forestry.  Four regional project implementation units were 
also set up  in Tuzla, Zenica, Bihac, and Mostar.  These units have contributed significantly to the rapid 
implementation of  agriculture and forestry project activities. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
17.  Some  US$90  million  of external  financing  is  needed  to  meet  next  year's  challenges.  A 
continued  effort  is  required  to  reduce  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina's  food  dependency  and  to  generate 
revenues and rural employment (farming will play a key role as a rural  employment buffer until other 
economic sectors and  major industries  recover from  the war),  and  will  provide job opportunities for 
returning refugees. 
18.  Continued donor assistance  is  needed for  import of critical inputs.  However, donor activities 
should shift from emergency-type operations to sustainable activities (box 3).  Particular attention should 
be paid to preparing for the transition from subsistence farming to a competitive, market-based, privately 
owned  agriculture  and  food  processing  sector.  Thus,  assistance  is  needed  for  activities  aimed  at 
increasing the efficiency of private agriculture -- and  in  particular for  developing key farmer support 
services, building up  farmer extension and research, and helping the Governments to address essential 
policy issues. 
Critical imports (US$33 million):  A declining effort, with a focus on Republika Srpska 
19.  Imported seasonal farm inputs (US$5  million).  Donor support should be  gradually phased out 
over  the  next  years,  as  the  farm  sector  recovers,  farm  purchasing  power  increases,  input  markets 
improve, and  business  links between the Entities and  with  neighboring countries are restored.  In  the 
interim period however, the F  AO will continue to provide support by assessing farm  input requirements - 109-
(by  region  and  by  type  of input),  preparing  appeals  to  donors,  and  organizing  procurement  and 
distribution of inputs, in many cases with the assistance ofNGOs and municipalities. 
20.  Seed  multiplication  (US$3  million).  As  part  of this  effort,  additional  seed  multiplication 
initiatives will be prepared by the F  AO for donor financing. 
21 .  Livestock and farm equipment (US$25  million).  In  1996 most donor activities focused on  the 
Federation; during  1997  significant efforts should be  made to expand assistance to Republika Srpska. 
Priority lists of livestock and equipment (mainly cattle and small farm tractors) are being developed by 
the Government ofRepublika Srpska, with World Bank assistance. 
Fruit trees and vineyards rehabilitation (US$10 million):  Reviving essential export 
sectors 
22.  Some  US$10  million  is  initially  required  to  begin  implementing  the  FAO-designed  project 
proposal, prepared in  1996, aimed at rehabilitating high-value fruit trees and vineyards.  Funds will either 
be used for bulk procurement by the Government or on-lent through commercial banks to farmers (who 
would select and procure the most appropriate plants on a commercial basis  ).
1  Expected benefits from 
this  project  include  rural  employment  generation,  soil  improvement,  substitution  of high-quality 
domestic fruits and vegetables for imports, and eventually exports of  wine and fresh fruits to neighboring 
countries. 
The project would aim to achieve full  cost recovery from  beneficiaries, at commercial interest rates, but with 
maturities adjusted to the long payback periods of  replacement plants. - 110-
Forestry rehabilitation (US$25 million):  Tripling wood harvesting capacity 
23.  About US$25 million is  required to implement the Forestry Rehabilitation Project, designed in 
1996 by the Entities Governments with  World Bank support (box 4).  Several  benefits are expected: 
increasing wood production; reviving the wood processing, furniture making, and construction materials 
industries; generating employment in rural areas, and possibly generating export revenues -- since Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was a major exporter of  wood products before the war. 
Rural financial markets development (US$5 million):  On the road to sustainability 
24.  Lack of access to seasonal credit is becoming a major constraint for the recovering private farm 
sector (box 5).  Given the problems faced  by the banks, formal  commercial  lending is  unlikely to  be 
available to farmers in the years to come.  To address farmers' needs, a US$5 million rural finance pilot 
program, combined with a technical assistance component, should be initiated during 1997.
3  In parallel, 
the establishment of a land bank, which would purchase land from retiring farmers and rent it to others 
wishing to expand, could be considered.  Such an institution could prove attractive to long-term investors 
(such as pension funds), which typically hold a portion of  their assets in real estate. 
2 
3 
Harvesting and transport equipment for commercial purposes (such as chain saws, skidders,  logging tractors, 
and  trucks for  log  transport) will  be  ceded to  State  Forest Enterprises and  private operators against  in  kind 
credit and supply arrangements with five-year terms and at near-commercial interest rates.  Road maintenance 
and forest nursery equipment will be provided to the State and Forest Enterprises on similar loan terms.  Credit 
will be repaid through local credit institutions. 
The rural finance pilot program could be carried out within the framework of the World Bank-supported Local 
Initiatives Project, which is  being implemented.  Through  local NGOs, loans (currently limited to  US$7,000 
per  beneficiary)  would  be  extended  to  small  businesses  throughout  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  under  the 
supervision of  a newly established nonprofit Employment and Training Foundation. - 111  -
Farmer support services development (US$7 million):  Helping to increase productivity 
25.  Major productivity gains  would  result  from  the  modernization  of agricultural  technology  in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which currently lags far behind Slovenia and Croatia.  To that effect, adequate 
farmer support services are urgently needed and  it  should be  possible to ensure their suitability to a 
market-economy already  in  the  initial  phase,  since there  is  no  structure  inherited  from  the  socialist 
period.  In 1997, US$7 million is required, including: 
4 
•  Re-equipment of agricultural  and  forestry  research  and  veterinary  institutes  tn  Sarajevo, 
Banja Luka, and Mostar, 
•  Institutional support to set up Entity-wide agricultural extension service networks,
4 including 
required initial equipment, stafftraining, and technical assistance; and 
•  Establishment of an  agricultural  market  information  system  and  database  accessible  to 
farmers, agroindustries, researchers, and donors. 
A newly-created public agricultural and forestry extension service could constitute the initial advisory network 
for  small  farmers  and  private  forest  owners  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina  -- but  attention  should  be  paid  to 
ensuring that this system remains demand-driven, possibly through the involvement of municipalities.  Donor 
support is  required to  finance  local diagnostic surveys, training programs for  extension officers, mass  media 
activities,  and  on-farm  demonstration  programs.  In  parallel,  private  advisory  services  should  also  be 
established -- possibly starting with private advisers to farmer associations. - 112-
The return on investment in  such a program will be high, since many farmers will already have at their 
disposal imported high-quality livestock and modern farm equipment, as a result of  the 1996 activities. 
Agricultural policy development and aid coordination (US$3 million):  Filling institutional 
gaps 
26.  Both Entities' ministries of Agriculture, Water Works, and Forestry are still insufficiently staffed 
.(the  Republika  Srpska ministry was  created  during  the  war)  and  lack  adequate  budgetary resources. 
External  assistance  is  required  to  develop  policies  and  strengthen  institutions,  with  an  emphasis  on 
remedying existing  institutional  gaps  in  both  ministries (box 6).  To the extent possible,  inter-Entity 
institutional capabilities should be developed to lower costs, expand geographical coverage, and benefit 
from increased sources of information and experience. 
5 
27.  Required activities in policy development for 1997 include: 
5 
•  Preparing an agricultural strategy and investment plan for both Entities; 
•  Assessing the environmental impact of  agriculture, agroindustries, and forestry; 
•  Supporting the development of budgets and organizational structures for both ministries; and 
The outbreak of the food  and mouth  disease  in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in  August  1996 
demonstrated  the  need  to  strengthen  agriculture  communication  channels  and  cooperation  mechanisms 
between the Entities. - 113-
•  Providing corresponding support to canton agricultural administrations in the Federation. 
Incremental recurrent costs (US$7 million):  A gradual hand-over to the governments 
28.  Continued external financing is  required in  1997 for incremental recurrent expenditures, such as 
project management staff and other operating costs.  However, with the gradual economic recovery in 
both  Entities,  Governments can  be  expected to cover some  of these  costs  with  their own  budgetary 
resources.  Incremental  recurrent costs should be  financed  by donors on  a declining basis, while cost 
recovery  through  user  fees  and  taxes  should  be  gradually  introduced.  By  the  end  of 1997  donor 
financing for the incremental recurrent expenditures of agriculture projects should not exceed 50 percent 
of actual expenditures.  By the end of 1998 donors should aim to reduce this percentage to 25  percent of 
recurrent expenditures. 
Recommended implementation arrangements 
29.  In  1996 donors relied heavily on international agencies -- mainly the FAO, UNHCR, and various 
NGOs --to implement their programs.  The involvement of  these organizations is expected to continue in 
1997.  However, in  light of  the 1996 experience (box 7), implementation responsibility should be shifted 
gradually toward the Entity Governments through the Project Implementation Units already established 
in the Federation (and the four regional project units located at the Canton level in Bihac, Tuzla, Zenica, 
and  Mostar)  and  being established  in  Republika  Srpska.  With  the  grown  improvement of the  local 
financial  sector  and  banking  system,  donor  funding  for  farm  investments  should  increasingly  be 
channeled through domestic financial intermediaries that can extend loans to farmers who would then be 
in charge of their own procurement -- so that the Governments can abandon their implementing role and 
focus on establishing an enabling environment for the sector. - 114-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
30.  To  ensure  that the  efforts  undertaken  by  donors  and  the  local  authorities  are  sustainable,  a 
number of policy issues should be addressed.  Although complete resolution of these issues will  require 
several years of  effort, first steps should be taken as early as possible. 
Budgetary support and cost recovery 
31.  Agricultural  subsidies  of  any  kind  (for  example,  transfer  payments  to  state-owned 
agroprocessing enterprises and state farms, agricultural loans at low interest rates, and free provision of 
public services) should in  principle be avoided.  Once the first few years of reconstruction have ended, 
beneficiaries must be charged the full cost for loans and public utilities.  Substantial investments (such as 
the replacement of fruit trees and vineyards or restocking of large-scale animal  reproduction centers) 
should not be  implemented without full  cost recovery from  benefiting farmers and enterprises.  At the 
same time, remaining price controls (e.g. for timber) should be abolished. 
Privatization of  government-owned assets 
32.  An  important effort should  be  made to ensure fast privatization of government-owned assets, 
including: 
•  The assets of  state farms and agrocombinats,
6 
•  Non-core activities in  state forest enterprises -- including wood transport and harvesting and 
activities that have little to do with forest management; and 
•  State-owned enterprises in food processing and agrotrade. 
Both  Entity Governments  have  expressed their commitment to  such  a  privatization  process.  In  the 
Federation substantial discussions have already been held between the Government and the Cantons to 
contemplate options for agricultural developments.  While the reforms should be conducted within the 
overall  privatization  framework,  donors  could  consider providing  additional  support to  both  Entities 
through an agriculture sector adjustment project.
7 
Property rights and land market development 
33.  Large population movements took place during the war and will continue to take place  in  the 
months and  years to  come.  Property rights  are  obviously a  complex issue.  The  Dayton-Paris  Peace 
Agreement established a Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees to 
register  claims,  particularly  those  related  to  farm  assets,  land  and  other  real  property.  This 
Commission's work will be key: since budgetary funds for compensation are not likely to be available, 
6 
7 
Before the war, these organizations dominated the sector-even though most agricultural land was owned by 
small private farms - and many of them are still  in  operation, particularly in  Republika Srpska.  Their land, 
buildings, livestock, equipment, and other holdings should be privatized as  soon  as  possible.  A forthcoming 
World Bank economic report to be submitted at the Third Donor Conference will address privatization issues. 
The cost of this operation has not been  included  in  the three- to  four-year reconstructioTI  program  financing 
requirements. - 115 -
other  solutions  (possibly  exchanges)  for  addressing  rights  to  land  and  farm  assets  will  have  to  be 
developed between the new residents and farmers.  Meanwhile, temporary user rights may have to be 
issued to the current occupants of the land if such law  is to be productively used.  Speed in  processing 
contested  land  user rights  is  essential  to  allow  for  the  development of a  land  market  in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (a precondition for part-time farmers to give up their land  holdings and for consolidating 
the currently fragmented structure of  agricultural land). 
Other issues 
34.  Several other issues should be  addressed to ensure that the reconstruction effort is  sustainable, 
including ensuring the environmental sustainability of agriculture and forestry redevelopment, promoting 
the  establishment  of farmers  associations  (which  has  proven  to  be  an  effective  way  to  reduce 
procurement costs and disseminate best practices), and developing agricultural markets responding to the 
needs of  the sector. 
Resolving policy issues:  A pre-condition for a sustainable development 
35.  Addressing policy issues -- cost recovery, privatization of governments' assets, property rights 
and landmarket development-- is critical for the future development of  agriculture and forestry in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Donors should strongly urge the Entity Governments to make rapid progress on this 
matter.  Decisiveness of governments' action to resolve these issues should significantly influence the 
amount and timing of  donor assistance to the sector. EDUCATION 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Functioning system before the war 
1.  Prior to  the  start of hostilities,  Bosnia-Herzegovina had  a  well  developed  education  system, 
financed  by  public expenditures accounting for about 6  percent of GDP.  In  spite of the disruptions 
caused by the dissolution of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, virtually all children completed 
the eight-year primary cycle; most also completed a four-year secondary cycle.  As elsewhere  in  the 
region,  the  preponderance of secondary  education  was  offered  in  the  form  of narrowly  specialized 
vocational education programs, oriented to the needs of industry.  Higher education was 0ffered through 
four  universities,  comprising  46  institutes  and  faculties.  Higher education  enrollments  emphasized 
science and engineering. 
Damaged infrastructure and reduced teaching force 
2.  All aspects of education were severely disrupted by the war.  Many teachers were drafted  into 
military  service,  killed,  displaced,  or took  refuge  in  other countries.  Approximately  70  percent of 
schools were damaged, destroyed, or requisitioned for military uses.  Many schools were rendered all but 
useless  through  loss  of windows,  furniture,  and  educational  material.  Budgetary  re·sources  to  pay 
teachers and provide textbooks and other educational materials dried up completely in  many parts of the 
country. 
3.  The situation differed  substantially from  one  part of the country to the other.  The Bosniac-
majority  part  of the  Federation  suffered  most  damage,  both  to  its  facilities  and  its  teacher  force; 
budgetary resources were critically  lacking, and salaries were not regularly paid.  The situation  in  the 
Croat-majority  part of the  Federation  was  somewhat  better:  damage  was  more  limited;  operational 
expenditures  were  more  adequately  covered  through  assistance  provided  by  Croatia.  In  Republika 
Srpska, the education system was seriously affected by the  international embargo and  hyper-inflation, 
which  drastically  reduced  budget resources  and  availability  of materials,  despite  substantial  support 
provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;  physical  damage to schools was significant but less 
extensive. 
4.  In spite of these difficulties, due to the extraordinary efforts of parents, local governments, and 
aid agencies, most children managed to continue their education throughout the war, though in  a very 
disrupted form.  Because the school year was abbreviated and educational inputs-- teachers, classrooms, 
and educational materials-- were lacking or improvised, the quality of education was far below prewar 
standards.  Where there was heavy fighting,  instruction was halted for almost a  year.  Where classes 
managed  to  continue,  the  school  year  was  shortened  to  less  than  half  its  normal  duration.  To 
accommodate students displaced from  destroyed schools and  the  influx of displaced  persons  in  some 
areas, most schools now function in two or three shifts of 3 1/2 hours each.  With the collapse of public 
transport,  children  in  rural  areas  and  even  in  city suburbs  have  difficulties  reaching  school.  Many 
teachers currently in the classroom are wartime volunteers, and lack pedagogical training.  Although the 
issue is  now under study in  the Federation by the Ministry of Education, no clear policy has yet been - 118-
established as to whether returning teachers will be able to recover their former teaching positions, or if 
the  volunteer teachers will  be  given  the  opportunity to  keep  their jobs  if they  obtain  the  pedagogy 
training required of  a normal teacher. 
5.  Since the signature of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, much  progress has been made and 
classes have resumed in  most parts of  the country on a reasonably regular basis.  Still, serious problems 
remain.  Education facilities need substantial repairs.  Education materials, reading materials, and basic 
furniture are scarce.  Even in  schools which have been "repaired" by the efforts of bilateral donors and 
nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  electricity,  heating,  and/or  water  are  often  lacking  and  the 
facility is thus unfunctional for parts of  the year.  Education programs at all levels need to be revamped, 
and the teaching force composed of war-time volunteers needs to be professionalized.  Salaries have still 
to be restored to levels which attract a qualified teaching force. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION CHALLENGE 
The priority reconstruction program 
6.  To address the needs  in  the education sector, a priority education reconstruction  program was 
developed jointly by the Government and  various  donors,  and  presented to the  donor community at 
meetings hosted by the European  Commission (EC) and the World Bank in  December 1995, and April, 
1996.  Indicative estimates were included for reconstruction needs in  Republika Srpska, for which little 
concrete information was then  available.  Setting reconstruction priorities inevitably  ~nvolves difficult 
choices among the many urgent and  legitimate needs throughout the education  system.  Because the 
available resources are so limited, these choices involve tradeoffs between the highest priority needs, and 
needs which can appropriately be deferred to a later stage in the reconstruction process. 
7.  The priority program was designed to address ~  the most urgent requirements for  restoring 
minimal operations in the sector in a coherent fashion, starting with those investments which could have 
an  immediate impact and benefit the largest possible number of school children.  The program focuses 
on: 
•  Ensuring that all classrooms are at least minimally supplied with textbooks and educational 
materials for students and teachers; 
•  Reconstructing  lightly  damaged  primary  and  general  secondary  schools  to  make  them 
functional quickly; 
•  Upgrading teaching skills; 
•  Providing remedial  education for young people whose education suffered during the war; 
and 
•  Strengthening capacities for education administration at all levels. 
The priority program does not  include essential  and  well justified reconstruction  activities  which  are 
more appropriately addressed at the next stage of  the reconstruction effort -- either because  they will take 
longer to implement, or because they will require policy decisions not yet taken.  On that limited basis, - 119-
total  foreign  financing needs for  priority education investments  in  the first three to four years of the 
reconstruction program in the education sector were then estimated at about US$180 million.
1 
8.  Based upon  updated damage estimates, and  better data on the situation  in  Republika Srpska, the 
overall  foreign  financing  requirements for  education  reconstruction  have  increased  somewhat from  the 
original  figure.  The current estimate is  that the priority education reconstruction  program  will  require 
US$273 million in external investment support for the three- to four-year period within the overall US$5.1 
billion priority reconstruction program.  These needs are presented in  table I below. 
•  In 1996, US$82 million was firmly committed (the initial first-year estimate was at US$72 
million) to the reconstruction program; about half this amount will  be disbursed this year 
(paragraphs 9 to 15); 
•  In 1997, US$70 million is  required, of which about US$25 million for Republika Srpska 
(paragraphs  16  to 27);  a  list of corresponding investments will  be  prepared for the Third 
Donor Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  For 1998 and 1999, a further US$121 million is required, along with a concerted effort to 
address sector reform and sustainability issues (paragraphs 28 through 33). 
Table 1.  Education Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
School reconstruction 
Educational materials 
Student recovery 
Teacher training 
Institution building 
Total 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
Donor inputs 
3- 4-year 
Program 
221 
25 
II 
7 
9 
273 
1996 Firm 
1997 
Requirements/ 
Commitments  Allocation 
72  58 
4  6 
I  2 
2  2 
3  2 
82  70 
1998-99 
Requirements/ 
Allocation 
91 
15 
8 
3 
4 
121 
9.  Tracking and tabulating overall achievements  in  the  education  sector  in  1996  is  difficult for 
several reasons.  Information on donor activities in Republika Srpska is still very sketchy.  The education 
sector has received assistance from both humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programs of many 
In  addition, requirements for  initial  budget support for  very  modest teachers'  salaries  and  school  operating 
requirements  for  communities  which  lack  other resources  for  these  needs  are  estimated  at  US$50  million 
during the three- to four-year period of reconstruction.  Not all ofthe 1,100 schools and 30,000 teachers in the 
system require support; some communities have the  resources to  provide  at  least minimal support for  these 
needs.  But many  communities do  not yet have  such  resources.  For these communities, temporary  budget 
support is crucial to help fill the gap until local revenues begin to recover.  Because the donor community has 
demonstrated no  willingness in  1996 to  provide significant funds  for  recurrent budget support, this  category 
receives  no  further consideration here.  However,  continued operation of the  education  system  will  require 
budget support for recurrent expenditures for teachers and schools in communities without financial resources 
(see sector report on "Fiscal and Social Support"). - 120-
donors, and the distinction is not always clear in the information provided, especially when humanitarian 
assistance involves compensation for teachers.  Implementation has often taken place in  a decentralized 
manner  directly  with  individual  schools  or  municipalities.  This  is  particularly  true  of resources 
channeled through NGOs.  In  such  cases,  the authorities  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina at the  Entity or 
canton level (in the Federation) are often not informed of donor activities.  Such separately concluded 
financing  arrangements,  while  producing  quick  results  on  the  ground,  may  have  generated 
inconsistencies among reconstruction activities.  They also cannot ensure that donor financing is directed 
to the most urgent needs as set forth in the priority reconstruction program. 
I 0.  These caveats notwithstanding,  table 2 summarizes available information on  firm  commitments 
to the sector for 1996.  A total of US$ 81.9 million has been firmly committed to education activities in 
1996.  This amount is shown in  table 1 as committed entirely for the priority program.  But to the extent 
that these commitments are for less urgent activities which may be more appropriate for a later stage of 
the  reconstruction  program,  the  1996  commitments  for  priority  investments  would  be  less  than  the 
amounts shown in  column two of table 1, and the unmet needs are greater than shown-in  columns three 
and four. 
11.  To  obtain  badly  needed  improvement  in  donor  coordination  in  the  education  sector,  the 
Education  Sector Task Force in  Sarajevo is  intensifying its  work.  Led  by UNESCO, the Task Force 
comprises representatives of the Ministries of Education of both  Entities -- thus  far,  the Ministry of 
Education of Republika Srpska has not participated -- EC, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNICEF, the World Bank, and 
bilateral donors and key NGOs represented in  Sarajevo.  Over the coming months, the Task Force will 
develop  a  more  accurate  consolidated  picture  of pledges,  firm  commitments,  contract  values  under 
implementation, and disbursements in  the several components of the program, based on a data base of 
individual contracts at the school level. 
School reconstruction 
Educational materials 
Student recovery 
Teacher training 
Institution building 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
72 
4 
1 
2 
3 
82 
Main donors 
Albania, Austria, EC, Finland, Greece, ISDB, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Switzerland, UNDP, US, World Bank 
EC, Malaysia, Norway, World Bank 
Malaysia, Austria 
Indonesia, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland 
US, World Bank, various European countries 
The Emergency Education Reconstruction Program 
12.  The program's content.  The largest and most fully documented set of financed  reconstruction 
activities in the priority program are those included in the Emergency Education Reconstruction Program 
which  is  being  implemented  by  the  Federation  Ministry  of Education,  and  being  prepared  by  the 
Republika Srpska Ministry of Education.  The program  comprises:  a)  the  refurbishment of 91  large 
primary schools throughout the Federation and the construction of five  new primary schools  in  areas 
with  no  alternative  school  capacity,  b)  the provision of selected  books  and  educational  materials  to 
schools in  the Federation, c) strengthening of education implementation capacity at the Federation and - 121  -
canton level, and d) preparation of similar reconstruction activities for education programs in  Republika 
Srpska. 
13.  The program  was designed to meet only the  most urgent needs for education  reconstruction. 
Two objectives which guided the design of the program were, first, to improve the educational situation 
of as many school children as possible with the very limited resources available, and, second, to do so 
quickly-- preferably, by the start ofthe 1996-97 school year.  Those principles led to the program's focus 
on  primary  education.  They  also  led  to  the  compressed  implementation  period  for  the  program  --
eighteen months  in  duration, with  most of it  in  the  first six months.  Within the Federation, activities 
under  the  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction  Program  are  apportioned  roughly  according  to 
population -- with about two-thirds of project expenditures occurring in  Bosniac-majority cantons, and 
one-third in Croat-majority cantons. 
14.  The total cost of the program is estimated at US$32.8 million, of which $10 million is provided 
by the World Bank-- half in the form of  a grant (approved in May, 1996), and half as a credit (approved 
in  June,  1996).  Even  before this financing was approved,  project implementation was  initiated  in  the 
spring of 1996 with support from the Government of  the Netherlands. 
15.  Good implementation progress.  There has been considerable progress in  implementation of the 
Emergency Education  Reconstruction Program  in  the Federation, as  described  below.  Preparation of 
program activities for Republika Srpska is in progress; implementation is expected to start soon. 
•  School  reconstruction/rehabilitation.  Damage  assessments  have  been  completed  for  all 
schools which are to  be refurbished under the program.  Of the US$1 0 minion financing 
initially provided by the World Bank, over 90 percent has been committed; more than US$5 
million has been disbursed, and an additional US$6 million will be disbursed by the end of 
1996.  Contracts have been signed and rehabilitation is  in  progress for 28 primary schools --
12  in Croat-majority cantons and  16  in Bosniac-majority cantons.  Other donor financing is 
supporting the rehabilitation of 22 schools located in  Bosniac-majority cantons.  Another 20 
schools  are  ready  for  tendering  for  rehabilitation;  only the  necessary  donor  financing  is 
lacking.  Architectural designs will be completed by end-January, 1997 for the remaining 16 
schools to be constructed or refurbished under the program.  But, again, work cannot proceed 
until additional donor financing is provided.  With financing from the UNDP, preparation of 
designs  for  the  five  new  schools to  be  constructed  under the  program  -- ail  in  Bosniac-
majority cantons -- is  underway.  Two of these new schools are being financed by NGOs. 
Financing for the three other new schools is being sought; 
•  Educational  materials.  Contracts  have  been  signed  for  US$1.5  million  of educational 
materials  and  twenty textbook titles to  be  provided  under the  first donor commitments. 
Additional titles are being procured with financing provided by the Soros Foundation and the 
German Government.  An  additional twenty-four textbook and supplementary reader titles 
are  ready for  tendering;  again only the  necessary financing  is  lacking.  All  of this  is  for 
schools in  Bosniac-majority areas since education officials for the Croat-majority areas of 
the Federation or Republika Srpska prefer to continue to get these supplies from Croatia and 
the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, respectively; and 
•  Institutional development.  On the institutional development front,  a Program Coordination 
Unit (PCU) has been established in the Federation Ministry of Education and is  overseeing 
implementation of all  aspects of the Emergency Education  Reconstruction Program.  This 
coordination  is  working  well  for  activities  being  implemented  by  the  Ministry,  but - 122-
coordination with  reconstruction activities  implemented by other levels of government has 
been hampered by the PCU's lack of information and jurisdiction over these activities.  This 
process  is  now  working  better,  based  upon  shared  information  between  the PCU  and  the 
implementing agencies.  But full  articulation  between  the  Ministry-implemented  program 
and other reconstruction activities will continue to require particular attention in the future. 
More generally, there is a serious need for better coordination among education authorities at 
various levels of government.  Clarification of roles of these bodies (paragraphs 28 through 
30) should help to improve this coordination. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
16.  The key challenge for implementation of  the priority program for education reconstruction is  to 
mobilize additional resources to fill  the large financing gap required to carry out the priority education 
reconstruction program, to be implemented in  light of the 1996 experience (box I).  An  immediate need 
is  to  secure  financing  for  the  large  unfinanced  portion  of the  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction 
Program, and to extend its coverage in Republika Srpska. 
17.  Beyond these priority efforts to jump-start the primary school system, however, there are very 
extensive financing needs for all of the activities listed in table I, for which donor financing is  urgently 
needed.  These are further described in the following paragraphs. - 123-
School reconstruction (US$58 million) 
18.  The  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction  Program,  when  fully  funded,  will  achieve  the 
rehabilitation or reconstruction of one-eighth of the primary schools in  the Federation, including most of 
the largest primary schools.  But the program deliberately focuses on  lightly damaged schools, because 
these schools could most quickly be made fully functional.  The many (often smaller) primary schools 
which  suffered  more  extensive  damages  are  not  included;  nor,  yet,  are  damaged  primary  schools  in 
Republika Srpska.  Neither are damaged educational institutions above the primary level in either Entity. 
There is as yet no systematic plan for repair and reconstruction of  these educational facilities throughout 
the country, although a few establishments have undoubtedly received some ad hoc support from donors. 
19.  Beyond the schools covered under the Emergency Education Reconstruction Program, the main 
priorities are to  repair and  reconstruct:  a)  more heavily damaged primary schools,  b)  lightly damaged 
general secondary schools, and c) carefully selected higher education and  vocational  tr~ining facilities 
throughout the country.  The Federation Ministry of Education has developed a list of schools  in the first 
two categories, to serve as the basis for donor financing commitments.  Similar lists will be prepared for 
schools  in  Republika  Srpska.  For  reconstruction  of facilities  at  the  post-primary  level,  it  will  be 
important to avoid expensive reconstruction and re-equipping of curricular streams whose relevance  in 
the new market economy is  questionable.  Although reconstruction efforts to date have focused on  the 
Federation,  school  reconstruction  in  the  future  will  need  to  redress  the  balance  by  paying  special 
attention to the needs in Republika Srpska. 
Educational materials (US$6 million) 
20.  The Emergency Education Reconstruction Program is making a start in providing some textbook 
titles to primary schools in  the Federation.  But there is  an  urgent need for donor assistance to enlarge 
this effort to cover carefully selected other textbook titles and  additional educational materials such as 
supplementary readers  in  primary  schools,  and  to  extend  the  provision  of textbooks  (particularly  in 
science, math and foreign  languages), readers, and educational equipment to  other levels of education. 
There is also a need to improve the pedagogic content of textbooks, and especially to reduce the number 
of required titles.  In  all  of this,  donor efforts should  give  priority to curricular material of common 
acceptability to all groups in  the country, which may in  practice imply a larger proportion of the overall 
effort dedicated to supplementary reading materials. 
Student recovery (US$2 million) 
21.  Most students have missed significant amounts of schooling during the war.  Those that have 
been displaced from  their homes have  been  even more seriously affected.  Many children from  rural 
areas, especially girls, worked with their families and did not regularly attend school.  Many displaced 
children as well as others affected by the war have fallen behind in basic skills such as reading and math. 
As the economy recovers around them, this cohort will tend to bear an  educational handicap throughout 
their lives.  As these young people enter the labor force, their educational deprivation will  make them 
less able to contribute to -- and to benefit from -- post-war recovery.  Remedial education programs are 
needed to help these students catch up to their peers.  For students who will already have left the school 
system, non-formal programs are needed to provide an opportunity to catch up in missed stciTts which are 
relevant to job needs. 
22.  There are also vast needs in  the two district areas of psychologically traumatized and  mentally 
retarded children.  In the past, children with handicaps were usually segregated from other children.  The - 124-
Government intends to provide better and more cost-effective care for these children by educating them, 
to the extent possible, in regular schools.  Early diagnosis and treatment is essential to the success of this 
strategy.  A proposal for a program to provide such care has been developed by the Government with the 
support of an  international foundation.  Implementation of this and other aspects of the student recovery 
program await donor financing. 
Teacher training (US$2 million) 
23.  Bosnia and Herzegovina lost most of its qualified teachers during the war, and much of its pre-
service and  in-service teacher training capacity.  Teacher training needs to be revived and modernized, 
both to upgrade the skills of unqualified teachers and to introduce a more modern pedagogy throughout 
the  education  system.  A  well  coordinated  initiative  is  currently underway with  the  participation  and 
funding  of UNICEF,  the  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (USAID),  the  Soros 
Foundation, the United States Information Agency, and the World Bank to help the Fe_ deration Ministry 
of Education modernize teacher training programs.  The Ministry of Education, in  cooperation with the 
University of Pittsburgh, is  working closely with educators from  each of the ten  Federation cantons to 
develop  new  teacher education  programs  and  to  prepare  a  plan  for  renewal  of the  teacher training 
infrastructure.  Findings  and  recommendations  of this  work,  in  the  areas  of programs,  teaching 
methodology, finance,  legislation, structure, and  management of teacher training,  will  be  presented  tn 
May, 1997.  Donor financing will be needed to implement these recommendations. 
Institution building (US$2 million) 
24.  There  are  major  needs  for  strengthening of capacity  at the  local  level  for  routine  education 
administration, and at the central level  for setting educational standards, providing quality control and 
pedagogical support, and carrying out other professional leadership functions which are appropriate in  a 
decentralized education system.  This will require not only clarification of roles of education authorities 
at the various levels of the system (paragraphs 28 through 30), but also vastly improved communication 
and coordination among them.  Training and equipment are needed to enable this to happen, as well as to 
introduce the program changes which are necessary to ensure sustainability (paragraphs 28 through 33). 
25.  In  summary,  in  1997,  there  is  urgent  need  beyond  the  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction 
Program to work with the Federation and Republika Srpska Governments to develop a much broader yet 
coherent and carefully targeted program for continued rehabilitation and development of the education 
sector.  This  effort  would  extend  the  support  provided  thus  far  for  rehabilitating,  reconstructing, 
refurnishing and re-equipping primary schools, covering more heavily damaged schools which require 
more  extensive  repairs  than  were  possible  under  the  accelerated  implementation  schedule  of the 
emergency program.  If still  necessary,  it  might also  support demining of schoolyards  and  adjacent 
terrain. 
26.  This broader education recovery effort should also support repairs to educational facilities and 
support for educational programs at other levels -- including preschool, secondary and higher education. 
As  in  primary education,  selectivity will  be  necessary  in  order to  focus  donor efforts  on  the  highest 
priority areas for reconstruction.  The first criterion for selecting education recovery actitms should be to 
provide support for children or young people whose education suffered directly as a result of the  war, 
through remedial education programs and programs for traumatized children (paragraphs 21  and  22). 
Another selection criterion  should be the extent to  which  proposed actions address sustainability and 
reform needs, as summarized in the following section.  For example, textbook investments for secondary - 125-
level should be considered for support to the extent that they permit the delivery of improved curricula, 
designed to address excessive subject matter specialization and fragmentation, especially in  vocational 
and  technical  schools.  Higher  education  investments  should  be  considered  to  the  extent  that  they 
promote the objectives of  efficiency and system integration. 
27.  To  achieve  this  broader coverage the  program  will  require  significant donor  financing.  An 
urgent priority is to develop the program into prioritized, modular elements from which donors can select 
for financing.  Moving into implementation of this expanded education recovery program as quickly as 
possible, and in  a manner which addresses the most urgent needs first, will require intensive work with 
the Government to identify priorities:  for  reconstruction of specific facilities, for provision of specific 
book  titles  and  educational  materials,  for  development  of specific  remedial  programs,  etc.  Once 
priorities are established, work will need to be launched immediately to prepare designs for schools to be 
reconstructed, to prepare manuscripts for printing, and to develop new programs.  Donor assistance will 
continue to be crucial for supporting these preparatory activities for education recovery, as it has been in 
the past. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
Roles of education authorities need to be clarified 
28.  The single most important structural  issue which  needs to be resolved  in  the education sector 
involves the  role  of different  levels  of government  in  financing  and  delivering  education  at  various 
levels.  With  the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to establish an 
effective education system from the structures and programs which it inherited from the -former Federal 
Republic of  Yugoslavia.  Education administration in the former Yugoslavia was quite decentralized, but 
the war has seriously affected the resources and capacity of government at all levels to plan and provide 
education.  Resolution of  this issue is particularly crucial to the resumption of  teachers' salaries. 
29.  According to the 1994 Federation Constitution, cantons are responsible for delivering education, 
but cantons may delegate this responsibility upward to the Federation or downward to communities.  In 
the short term, this policy is  impractical  because most cantons lack the capacity to manage education 
delivery, and all cantons lack the budget resources to do so.  More fundamentally, the small size of some 
cantons is  inconsistent with efficient management of some education functions.  In higher education, for 
example, cantonal universities would be too small to capture economies of scale and allow for program 
diversity.  Efficient  administration  may  also  call  for  particular  functions  such  as  curriculum 
development, educational materials development, and quality control being carried out at the Federation 
or the State level.  In view of the sizable differences in  income among the cantons, there is also likely to 
be  a  need  for some  inter-cantonal transfers to provide for education of at least minimally acceptable 
quality in the poorest cantons. 
30.  Although  the  unitary  structure  of government  in  Republika  Srpska  presents  fewer  issues  of 
decentralization,  there  are  nonetheless  similar  issues  to  be  resolved  involving  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of local education authorities vis a vis central authorities. 
Teachers' qualifications need to be improved 
31.  Another,  related  policy  question  which  is  crucial  for  sustainability  of  the  education 
reconstruction  program is  how to  retain  qualified teachers  in  the system, how to  upgrade the skills of - 126-
unqualified  teachers,  and  how  to  attract  those  who  have  left  to  return  to  the  profession.  In  the 
Federation, the Ministry of Education has collected data on  teachers and their qualifications in  primary 
education, and is carrying out a study of secondary education teacher needs.  The Ministry estimates that 
about  8,000  teachers  Jack  formal  qualifications.  The  Federation  Ministry  of Education  has  also 
maintained contact with many of the former teachers who are now in  "temporary" other work in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, are performing military service, or are refugees in other countries-- many of  whom are 
currently working as teachers.  The Ministry estimates that as  many as 4,000 teachers are abroad and 
could potentially return to Bosnia and Herzegovina to teach.  Essential to managing and supporting this 
process of rebuilding a strong, qualified teaching force will be specific decisions on: 
•  Resumption and level of  teacher compensation; 
•  Incentives to attract qualified teachers to return to teaching, and 
•  The process for raising the qualifications of unqualified teachers. 
The content of  education programs needs to change 
32.  There are needs for  content change at all  levels of the education system to  promote post-war 
reconciliation  among  the  parties  to  the  former  conflict.  At  the  secondary  level  -- especially  in 
vocational/technical  programs -- a significant reform of structure and content is  also needed to reorient 
education to the requirements of a modern market economy and post-communist society.  At the same 
time, secondary vocational education may be expected to play a major role in providing qualifications to 
those who dropped out of school or were otherwise deprived of  access to secondary education during the 
war.  Rather  than  rebuilding  all  secondary  vocational/technical  schools  which  were  destroyed  or 
damaged during the war, reconstruction should take the form of  developing practical, "second chance" or 
remedial  education  programs for  students  and  young  adults.  These  programs  should  stress adequate 
preparation  in  general  subjects,  while  at  the  same  time  starting  the  process  of  developing 
vocational/technical  education  programs  which  embody  a  more  modern  curriculum  than  was  in  use 
before the war.  To start with, this should  involve  reinforcing general  academic studies  in  secondary 
education and orienting more students to general education.  The science and math content of vocational 
education should  be  strengthened.  Vocational  education  should  be  developed  for  broad  occupational 
families, rather than for narrow occupations.  More generally, pedagogy should be modernized to give 
greater emphasis to the synthesis and application of facts rather than the simple mastery of facts.  And 
there should  be  more emphasis upon  self-directed learning and  teamwork learning rather than  passive 
absorption of material provided by the teacher or the textbook.  Application  of these changes has far-
reaching implications for new teacher-training programs and new educational materials, including school 
libraries.  Over time, there  is also  a need  for  modification  of the content of social  studies and  other 
courses  to  explain  recent  political  developments  in  the  region  in  a  fashion  which  encourages 
reconciliation among the parties of  the former conflict, and the return to a common language. 
There is a need for change in higher education administration and finance 
33.  In order to offer higher education programs of high quality and diversity, a number of changes 
are needed in the administration and financing of higher education.  Because it is not possible to maintain 
high quality programs in  multiple, small, free-standing universities, there  is  a need to move toward an 
integrated higher education system with critical mass in  particular fields and open access to specialized 
programs in  different parts of the country.  This will  require harmonization of program and admission 
requirements, reciprocity agreements  across  faculties,  and  consolidation  of some  small  programs  and - 127-
facilities to a more economical scale.  In order to contain the budgetary cost of higher education, there is 
a need for introduction of student fees and the development of needs-based and merit-based fellowships. 
In  order to ensure the market relevance of program offerings in  higher education, budgetary resources 
should  be  allocated  to  programs  based  upon  student  demand  and  efficiency  of past  use  of budget 
resources. HEALTH 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Systemic problems before the war 
1.  Despite  significant improvements  in  health  status  during the  1970s and  1980s,  prewar health 
indicators in Bosnia and Herzegovina reflected a mixed picture: for some indicators, the country was one 
of the  most  advanced  in  Central  Europe,  while  for  others  it  lagged  behind.  A  supply-dominated 
approach to centralized planning had resulted in the proliferation of large hospitals and a heavy reliance 
on specialized polyclinics.  Relatively little attention was paid to primary health care or family practice. 
The use of resources was far from optimal, with health expenditures totaling around 6.5  percent of GOP 
(about US$150 per capita per year in  1991 ), a relatively high amount in Central Europe. 
1 
The war has taken a heavy toll 
2.  The health status of  the population deteriorated severely during the war (box 1  ).  The damage to 
the  health  infrastructure  has  been  unevenly  distributed  throughout  the  country,  however,  and 
reconstruction efforts must take into account these differences.  For example, failure to maintain medical 
equipment, though significant in both Entities, seems to have been more severe in Republika Srpska than 
in  the  Federation  (which  received  significant  international  assistance),  whereas  direct  war-related 
physical damages are heavier and more widespread in the Federation. 
3.  After the unified health and health financing system collapsed at the beginning of the war, three 
systems emerged: two  in  the  Federation  and  one  in  Republika Srpska.  At  the  end  of  hostilities, the 
Dayton-Paris  Peace  Agreement  assigned  the  responsibility  for  the  health  sector to  the  Entity  level. 
Regional differences remain: Republika Srpska has a unified, though  weak, system with no  significant 
Source:  World Bank estimate.  Authorities  in Bosnia and Herzegovina use a prewar heafih  expenditure per 
capita figure of US$245.  Regardless of the exact figure,  Bosnia and Herzegovina's health expenditures were 
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difficulty between the Government and the municipalities;  in  the  Federation, tension  between the two 
constituent peoples and an unclear delineation of authority and responsibilities between the Government 
and the Cantons have resulted in persistent difficulties, still not resolved. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
4.  The rehabilitation strategy for the health sector is based on three principles: 
•  The sector must continue functioning on  an emergency basis while it recovers and prepares 
the transition to a modern and efficient system; 
•  Scarce  resources  should  be  optimally used,  in  order to  ensure the  sustainability of health 
services; and 
•  A balance must be  struck between  modern  primary  health  care services and  high-quality, 
streamlined hospital services: the unwieldy prewar system should not be rebuilt. 
5.  The overall reconstruction program, as presented to the donor community in  December 1995 and 
April  1996, remains valid?  It will require US$425 million in external financial support for the three- to 
four-year reconstruction period within the overall US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program (table 
1  ): 
2 
•  In 1996, US$83 million was firmly committed; despite a financing gap of nearly 43  percent 
(the first-year program was initially estimated at US$145 million), a number of activities were 
carried out successfully this year (paragraphs 7 to 17); 
•  In  1997,  US$90  million  in  external  financing  is  required,  including  US$70  million  in 
investments,  65  percent  of  it  for  the  Federation  and  35  percent  for  Republika  Srpska 
(paragraphs  18  to 26).  A  list of corresponding  investments  will  be  prepared  for  the  Third 
Donor Conference to be held in early 1997; 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$252  million  will  be  necessary,  and  policy  issues  should  be 
addressed to ensure sustainability of  the program over the medium-term (paragraphs 27 to 30). 
The total amount required has been revised from the initially estimated at US$540 million to US$425 million: 
•  Massive support for health personnel salaries was initially foreseen; in  view of  the current salary 
structure within the country (and the reluctance of  the donor community to finance such costs), this 
amount has been substantially reduced; and 
•  1996 experience shows that cost estimates for program management can be cut substantially, since 
management costs are often funded as part of each project, and the use of local capacity reduces the 
need for external management assistance. - 131 -
Table 1.  Health Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4-year  1996 Firm  1997 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/ 
Allocation 
1998-99 
Requirements/ 
Allocation 
Public health interventions  16  3  4  9 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation  290  50  54  186 
Rehabilitation of  War Victims  30  23  3  4 
Budget support for recurrent expenditures  76  5  22  49 
Sector reforms  8  1  4  3 
Program management  5  1  3 
Total  425  83  90  252 
6.  The  program  has  been  defined  by  the  Entity  Governments  with  the  assistance of the  World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank (box 2).  The immediate objectives of the program are 
to: 
•  Prevent and  control  epidemics  and  communicable  diseases  through  priority  public  health 
interventions; 
•  Reconstruct  and  rehabilitate  priority  health  infrastructure,  including  civil  works  and 
equipment to restore key outpatient and hospital facilities; 
•  Rehabilitate war victims, by addressing both physical disability and psychological trauma; 
•  Define a human resources development strategy; 
•  Support recurrent expenditures,  including salaries for  health  sector staff and  purchases of 
essential  generic drugs  and  supplies;  this  support would  be  phased  out over a three-year 
period, as the ~ntity Governments take over financing responsibility, and 
•  Support the first stages of sector reform, to render the sector more cost-effective and fiscally 
sustainable. - 132-
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
7.  Efforts  in  1996  focused  primarily  on  preventing  further  deterioration  of the  overall  health 
situation by providing emergency assistance to the health sector (mainly through the direct provision of 
essential goods and services).  Additional assistance was provided to initiate the physical and functional 
rehabilitation of the  health care delivery  system  in  the context of both  Entities'  sectoral development 
strategies. 
8.  A  number  of activities  were  carried  out  through  the  combined  efforts  of the  two  Entity 
Governments and  the  international  community.  Some US$83  million  in  external  financing  has  been 
firmly  committed  out of an  estimated  $145  million  for  the  first-year  program  (table 2).
5  The  main 
achievements are described below, although the decentralized nature of the sector and the large number 
of  actors make it difficult to draw a comprehensive picture. 
3 
4 
5 
Federation Health Program.  Health Reform  and Reconstruction Program  of  the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Federation Ministry of Health.  January 1996. 
Strategy of  Health Development for Republika Srpska by the Year 2000. Republika Srpska Ministry of Health. 
1996. 
Several bilateral donors provide such support through humanitarian programs and budget lines which may not 
have been reported to the donor database. - 133-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Public health interventions 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation of  war victims 
Budget support for recurrent 
expenditures 
Program management 
Sector reforms 
Total 
Amount 
3 
50 
23 
5 
83 
Main Donors 
UNICEF, UK, SIDA 
EC, Italy, Japan, Denmark, SIDA, UK, UNICEF, 
US AID 
Canada, Council of Europe Social Development 
Fund, EC, Iceland, ICRC, Italy, Netherlands, SIDA, 
UK, UNDP, UNHCR, the World Bank 
EC, Denmark, Italy, ICRC, UK 
WH0,
6 World Bank 
EC, Italy, SIDA, UNICEF, UK, WHO, World Bank 
Public health interventions 
9.  In both Entities, public health interventions have focused on preventive medicine, with particular 
attention to the most vulnerable groups (displaced persons, children).  These decentralized activities (for 
a total amount of commitments of US$3 million) were supported or carried out by a number of agencies 
and Governments, among them  WHO, UNICEF, the United Kingdom Red Cross, the United Kingdom 
(UK),  the  Swedish  International  Development  Agency  (SIDA),  and  Action  Internationale  Contre  Ia 
Faim. 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation: Urgent repairs and planning 
10.  Urgent repairs and the re-equipment of health facilities received commitments totaling US$50 
million.  Efforts focused on: 
•  Hospitals  in  both  Entities,  with  financing  mainly  from  the  European  Commission 
Humanitarian  Office (ECHO), the UK Overseas Development Administration  (ODA) and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); 
•  Dispensaries (ambulanta and dom zdravlja), with the support of ECHO, the Governments of 
Denmark, Italy, Japan and the UK, SIDA and UNICEF. 
These projects are being implemented to a large extent by the International Management Group (IMG) 
and by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
11.  In  parallel, the Entity Ministries of Health, with the support of international organizations, have 
designed  a  series  of priority  investment  programs  in  the  health  sector.  The  programs  constitute  an 
important step in the reconstruction process by translating strategies into concrete projects.  They aim to 
provide a rational and cost-effective framework for further donor involvement and thereby to reduce the 
risk of  uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable investments: 
6 
•  Preparation  of an  Essential  Hospital  Services  Program  has  been  completed  (including 
support for sector-widr. finance reform), in both the Federation and Republika Srpska; 
WHO extra-budgetary resources. - 134-
•  Preparation has begun for a rehabilitation and restructuring plan for Basic Health  Services 
(Primary Health Care and  Public Health)  initiated  by the Entity Ministries of Health  with 
WHO support; and 
•  Pilot projects for the Primary Health Care Project have been initiated in  eleven ambulantas 
in Sarajevo by UNICEF, to test new approaches to health care planning and care-giving. 
Rehabilitation of war victims: A comprehensive program under implementation 
12.  With the support of WHO,  the Canadian  International  Development Agency (CIDA) and  the 
World Bank, the Federation Government designed a comprehensive US$30 million program to address 
the  war-related  physical  and  psycho-social  rehabilitation  needs of the  population.  Launched  in  June 
1996,  the  program  is  establishing  community  care  centers  throughout  the  country,  strengthening 
orthopedic  and  reconstructive  surgical  departments  and  developing  the  production  of prostheses, 
including the  reconstruction  of facilities  (US$5.5  million),  the  supply of drugs  and  medical  supplies 
(US$3.5  million)  and  equipment (US$1 0  million).  Three-quarters of the  required  amount  has  been 
committed by the Council of Europe's Social Development Fund, the Governments of Canada, Iceland, 
and Italy, WHO, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the  World Bank; ECHO has 
also contributed by financing direct in-kind support (drugs and supplies) through NGOs. 
13.  A number of NGOs have also  implemented decentralized projects, with funding from  ECHO, 
ODA,  SIDA,  the  Governments  of  Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  However,  coordination  of  these 
decentralized  initiatives  with  activities  undertaken  as  part of the  Government-designed  program  has 
often  been  difficult.  In  Republika  Srpska,  which  has  not  yet  developed  a  comprehensive  program, 
various NGOs and international agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR),  ECHO  (through  Medecins  Sans 
Frontieres), and WHO have provided services and supplies for rehabilitation activities. 
Budget support for operating expenditures: Drugs and medical supplies first 
14.  Support for recurrent expenditures has focused  heavily on  essential drugs and medical supplies 
directly procured and distributed by the donor community on a decentralized basis through NGOs.  The 
main financiers have been ECHO and ODA.  In  addition, a number of donors have included support for 
recurrent expenditures (drugs and supplies) in  larger support programs aimed at physical rehabilitation 
and repairs of facilities.  No significant support has  been  provided for complementing health workers 
salaries. 
Program management: Substantial involvement of  the Entity Ministries of  Health 
15.  The Federation Ministry of Health took substantial responsibilities for preparing and supporting 
the  implementation  of program  activities.  Initially,  specialized  working  groups  were  established  to 
prepare the three priority investment projects (War Victims Rehabilitation, Essential Hospital Services, 
and Basic Health Services).  Later, the War Victims Rehabilitation Working Group was transformed into 
a  professional  advisory  team  in  support  of the  Project  Implementation  Unit  (PIU).  A  similar 
development  is  expected  for  the  other  working  groups.  Although  more  limited  in  scope,  a  similar 
approach  has  been  followed  in  Republika Srpska,  where the Ministry of Health  has  also expressed  a 
strong willingness to undertake the required activities. 
16.  To ensure donor coordination, a Task Force on  Health  and  the  Social  Safety Net, chaired  by 
WHO, was established in Sarajevo in May 1996.  Through this framework, the main actors in the health - 135-
sector have met regularly to exchange information, discuss strategies, and prepare a compendium of  the 
needs and priorities in the health sector. 
Sectoral reforms: A productive dialogue initiated 
17.  In  1996 sectoral reform activities focused on initiating dialogue between the Entity Governments 
and international orfanizations such as WHO and the World Bank and on preparation for health reform 
and  reconstruction.  Policy  issues  have  often  been  addressed  as  part of the  preparation  for  priority 
investment projects process.  Three main areas have been identified: 
•  Structure and organization of  the health care delivery system.  Discussions were held during 
preparation  of the  Essential  Hospital  Services  Rehabilitation  Program;  accordingly,  this 
program calls for the rehabilitation of a streamlined health system (a marked departure from 
the pre-war model based on large hospital infrastructure), with hospital capacity reduced by 
30 percent from the pre-war level, and incentives for improving the quality and efficiency of 
health care; 
•  Health financing mechanisms.  The underlying principles for the Federation's future health 
financing system (e.g. universal access, efficiency, cost-containment and sustainability) were 
agreed upon during negotiations of a World Bank-funded Transition Assistance Credit and 
preparation of the Essential Hospital Services Program;
8 the Republika Srpska Ministry for 
Health is currently developing a similar approach; and 
•  Sector  governance.  Discussions  on  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of various  levels  of 
government  (State,  Entity,  and  Canton/region)  have  been  held  between  the  Federation 
Government and the Cantons, and  between the Republika Srpska Government and regional 
and municipal health planners, with the support of WHO; progress has been slowed by the 
widespread  political  uncertainty  during  the  pre-election  and  the  immediate  post-election 
period and by the persistent disagreements on  budgetary flows among the various levels of 
government. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
18.  Some US$90 million in external financing is required for 1997.  While support is still needed for 
emergency activities,  assistance  should  increasingly  be  directed  to  the development of a  sustainable 
health  system, and donor contributions should  be  directed to the  investment projects prepared  by the 
Entity Governments.  The 1997 program aims to:  · 
7 
8 
•  Restructure basic health  services, with a focus on public health  intervent-ions and primary 
care services at the local (ambulanta and dom zdravlja) level; 
•  Restore essential secondary-level hospital services; 
•  Provide continuing support to the physical and psycho-social rehabilitation of war victims; 
Efforts have been made  difficult by the understaffing of the Ministries of Health  and the subsequent limited 
availability of qualified personnel. 
Substantial technical assistance was provided by the UK Government through the Know-How Fund. - 136-
•  Ensure  the  short-term  functioning  of the  health  system  by  providing  consumables  and 
medical supplies (in support of  primary and secondary health care networks); 
•  Initiate the  health sector reform  to ensure financial  sustainability and effectiveness of the 
health system; and 
•  Undertake a program for human resources development, including training and re-training of 
current health workers. 
Public health interventions (US$4 million) 
19.  Public health interventions in  1997 would build on the gains of 1996 and broaden the scope of 
activities to preempt future epidemics of  avoidable chronic diseases.  The activities would focus on: 
•  Continuing  disease  prevention  and  health  promotion  activities  through  immunization, 
tuberculosis control, rabies control, water purification and testing, toxic waste management, 
nutrition monitoring and promotion; 
•  Strengthening the functions of public health institutes in  both Entities, to ensure appropriate 
surveillance,  database  management,  disease  notification  and  planning  of public  health 
interventions; and 
•  Developing  medium-term  programs  for  the  prevention  and  control  of chronic  diseases,  . 
particularly lung cancer and heart diseases. 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation (US$54 million):  Restoring essential services 
20.  Reconstruction  and  rehabilitation of health  services are  the  primary  focus  of 1997  activities, 
following through on the programs prepared in  1996 as a vehicle for implementing donor contributions: 
9 
10 
• 
• 
The Essential Hos~ital Services Program focuses on addressing the most urgent needs in the 
hospital  subsector  and  on  initiating  health  financing  reform.  The  program  consists  of 
several modules, the completion of which would result in  fully functional  service delivery 
units:  physical repairs, provision of equipment and supplies, improvement of clinical skills 
and the provision oftechnical assistance in support of  health finance reform.  Total financing 
required  over  a  three-year  period  is  estimated  at  US$192  million  (73  percent  tOr- the 
Federation and 27  percent for  Republika Srpska).  The Governments of Greece,  Iceland, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  Spain,  and  the  UK and  the  World  Bank  have  indicated  interest  in 
.  h"  10  suppot'tmg t  IS program. 
The  Basic  Health  Services  (Primary  Health  Care  and  Public  Health)  Program_ aims  to 
develop primary health care and public health services as the basis of  the new health system 
(box 3).  Priority will be given to the renovation and equipping of ambulantas, particularly to 
those  participating  in  family  medicine  retraining,  and  to  the  selective  renovation  and 
In  the Federation, the  program  includes eight Canton-level  hospitals  (Zenica,  Livno,  Bihac,  Travnik,  Jajce, 
Orasje,  Gorazde  and  Sarajevo  State  Hospital), and  parts  (secondary-level  services)  of three  clinical  centers 
(Mostar,  Tuzla  and  Sarajevo  Kosevo  Hospital).  In  Republika  Srpska,  it  includes  eight  regional  hospitals 
(Prijedor,  Gradiska,  Doboj,  Bijeljina,  Pale/Kasindoi/Sokolac,  Trebinje,  Brcko  and  Zvomik)  and  part  of the 
Banja Luka Clinical Center. 
A World Bank (IDA) US$15 million credit was approved on December 14, 1996. - 137-
equipping of portions of  dispensaries (dom zdravljas) that could support ambulantas, such as 
centralized laboratory and x-ray facilities. 
11  Ongoing preparatory work for these programs 
should be completed by both Ministries of  Health in the first quarter of 1997. 
Rehabilitation of war victims (US$3 million): A community-based approach 
21.  For  war  victims,  efforts  in  1997  should  be  directed  toward  implementing  the  remammg 
commitments from  1996.  The emphasis should  be  on  increasing the availability of services to  war 
victims  through  community-based  rehabilitation  centers  providing  physical  and  psycho-social 
rehabilitation,  acute  psychiatry  services,  and  access  to  orthopedic  and  reconstructive  surgery.  The 
production and fitting of  prostheses will receive special attention. 
Support for recurrent expenditures (US$22 million): Meeting shortfalls and strengthening 
coordination 
22.  Budgetary  resources  for  the  operating  costs  of  health  facilities  will  most  likely  remain 
insufficient in  1997.  Effective rehabilitation of  the sector and efficient use of repaired facilities require a 
minimal  level  of operating  resources,  particularly  in  terms  of medical  supplies,  spare  parts  and 
consumables.  Temporary  assistance  is  still  required  to  help  cover  these  operating  costs,  until 
government  and  health  insurance  resources  increase  enough  to  insure  self-sustainability.  Donor 
assistance is not designed to substitute for local resources but to complement them on a decreasing basis 
over a short interim period. 
23.  An adequate supply of essential drugs and medical supplies is  particularly critical.  Donors are 
likely to continue provide such goods "in-kind" and to implement projects in a decentralized manner.  In 
1996, expired or unnecessary pharmaceuticals and supplies were delivered in  various health facilities --
and efforts should be made to prevent such a situation in  1997.  Emphasis should be put on strengthening 
coordination  mechanisms  by systematically  involving  Government's agencies  in  the quantitative and 
qualitative definition of  needs and allocation of  supplies. 
Sector reform (US$4 million): Management and administrative reforms for improving 
sustainability 
24.  Management capacities at the Entity, canton, and  municipal levels are crucial for ensuring the 
success  and  long-term  efficiency of planned  investments.  Substantial  donor  support  is  required  for 
II 
The  Program would also  include undergraduate educational  reforms  at  faculties  of medicine  (starting  in  the 
academic  year  1996-97)  aimed  at  introducing  family  medicine  principles,  ambulatory  care  experience, 
supportive seminars, and tutorials.  Analogous reforms would be introduced  in  nursing education to facilitate 
team development.  A strategy for credentialling family physicians should also be developed. - 138-
capacity building and preparation of a  number of reforms -- from  designing financing mechanisms to 
establishing management and information systems (box 4). 
Program management (US$3 million): Strengthening donor coordination 
25.  Continued support, both financial  and advisory,  is  required to strengthen project management. 
Assistance should be directed to the PIUs established within the Entity Ministries of Health.  Now that 
the  emergency-based  activities of 1996  are  largely  in  place,  donors  should  increasingly  involve  the 
Entity Ministries of Health  in  implementing their projects.  PIUs for each sector should eventually be 
given full  implementation responsibility -- with foreign technical assistance as needed -- in  coordination 
with all relevant authorities. 
26.  While the Sectoral Task Force on  Health and  the Social Safety Net will continue to  provide a 
forum  for setting priorities among the Entity Ministries of Health  and  donor agencies, the  Ministries 
should progressively assume responsibility for mobilizing resources and coordinating assistance from the 
donor community.  A  first  step  in  this direction  was  the establishment of an  executive office  and  a 
coordinator of  external assistance within the Federation Ministry of Health to oversee these functions. - 139-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
27.  Even  before the war, the health sector suffered systemic problems.  Health sector recovery will 
therefore  require  much  more  than  external  financing  assistance:  major policy  reforms  are  needed  to 
ensure  the  financial  sustainability  of reconstruction  efforts,  to  promote  cost-effectiveness,  and  to 
introduce  the  private  sector to  activities  once  dominated  by  the  government.  Because  the  changes 
required are so extensive, reforms should be accompanied by measures to protect the most economically 
vulnerable groups, especially in  the early stages of post-war recovery, which should help to ensure the 
acceptability and feasibility of  the reform.  Donor support, both financial and advisory, is required for an 
intense  startup  phase  in  1997,  in  light of the  1996  experience (box 5),  that  includes  policy analysis, 
limited-scope surveys, and local and external training.  Ongoing support for implementation during 1998 
and 1999 will subsequently be needed.  Some of  the most important policy issues are discussed below. 
Sector governance 
28.  Sector governance  in  both  Entities should  be clarified, and  responsibilities and  corresponding 
resources  clearly shared.  Particular attention  should  be  given to  revenue generation  and  expenditure 
patterns, responsibility sharing among the various levels of  authority (Entities, Cantons in the Federation, 
municipalities), and private sector involvement.  The governance  issues are particularly critical  in  the 
Federation.  The health  system  is  currently split between the Croat-majority and  the Bosniac-majority 
areas.  In  addition,  the Constitution gives  important health  sector responsibilities to the cantons.  In 
developing this  sector  at  the  cantonal  level,  steps  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  a  fragmented  and 
inefficient system of health financing and delivery does not emerge. - 140-
Sector financing 
29.  The Federation health financing system is largely demonetized and urgently needs reform.  Most 
health  workers  are  paid  insufficient  salaries.  The  Federation  Government  should  proceed  with 
implementation of the recently decided health financing reform (box 6).  Reforms should also focus on 
potential economies of  scale. 
30.  Similar  steps  are  underway  in  Republika  Srpska,  where  substantial  effort  will  be  required. 
Health  care  is  currently financed through a  Public Health  Fund,  which  collects and  distributes funds 
through regional branches that in  turn pay health institutions.  The prices are set by the Public Health 
Fund and are not based on actual costs.  Payments to health institutions are insufficient to cover even the 
minimal needs of  the health system.  In  its Strategy of  Health Development for Republika Srpska by the 
Year 2000, the Ministry of  Health has indicated potential reforms.  Although a step in  the right direction, 
the proposed set of measures is  still  insufficient to resolve current difficulties and remains vague on  a 
number of critical questions (e.g. financial projections, governance and regulatory mechanisms, etc.). 
12 
The Ministry of Health is currently working, with the support of WHO, on a detailed set of measures to 
implement reforms-- and donor assistance will be required. 
12 
The proposed reform  is based on the establishment of a two-tier financing system: 
•  Compulsory insurance, financed through payroll taxes paid by the employer and the employee and 
administered by the Public Health Fund, would cover the entire population; and 
•  Optional private insurance. 
Prices would be determined by the Public Health Fund.  Republika Srpska Government would pay for services 
for economically vulnerable groups (which have not yet been clearly defined). FISCAL AND SOCIAL SUPPORT 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Building a new system of  governance 
I.  As a consequence of the conflict in  Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prewar government structure in 
the  country  disintegrated.  The  new  institutional  framework  laid  out  in  the  Dayton-Paris  Peace 
Agreement implies substantial changes to the country's legislative and  policy-making institutions.  At 
the State level, ministries and institutions responsible for those functions designated to the State have to 
be set up,  including the Ministry of Finance (with a foreign debt management unit), Foreign Trade and 
Communications,  Justice,  as  well  as  the  Central  Bank.  The  start-up  cost  of these  efforts  will  be 
significant,  both  to  attract  well-qualified  individuals  from  all  parts  of the  country,  and  to  provide 
adequate facilities for these institutions to function. 
2.  At the  Federation  level,  ministries  and  institutions  also  need  to  be  set  up  or  strengthened, 
including line and sector ministries, the tax and customs administrations, the payments bureau, and the 
banking supervision agency.  Cantonal administrative structures also need to be set up or strengthened to 
develop capacities for governance, including budget preparation and execution.  Republika Srpska needs 
to  strengthen  institutions,  establish  a  banking  supervision  agency,  and  develop  capacities  for  budget 
preparation and execution, as well as for treasury functions, auditing, and financial contra[ -Customs and 
tax administrations need to be modernized and harmonized between the Entities. 
Protecting the most vulnerable groups of  the population 
3.  In  addition to building new government institutions, a major challenge for the authorities  is  to 
protect the most vulnerable members of society.  About 400,000 elderly or disabled persons depend on 
pension  benefits  to  survive,  and  the  number of children  without  parents  reached  14,000  during  the 
conflict.  In  addition,  at  least  7,000 war-disabled  depend  on  government  support  for  survival  and 
reintegration  into  economic activity.  Finally,  a  number of households  need  minimum  cash  support 
during the transition  back  into  employment, especially when  the  head  of the  household  is  sick  or a 
single-parent. 
Limited fiscal resources 
4.  The governments have extremely limited fiscal  capacity to address these needs.  Tax revenues 
shrank dramatically as economic activity slowed and wage payments fell to a minimum during the war. 
By 1995, for example, the base for sales tax had fallen to perhaps only one-quarter of its prewar level, as 
had GOP.  Payroll taxes have also plummeted, since both employment and wage levels are a fraction of 
their prewar levels.  Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina's prewar fiscal and tax collection system has 
collapsed.  In  its place, three separate fiscal systems developed, with divergent tax policies-and separate 
administrations.  To  the  extent  that  tax  revenues  are  collected,  they  are  kept  by  different  fiscal 
authorities.  As  the economy recovers and  new tax systems are established  in  the Entities, revenue  is - 142-
expected to recover.  This will take some time, however, and in  the interim period, resources have to be 
found to help cover key spending requirements and ensure minimal provision of  social protection. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
5.  The stretegy of donor assistance in  this area is  to restore, within a  limited period (three to four 
years), the government's capacity to efficiently raise revenue,  in  parallel with  gradual  recovery of the 
economy and to strengthen the institutions to cover all  necessary public expenditures on a  sustainable 
basis.  During the transition, financial assistance should be provided to help develop and strengthen the 
government  institutional  capacity  and  to  provide  minimal  social  protection  to  the  most  vulnerable 
groups. 
6.  Achieving  these  objectives  will  require  an  estimated  US$514  million  in  external  financial 
support for  the  three- to  four-year  program  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority  reconstruction 
program  (table  1  ).  The program  submitted  in  December  1995  remains  valid;  it  includes  support to 
government institution-building (US$121  million),  protection,  on  a  supplementary basis,  of the  most 
vulnerable groups during the transition (US$83  million), and general fiscal  support to the government 
budget  (US$31 0  million)  to  cover  counterpart  costs  associated  with  donor-financed  reconstruction 
programs,  recurrent social  expenditures  in  health and education,  and  to  provide  liquidity for  ongoing 
external obligations.  Of the total requirement: 
•  In 1996, US$262 million was firmly committed, substantially more than the initial estimate of  first-
year needs (US$75 million) and several activities were successfully carried out (paragraphs 7 to 12); 
•  In 1997, US$120  million in external financing is  required for the State, the  Federation and the 
Republika Srpska (paragraphs 13  to 17).  A list of  corresponding investments will be prepared for the 
Third Donor Conference to be held in early 1997; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$132 million will be necessary.  The specific need for further support to 
government institutions and social protection will fall  after  1997, while general fiscal  support will 
still be required (paragraphs 18 to 21 ). 
Table 1.  Fiscal and Social Support Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 Year  1996 Firm 
1997 
1998-99 
Program  Commitments 
Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation 
Allocation 
Support for key government institutions  121  61  20  40 
Support for social expenditures  83  41  20  22 
General fiscal support  310  160  80  70 
Total  514  262  120  132 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
7.  1996 assistance focused on supporting Government institutions, primarily at the Federation level, 
and to a lesser extent at the State level; on supporting vulnerable groups in the Federation; and on general 
fiscal  support.  Of the  US$262  million  committed  for  these  purposes  in  1996,  US$61  million  was - 143-
allocated to  institution building, US$41  million to support of vulnerable groups, and US$160 million to 
general fiscal support.  Some US$183 million had been disbursed by October 1996.  By the end of 1996, 
disbursements are expected to reach US$230 million. 
Support to government institutions 
8.  In  1996, support to State and Federation governments amounted to US$61  million, including: 
•  A  US$17.4 million Building Repair Fund to rehabilitate buildings and office space for key 
government institutions, financed by the Governments of Japan and the Netherlands, and the 
European Commission (EC); 
•  Technical assistance of US$38.6 million to  provide office equipment (such as furniture and 
computers, vehicles), advisory services, and training to key State and Federation institutions. 
Funds came from the Governments of Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the 
EC, the  United  States Agency for International  Development (USAID), the  United  States 
(US) Treasury, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the United Kingdom's 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA), and the World Bank; and 
•  A  US$5  million  Wage Fund  to  provide salary supplements to  staff of the core State and 
Federation  government institutions (financed  by  the Governments of the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, and the World Bank, under an Emergency Recovery Project) (table 2). 
9.  With  these  resources  and  funds  provided  under  the  general  fiscal  support,  donors  directly 
supported more than ten Government institutions, including: 
•  Federation Customs Administration (US$2.7 million from the EC and others); 
•  Federation Tax Administration (US$1 .8 million from the US Treasury and others); 
•  Federation Payments Bureau (US$0.4 million from the World Bank's Transition Assistance 
Credit); 
•  Federation  Banking  Supervision  Agency  (US$2.7  million  from  the  Government  of 
Switzerland, USAID, and others); 
•  Federation  Privatization  Agency  (being  created;  US$1  million  from  the  World  Bank's 
Transition Assistance Credit); 
•  Cantonal  privatization  agencies  (being  created;  US$4  million  from  the  World  Bank's 
Transition Assistance Credit); 
•  Public finance  control  institutions,  including financial police  (US$0.8  million  from  the 
World Bank's Transition Assistance Credit); and 
•  Cantonal budget offices (US$2 million from USAID and others). - 144-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Support for key government institutions 
Support for social expenditures 
Other fiscal support 
Total 
Support to social safety net 
Amount 
61 
41 
160 
262 
Main donors 
Austria, EC, Germany, Iceland, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, US, 
World Bank 
Austria, Canada, EC, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Sweden Switzerland, UK, 
UNICEF, World Bank, 
Japan, Netherlands and the World Bank 
10.  In  1996 donors committed  US$41  million to support vulnerable groups through  two  different 
types of programs:  (i) transitory emergency relief to ensure  minimum  consumption  needs  and  living 
standards are met (cash benefits to the poorest households to complement food aid programs, emergency 
repairs and provision of equipment to institutions for children and the mentally ill, pension support for 
the  elderly), (ii) programs designed to  bring lasting improvements  in  living standards (mobility aids, 
health  care assistance,  professional  training and  employment services  for  the disabled  and  the  blind, 
foster parents and small villages for orphans). 
11.  Specifically, the following programs in the Federation have received assistance: 
•  Emergency cash benefits for the poorest households, from the governments of Canada, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden and the World Bank's Emergency Recovery Credit; 
•  Emergency repairs for  institutions for children and the mentally ill,  from  the World  Bank 
and other donors; 
•  Mobility and other equipment for the war-disabled, from the World Bank; other donors have 
provided similar support through nongovernmental organizations; 
•  Microprojects  for  the  retraining  of the  disabled  and  blind,  from  the  World  Bank  and 
individual donors; 
•  Foster  parents  for  children  without  parental  care,  from  UNICEF,  the  World  Bank  and 
individual donors; and 
•  From  the general  fiscal  support (see  below) the  Federation  government has  established  a 
Federation  Pension  Agency  and  a  Federation  Health  Insurance  Agency  to  develop  and 
implement reforms in these areas. 
General fiscal support 
12.  In  addition to the institution building and social  safety net programs, the Federation and  State 
Government budgets have  received  firm  commitments for  US$160  million  in  fiscal  support  in  1996 
(including  fiscal  support  for  counterpart  funding  to  donor's  reconstruction  assistance  from  the 
Government  of Japan  for  US$50  million,  a  US$20  million  grant  from  the  Government  of the - 145-
Netherlands, and  a  US$90  million  World  Bank Transition  Assistance Credit).  These  resources  have 
supported: 
•  Recurrent  expenditures  of the  government,  including  coverage  for  part  of public  sector 
employee (such as teachers and doctors) costs; 
•  The social safety net, including pension and health programs; 
•  Government institutions, including the institutions mentioned above; 
•  External debt service; and 
•  Economic recovery, including critical  imports for  industrial sectors and a  line of credit for 
small and medium-size enterprises. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
13.  A total of about US$120 million in  external financing will be needed in  1997 for fiscal support. 
Assistance to government institutions  in  1997  should  focus  on  establishing key  State  institutions,  on 
further  strengthening  Federation  institutions,  and  on  establishing  and  strengthening  institutions  in 
Republika Srpska.  Required assistance includes advisory services and training; office equipment such as 
computers, vehicles, furniture, communications equipment; and, equally important, buildings and office 
space.  Social assistance needs will progressively decline in  1997 to reflect the economic recovery which 
has already started in  1996.  Nevertheless, there are still significant gaps between the needs for protecting 
vulnerable groups and the revenues that can possibly be generated by the domestic econ.omy.  Thus, the 
1997 assistance to the social safety net needs to continue focusing on pension and pension reform and on 
programs for the most vulnerable groups.  Assistance also needs to be delivered to the entire country. 
Finally, general fiscal support will be needed to cover the country's financial and other obligations. 
Support to government institutions (US$20 million) 
14.  First,  technical  assistance  will  be  needed  to  help  establish  new  agencies,  rationalize  current 
institutional  structures,  train  government  workers  for  their  new  role  in  a  market  economy,  furnish 
institutions with necessary equipment to modernize, strengthen auditing and financial capacities, and the 
like. 
15.  Second, office space should be provided, with particular attention paid to the needs of the new 
State  Government.  A  general  investment  facility  of about  US$20  million  will  be  established  to 
rehabilitate,  rebuild,  and  repair existing government buildings for  use  by  the  State,  Entity,  and  local 
governments.  The facility will  focus  on  basic repairs that bring buildings and offices  up  to  minimal 
standards, maximizing the impact of  available resources -- as did the 1996 Building Repairs Fund. Areas 
and  institutions which need support in  1997 are listed below (costs are reflected in  table  I, projects are 
included in box 1  ): 
Developing State Institutions 
•  A new independent Central Bank needs to be created, at the earliest possible date, to act as 
the sole agency for monetary policy and currency issuance in Bosnia and Herzegovina (about 
US$2 million); - 146-
•  A new external debt management system, with units at the State and Entity levels, needs to 
be created to: (a) prepare and negotiate loan agreements and monitor the use and repayment 
of government debt; (b) develop and  implement an  external debt recording system; and (c) 
formulate proposals for debt strategy and policy (about US$1  million); 
•  A new trade policy department needs to be established to set trade policy and  initiate reform. 
This department will:  (a) establish a common external trade structure for both  Entities; (b) 
enact  a  new  foreign  trade  law;  and  (c)  negotiate  membership  in  the  World  Trade 
Organization  (WTO)  and  agreements  on  trade  liberalization  with  other  trading  partne;s 
(about US$1  million); and 
•  The overall State judiciary system needs to be strengthened and coordinated with the  Entity 
jurisdictions (at least US$1  million). 
Developing Entity Institutions 
•  Both  Entities'  customs  administrations  need  to  modernize  their  border  facilities  with 
neighboring countries.  Moreover, procedures of the Entities' customs administrations need 
to  be  coordinated  to the  greatest extent possible to  avoid  customs evasion.  Harmonized 
methods and coordinated training programs also need to be developed (about US$3.5 million 
for both Entities, without taking into account construction of  any large border facilities); 
•  The Entities' tax administrations, particularly that of the Federation, require major support to 
become fully operational and further develop.  Both Entities require a major rationalization 
of  their tax administration- staffing, structure, and functions together with modernization of 
procedures and facilities (about US$4 million for both Entities); 
•  Entity banking supervision agencies require further strengthening (Federation) or need to be 
established  (Republika  Srpska)  to  provide  a  uniform  legal,  regulatory,  and  institutional 
framework  for  bank  licensing,  regulation  and  supervision  throughout  Bosnia  ..  and 
Herzegovina.  This effort is a pre-condition for the development of a sound financial system 
(US$2 million for both Entities); 
•  Auditing and budget control should be  strengthened to develop confidence and trust in  the 
Government at all levels (US$2 million for both Entities); 
•  Budget preparation  and  execution  at the  Entity  and  local  levels  should  be  improved and 
made transparent.  Major assistance is  also needed to develop the treasury functions of the 
Entities (about US$2 million for the State, both Entities, and local governments); and 
•  Basic data for  economic  management needs  to  be  improved,  including:  population  and 
migration  statistics;  household  surveys on  income,  consumption,  and  unemployment;  and 
cost of living data (about US$1  million for both Entities). - 147-
Assistance to provide a minimal social safety net (US$20 million) 
16.  Some US$20 million is needed in  1997 to provide financial and institutional support to maintain 
minimum pension and social protection for the most vulnerable groups in  both  Entities.  In  particular, 
about US$12 million will be needed as supplementary financing to provide a minimum monthly pension 
for  all  pensioners  in  the two  Entities.  This amount  includes  institutional  support to  develop  a  new 
pension system that is affordable and that offers an adequate floor of  coverage.  In addition, resources are 
needed to  support microprojects for the disabled (including retraining and employment programs, and 
provision of mobility, hearing, and vision aids).  Resources will also be required to support continuation - 148-
of the Government foster parents  program, as  well  as  pilot programs to  motivate family  members to 
provide basic assistance to the mentally ill or the disabled (about US$8 million for both Entities). 
General fiscal support (US$80 million) 
17.  Additional fiscal  support of US$80 million will  be needed to cover the budgetary needs of the 
State  and  Entities,  particularly  in  providing  domestic  counterpart  funding  for  the  donor-financed 
reconstruction program, in  supporting recurrent expenditures for education and health, and in  helping to 
provide liquidity for ongoing external obligations. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
18.  Underlying these institution building efforts and social safety net provisions are two objectives: 
providing  sustainable  government  finances,  and  readjusting  the  role  of the  public  sector  to  support 
private sector development.  Major reforms  will  be  needed  to establish  a  new, efficient government 
finance system to achieve this objective.  Sustainability can be achieved by:  (a) establishing  new fiscal 
arrangements between the State, Entities, and  local governments; (b) introducing new tax policies and a 
modernized  revenue collection  system to raise domestic  resources efficiently;  (c)  cutting government 
spending; and (d) improving management of public outlays, including better targeting of social spending. 
Public sector restructuring should occur simultaneously with the establishment of new  institutions and 
rationalization of overall  government spending.  These  issues are also discussed  in  Volume 2 of this 
report. 
Establishing a new system of  intergovernment fiscal relations 
19.  A new system of government finance should be set up, based on the outline in  the Dayton-Paris 
Peace Agreement, to clearly determine the assignment of responsibilities and the allocation of revenue 
across  different  levels  of government.  According to  this  agreement,  two-thirds  of the  State  budget 
should be financed by the Federation and one-third by Republika Srpska.  However, the specific means 
by which the Entities will raise the money and transfer funds to the State have not yet been determined. 
At the Entity level an asymmetric fiscal system is envisaged: decentralized in the Federation (mostly at 
the  canton  level),  and  centralized  in  Republika  Srpska.  In  the  Federation,  decisions  for  assigning 
responsibilities, and sources of revenue, have not yet been made, although they are critical at this stage. 
To a lesser extent this is also an issue in Republika Srpska. 
Efficiently raising revenues 
20.  Efficiently  raising  revenue  will  require  well-defined  tax  policies  as  well  as  significant 
improvements in  the revenue collection administration.  Tax policies should focus on harmonizing and 
reducing  tax  rates,  and  on  defining  tax  bases  that  support  private  sector  development  by  setting 
incentives for compliance, rather than for evasion: 
•  Payroll contributions.  The current high  payroll  taxes  undermine tax collection, motivate 
evasion, and introduce perverse effects to the labor market.  Furthermore, these rates vary 
greatly across the  country.  The overall  tax and  contribution  rates  on  payrolls  should  be 
reduced, and harmonized across Entities; 
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•  Customs  tariffs.  Import  duties  differ  between  the  Entities,  and  are  excessively  high  in 
Republika Srpska.  Customs duties should be reduced and made uniform for all  of Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina;  import  quotas,  export  controls,  and  other  trade  restrictions  should  be 
phased out; 
•  Corporate  and personal income  taxes.  These taxes  are  not  yet  important  in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,  but their importance will  increase as  the economy moves toward  a  market-
oriented system.  Major reform will be needed to introduce modern tax codes in  these areas 
on a harmonized basis for the entire country; and 
•  Tax and customs administrations.  Major overhaul will be required to rationalize existing tax 
and  customs  administrative  structures  in  both  Entities,  to  make  them  compatible,  to 
modernize assessment and enforcement, and to improve procedures and  hardware and train 
staff. 
Reducing the size of  the public sector and improving management of  public spending 
21.  Public spending accounted for the bulk of Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy in  1995, even as 
significant arrears accrued.  Private sector development would be facilitated by cutting public spending 
and taxes as a share of GDP. 
•  Reducing  expenditure.  Major  cuts  are  needed  in  certain  areas  of  public  expenditure, 
including defense,  broad subsidization of the economy, and  various entitlement programs. 
Avoiding the buildup of large administrative structures for the governments is also important 
to  controlling  expenditures.  Public  employment  in  government  institutions  should  be 
rationalized,  pari  passu  with  economic recovery  and  in  coordination  with  retraining  and 
employment generation programs; 
•  Improving expenditure management.  The public sector's share of the economy also needs to 
be reduced  by developing a  more  systematic,  less  ad  hoc  approach  to  budgeting.  Budget 
preparation  and  execution  need  to  be  modernized  to  increase  accountability  and 
transparency.  Some  expenditures,  such  as  public  investment,  require  developing  an 
institutional mechanism for evaluating alternatives; and 
•  Setting sustainable wage and pension levels.  Wage and  pensions should be established at 
levels that are sustainable  in  the  medium-term.  This requires setting them  in  accordance 
with the Government's capacity to generate revenue. 